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THE IRISH STRUGGLE AND ITS RESULTS

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THE IRISH STRUGGLE AND ITS RESULTS

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

L. PAUL-DUBOIS

AND REVISED BY

T. P. GILL

LATE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, IRELAND

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

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PREFACE.

THE present book is a continuation of the work which was published over twenty years ago by the same author, under the title of *Contemporary Ireland and the Irish Question*. Its purpose is to recount the history of the tragic events through which Ireland has passed since 1914. An effort is made to view these events in the light of the past by tracing things to their causes—moral or material, traditional or incidental, as the case may be—and by seeking to understand why and how Ireland being what she is was bound to react as she did to the happenings of the years since the Great War.

Someone has said that in Ireland it is always the unexpected that takes place. As for the unexpected —one can at any rate attempt to explain it. And the conclusion to which we are led is, I believe, that in a given country it is always, with minor variations, the same psychological forces that we find in action : those forces, namely, which race and environment have made the basic and decisive factors of the nation.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE.

This work is a continuation of M. L. Paul-Dubois' "Contemporary Ireland," published by Maunsel & Co., in 1907. *The present work was published in French in* 1927, *and brings the story of Ireland down to* 1926. *Its special object was to tell of the momentous events since* 1914. *They are viewed in the light of the past, and traced to their causes—traditional, material, or ephemeral. The reader will please remember that the book was written in* 1927, *and some figures and tenses may not accurately apply to* 1934. *A great disadvantage and cause of delay in publication of this translation was the lamented death of Mr. T. P. Gill, who was a friend of M. Paul-Dubois, and under whose supervision the translation was being made.*

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THE IRISH STRUGGLE AND ITS RESULTS

Chapter I.

ORIGINS OF THE STRUGGLE.

(1914—1918.)

THE Great War has changed the face of the whole world: nowhere more so than in Ireland. Ireland, on the eve of the catastrophe, had a powerful party in the House of Commons, and had just seen Home Rule, aim of her traditional claims, passed by the British Parliament. But from 1918 she had renounced Parliamentary and constitutional action, the "extremists" had become her masters; and it was no longer Home Rule, a limited and granted autonomy that she was claiming, but an independent Republic. . . . . Formerly Ireland had a horror of bloodshed; in no other country was crime more rare, and oftener than not the judge at the assizes received the symbolical pair of white gloves from the sheriff—sign that he had no one to condemn with his white hands. But only yesterday, as it were, the land of Ireland was again given up to fire and slaughter: violence and reprisals were the order of the day: it was actually the reign of terror once more. . . . . On the 3rd of August, 1914, Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament that Ireland was "the one bright spot on the horizon of the Empire and of the world." Why did it become darkened over? During the first period

of the war Ireland put forth a fine military effort, and, save amongst an inconsiderable minority, her heart never ceased beating for the cause of the Allies and for Freedom. Why did it happen that little by little she was alienated from the common cause, thrown back upon herself, withdrawn, the epithet 'neutral' or 'enemy' attached to her name and certain of her sons betrayed into pro-German sympathies? Why? Let us try to understand. It is not easy, for if as Lady Clanricarde daughter of Canning said, England is a wall so high that she hides the sun from Ireland, this high wall also hides Ireland from our continental gaze. Stifled or misrepresented by abuse, prejudice, passion, propaganda, the real voice of Ireland with difficulty gets itself heard outside. The government of London always regarded the Irish question as a "domestic" question. This nevertheless did not mean a silenced question. For through its repercussions the problem of Ireland spreads far beyond its geographical limits. The peace of the world requires that it should cease to trouble English politics, to disturb the British Empire, and to poison the relations beween England and the United States. Moreover, it is natural for the French to cherish at heart a deep sympathy for Ireland, to whom they are bound by so many historical ties and affinities, and why should not the loyal friends of England interest themselves, with a quite independent and clear-sighted judgment, in the drama in which Ireland's destiny is at stake?

I.—NATIONAL IRELAND BEFORE 1914.

To unravel the knot of this drama, we must go back a little and review the state of affairs in Ireland during the period preceding the war.

After six centuries of invasions, and wars, of plantations, massacres and persecutions, Ireland, bound to Britain against her will by the Act of Union

of 1800, saw herself during nearly the whole of the nineteenth century under the yoke of civil and political oppression, and of economic and financial exploitation. She had never renounced her national rights, she never ceased to struggle for their recognition. To break the yoke, to win her liberty, she made use by turn of two different methods. One constitutional and parliamentary, by which O'Connell sought to repeal the Act of Union by legal means, and Butt and Parnell to attain Home Rule—that is to say, a certain measure of self-government within the Empire. The other "physical force," uncompromising extremism, sought through passive resistance and internal reconstruction (the policy of Young Ireland in 1848, and in our time of Sinn Fein) or through violent and revolutionary means (as of old the Fenians and in recent times the "Republicans") complete separation from Great Britain and the Empire (the freedom and independence of Ireland). Ireland throughout her history has oscillated regularly between these two policies. When one declined, the other progressed: whenever constitutional action was paralysed or destroyed, unconstitutional action once more took its place; the political history of Ireland during the war might practically be summarised as a substitution of one of these methods for the other.

Before the war Parliamentary action was generally recognised. It was so in fact for forty years, since the advent of the National Parliamentary Party. No doubt the spirit of extremism was not dead: it survived in certain revolutionary groups such as the Fenians, it remained the ideal of a few irreconcilables who represented less a Party than a doctrine, and lived less by action than by thought. But actually constitutionalism had with it the mass of the country and had moral authority; and if the Parliamentary Party was often the object of sharp criticism, it had behind it the bulk of the national strength. Formed by the

strong hand of Parnell, this Parliamentary Party under the subsequent leadership of a talented man of great political sense, John Redmond, enjoyed an exceptional position after the advent of the Liberal Government in 1906. It supported the Liberal Government in its struggle against the Lords, and for the abolition of the *veto* of the Upper House : Would not the removal of this obstacle mean certain victory for the Home Rule Bill introduced by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons in May, 1912? The prospects were favourable. English opinion outside the Tory camp no longer opposed Home Rule with the old hostility ; it accepted it more or less with resignation, knowing that justice could no longer be withheld ; and further enlightened by the turn of events in South Africa, where after the 1900 war, the concession of autonomy assured and laid the foundations of Boer loyalty.

Even in Ireland, with the exception of Ulster, Unionism was ready to lower its flag. Centre and symbol of British rule, the " Castle " no doubt remained master of the country, the instrument of class and of strife, at once tyrannical and weak, irresponsible always, a factor of corruption and division. But the Unionist minority, the English oligarchy, the Ascendancy as it was called had lost one by one the privileges it possessed as a governing caste, and was entering the ranks and trying to adapt itself to the new state of things. Landlordism itself was on the eve of disappearing ; thanks to the Wyndham land purchase scheme of 1903, the system of peasant ownership was being organised and extended. The Agricultural progress of Ireland was remarkable. It had become, next to the United States, the principal supplier of foodstuffs to Great Britain. Emigration and poverty were on the decline. Let us recall, moreover, that in the years of self-communing which followed the death of Parnell, Ireland conscientiously worked for her intellectual and moral

regeneration ; and, by the struggle against Anglicisation, for the restoration of her national being. We have already spoken of the meaning of the Gaelic Movement.[1]

As for anti-British feeling, that sentiment so old and deep-rooted in Ireland, is always there, latent, more or less in evidence according to the individual or district, fatal product of the past, legacy of so many centuries of distress and tyranny. But in the years preceding the war it was at its lowest tension, and one would have thought that it would completely disappear amongst the majority the day when England would have definitely satisfied the National claims. As far back as 1885, in Gladstone's time, one saw a tendency to a friendly settlement frustrated. In 1914 England, by granting Home Rule, had in her hand a decisive means, a unique opportunity of conciliating Ireland the irreconcilable. But let Ireland's effort be baffled, her claims again frustrated, the anti-British feeling would instantly emerge, more violent and more tragic than before. Grattan said : " Their equals, we will be their best friends ; less than that, their worst enemies." But who would have believed in this unhappy hypothesis at a time when Home Rule was in sight and apparently at hand, and eager minds were anticipating the day, when for the first time in her history, Ireland seemed on the point of attaining her goal.

II.—REBEL ULSTER.

Between her and her goal, between Ireland's hope and the goodwill of England, unhappily an obstacle arises : Ulster. We know that Ulster, northern province of Ireland, was " planted " with Scotch and English Protestants, by James I, after the " flight of the Earls," and then, during the whole of the

1 *Contemporary Ireland,* Part 3, chapter II.

17th century, by a great tide of immigration. While in the rest of Ireland, the successive invaders, mingling with the Celtic and Norman population, were, for the most part, rapidly assimilated by it, and became according to the accepted phrase, *Hibernis ipsis Hiberniores,* the immigrants of Ulster, notwithstanding a great exodus to America in the 18th century, formed a solid body and made a better resistance to fusion. They, too, nevertheless became Hibernicised in due course and took on much of the Irish character. Indeed of all the inhabitants of Ireland, if by right of their Scotch blood they are the most energetic and enterprising, they are also the most restive and inflammable. At the end of the 18th century they were the first to start a rising for liberty and enrol under the flag of the "United Irishmen." Belfast, to-day bulwark of reaction, was then a hot-bed of rebellion. But since 1800, Protestant Ulster rallied to England who attracted her by a policy of favours and privileges which was destined to sow discord and make the Ulsterman, the "Orangeman" her soldier in Ireland.[2]

Faithful to the Union, Ulster henceforth opposed all Nationalist Ireland's claims. From Liberal which it used largely to be politically, it went over to the Tories in 1885, when Gladstone converted the Liberal Party to Home Rule. What is there at bottom in this anti-nationalism, in this "Orangeism" of Ulster? First of all there is the anti-Catholic spirit, accentuated by rivalry of interests: the Ulster Protestants despise the "errors of Rome," they detest that "Popery" which has survived massacres, deportations, Penal Laws, and raises its head and claims its rights, and in face of which they look upon themselves as the defenders of liberty of conscience in Ireland. They fear —a foolish fear when one knows the sentiments of

[2] The Orange Society was founded towards the end of the eighteenth century by the counter-revolutionaries, anti-Irish in Ulster, and takes its name from William III of Orange, victor at the Battle of the Boyne.

the Southern Nationalists for their brothers of the North—the oppressive measures which if power was given it an Irish Parliament in Dublin might use against Ulster, against her material interests or her moral rights. In short, and above all there is a bitter attachment to the privileges which Ulster received from England, as reward for her "loyalty," and for her struggle against Nationalism. What she fears to lose the day she shall be nothing more in Ireland than a province like another is neither her liberty nor her prosperity, but her power of domination. That is the "Orange" spirit such as it has been created or fostered by England as a means of opposing Nationalist Ireland.

Observe also that in Ulster the democratic, or rather radical spirit survives, a racial trait of the Scotchman and the Presbyterian, and a historical legacy among the descendants of the insurgents of 1798; and that Ulster radicalism far from espousing the cause of political or religious hegemony is, at heart, not very far from aligning itself with the Nationalists as in the time of the "United Irishmen." Finally, observe that Ulster represents nothing in the nature of a homogeneous *bloc*, and that Nationalism holds its positions there in the face of Radicalism and Orangeism. Out of 1,580,000 inhabitants the province had 690,000 Catholics in 1916, and in Ulster Catholic means Nationalist; in the 1918 elections as against 17 seats won by the Unionists National Ireland held 15. Out of nine counties in the province, three are almost exclusively Catholic, in two others, Catholics and Protestants are equal; there only remain four: Down, Armagh, Antrim and Derry, in which the majority is Protestant. Ulster is, therefore, only a minority in Ireland, and a divided minority.

National Ireland does not consider this minority as foreign and refractory; she has never despaired of regaining it. As the Orange opposition is tied to

the English opposition, must they not both give way together? Before the war quite the contrary happened. Orangeism became excited for two reasons. The first was the result of the progressive decay of the English "garrison," the Anglo-Saxon oligarchy in Southern Ireland, who were not so very long ago the sovereign masters of the "Castle," of the soil, of the church, of the machinery of the law, and who, as they saw themselves during half a century, gradually stripped of all their feudal powers, and from a caste becoming a class, were tending more and more, through force of circumstances, to merge with the other classes. The spirit of domination was aroused in the Orangeman at the thought that henceforth, it was for him alone to lead the fight against Nationalism, and to defend the last remnant of English power in Ireland—the supremacy of Ulster. Secondly, there were external incitements: English Tory propaganda. Implacable adversaries of Home Rule, the extreme English Unionists, the Tory party in short, were not slow in agitating in England, when they saw this Home Rule, which they thought dead, as Joseph Chamberlain said "as dead as Queen Anne," rising from its ashes, accepted by the bulk of public opinion, proposed, "introduced" by the Liberal Government, while the House of Lords, the central stronghold of resistance, was about to see the veto abolished and its opposition defeated in advance. Who would help English Toryism? Ulster, which will serve as the banner of Unionism, and whose prejudices they know how to exploit and whose passions they know how to flatter by an intense propaganda, Ulster is the best trump-card in their game.

Thus, during the three years from 1911 to 1914, the Tories "worked" Ulster. They roused it (at first it was somewhat apathetic) they excited and inflamed it. From the month of January, 1911,

Mr. Bonar Law, leader of the Conservative Party, and future leader of the coalition in the House of Commons, urged Ulster to armed revolt against Home Rule. "Ulster will have reason to resist, and we will sustain her to the end." And again, "Whatever means you have to adopt, constitutional or not, you will have the whole Unionist Party behind you." And Mr. Duke, afterwards Chief Secretary for Ireland: "The Ulstermen have the moral right to resist, and to kill those who are exercising that right would not be repression but murder." The great ones of Toryism took part personally, their example being followed by Mr. Walter Long, recently a minister; Lord Curzon, Sir F. E. Smith, future Lord Birkenhead and Lord Chancellor of England. Enormous sums for propaganda were subscribed by the English aristocracy. To direct the movement in Ulster a non-Ulster Irishman was chosen, a man of audacity and an organiser—Sir Edward Carson.

Thus, the Orange movement was organised, and "Rebel" Ulster raised its head. After a year of preparatory manifestations, Sir Edward Carson on the 28th September, 1912, proclaimed the Covenant, which was quickly covered with signatures, and by which Ulster was pledged to defend itself "by every means" against Home Rule. A provisional Government was formed, ready to function on the day of danger. They recruited, they armed, they trained a volunteer army to save the cause—and the stake—of Unionism in Ulster. An army—this is no empty word. Arms and munitions were imported, cadres were formed, troops were moved, manœuvres took place, they prepared for war. On the 24th of April, 1914, 50,000 rifles and a million cartridges coming from the *Deutsche Munitionen und Waffenfabrik* were landed at Larne and Donaghadee. Ten thousand Orangemen participated in the operation

which was conducted under the eyes of the police with the connivance of all the officials from admirals to telegraphists. Ulster had at this time, it is said, a hundred thousand volunteers well armed and ready to march, with cavalry, cyclist sections, automobiles, ambulances and nurses.[1] Bluff and stage management, people said. Yes, undoubtedly, in the eyes of English public opinion, which Orangeism set out to impress, and of the English Government which it wished to intimidate. It was clear that the Ulster army would not fight against English troops, and these latter on their part, would refuse to march against them, as was just then demonstrated by the incident of the Curragh Camp where a hundred officers with General Gough tendered their resignation the day they believed they were called upon to intervene in Ulster. But as far as Ireland herself was concerned it was a different story. When in a civilised country a party, which called itself the party of order, solemnly declares in advance, that it will resist " by every means " a certain law which displeases it, and, tolerated by the Government, to this end creates an army and prepares for war, it is anarchy, it is rebellion or revolution which opens out before us. Now, everyone knows how fertile and infectious is the germ of revolution : the course of history was about to prove the fact once more.

Behold then " physical force," after a long sleep, reappearing in Ireland, and it is those who were styled the " loyalists " who brought it back to life. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, was not blind to the danger. " A more deadly blow," said he, " was

[1] Germany took a great interest in the movement. M. de Kuhlmann, since then a minister of William II, came to Ulster during that spring. Triumphal arches were to be seen with the words : " Welcome to the Kaiser." Newspapers and politicians emulated one another in declaring that they preferred Germany and the German Emperor to the government of John Redmond and the Fenians. A German was military instructor to the Ulster Volunteers.

never struck in our time by a group of political men, conscious of their responsibility, against the very foundation upon which democratic government rests." But it was the first duty of Mr. Asquith's Government to act, and it did not dare. It preferred to believe or to make believe that the thing was bluff. It contented itself with protesting in words, not venturing to break its lance on the visor of the Tories who had mounted this machine of political war against it ; trusting, on the other hand, to these same Tories to take care that this machine was not put to dangerous use. Ill-fated weakness, capital mistake, whose disastrous repercussions were soon to make themselves tragically felt.

Ulster armed to resist the law, and the Government allows it ! *Felix culpa!* Happy fault, said those who represented extremism in National Ireland, because it will revive amongst us, the spirit of revolt and violence against England : it is Orangeism that will resuscitate Fenianism, it is the loyalists who will open a career for the revolutionists ! This alas ! is what happened. This fatal mistake authorised the moderates, as they judged, to respond on their side by raising amongst themselves " National Volunteers," not for the purpose of fighting their brothers, but to " defend and uphold the rights and liberty of the whole Irish people, without distinction of creed, class or party." It was in this vigilant but tolerant spirit, that on the 26th November, 1913, when the Ulster army was already in formation for a year, the raising of the National Volunteers was decided on at Dublin, under the impulse of a group of promoters who, for the most part, held moderate opinions, and but a small fraction of whom were of advanced tendencies. Redmond, who at the beginning held aloof from the movement, after some months took over control, a step which brought about the secession of the extremist minority. The organisation developed

rapidly. By June, 1914, it had as many men as the Ulster army, or something more, but arms, with which the Ulstermen were well provided were wanting. Without openly opposing them, the "Castle," so affable to the Orangemen, did all it could to thwart their efforts: a partiality which the Government authorities in Ireland never failed to show, but which, in the present case, irritated Irish feeling more than ever. For instance, ten days after the announcement of the raising of the National Volunteers a "proclamation" came out, as if by chance, prohibiting the importation of arms. Once, at Howth, near Dublin, the Nationalists assembled to land a contraband cargo of arms, as the Orangemen had done without obstruction a little while before at Larne. On the return journey there was a collision with the troops, three civilians were killed and thirty wounded. This was just a week before the war. . . . .

By the spring of 1914, in Ireland apparently calm and at peace, there was an Ulster army ready to rebel against Home Rule, and an army of National Volunteers organising to oppose it; and as the Government had been too lethargic to deal firmly in time with the former, they could not attempt to interfere with the latter. In Parliament, Sir Edward Carson and the Orangemen put forth their final efforts to kill the Home Rule Bill. Mr. Asquith tried to appease them by offering to exclude from the operation of the Act for six years those of the Ulster Counties, which, consulted by a referendum would by a majority of the electors vote for exclusion. Redmond accepted the offer, pushing the spirit of conciliation to such a point that he was angrily reproached by his fellow countrymen. Carson refused, insisting that the exclusion should be definitive, and should be applied to the whole of Ulster (including the three counties with a Catholic majority), which made Mr. Churchill say: "Decidedly Ulster prefers

blows to equity, and bullets to votes." In vain did King George convene a conference at Buckingham Palace of representatives of the Orangemen and the Nationalists. Once again the Orangeman showed himself uncompromising. At last, on the eve of the war, Parliament voted Home Rule, a very inadequate form of Home Rule, especially from the financial point of view, which the Nationalists accepted only to end the matter; but Mr. Asquith had promised the Ulstermen that before it was applied the measure at the end of July, 1914, would be made the subject of a special amending Bill. So that Ulster again thus held the destiny of Ireland in its hands. The crisis seemed insoluble—unless by civil war, and from civil war, prepared by Ulster, incited by the Tories and tolerated by the Government, Ireland was only saved by the foreign war.

III.—IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN WAR.

The European War broke out, and on the evening of the 3rd of August, the same evening on which Sir Edward Grey announced to the House of Commons the invasion of Belgium and prepared public opinion for the entry into the war of Great Britain, John Redmond rose—dramatic and solemn moment—and in a few touching and simple words of immense importance, *he offered England the loyalty of Ireland*. Parliament applauded, but in the general emotion neither Parliament nor public opinion seemed to grasp the true significance, or to measure the full political value of the Irish Leader's declaration. For seven hundred years Ireland had been at the mercy of her enemy, England; to-day, without renouncing her national rights, and trusting in the plighted word, in Home Rule actually voted, she offered England peace and reconciliation. Germany was counting on the prospect that with civil war in Ulster and consequent

trouble in Ireland, England would have been paralysed.[1] National Ireland restored to England her freedom of action. England was about to participate in the crusade for the liberation of peoples and the defence of small nationalities; Ireland, so long oppressed by her, took her stand by her side. Thus, in entering the war England not only might have had her mind at rest as regards the sister island, but the voice of the sister island supported and "justified" in the eyes of world opinion the entry of England into the war. That was the import of the grave and forceful words of Redmond.

In those critical days, Redmond might have "treated" with the Government, laid down his conditions (he was much reproached afterwards in Ireland for not having done so), for Home Rule had been voted but not promulgated, Ulster opposition was powerful, Ireland had as yet only obtained from England a scrap of paper, and that paper unsigned. But no! With as much courage as political judgment, Redmond brought to England, freely and graciously the sympathy and help of Ireland. Before the menace of Teuton imperialism, without hesitation he ranged his country on the side of right. In an instant, for the defence of civilisation against barbarism, he reversed the traditional policy of Ireland towards England. Or rather he adapted it: relying firmly on the undertakings of England, and counting on the promised liberty soon to be realised, it is his wish that the first act of the New Ireland, of Ireland free, should be to espouse the cause of world liberty.

Ireland, or at least the great majority of the country who understood and approved her Leader,

1 The preparations for rebellion made by the Orangemen of Ulster against the "liberty" of Ireland, and the probability that a civil war in Ireland would be the outcome were, according to Mr. Gerrard, United States Ambassador at Berlin, amongst the reasons which led the German Empire to declare war, in the conviction that England would be prevented from taking part.

responded to the word of Redmond. Anti-British spirit was, for the time being, submerged under a wave of enthusiasm ; feeling and sentiment were everywhere in favour of the Allies. In a spirit of sacred union, once again National Ireland offered her goodwill to Ulster ; once again it was rejected, and Ulster with greater violence resumed the struggle against the Home Rule Bill, this " scrap of paper " according to the unlucky phrase then made use of by one of the Unionist chiefs.

At the very time recruiting was being organised in England, it was started in Ireland in response to the appeal which the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, addressed to the Irish for the " free gift of a free people." Redmond gave himself and spent himself unreservedly in this propaganda which encountered, it must be realised, certain difficulties arising out of circumstances and environment. To begin with, it was the first time in history that National Ireland was called on to take up arms by the side of England, as ally and not as enemy. Then amongst the mass of the people there was the deep traditional mistrust of British promises. Amongst the peasants of the country, and especially amongst those of the distant West there existed, moreover, an apathy due to complete ignorance of continental affairs. And there was that feeling of repulsion, of contempt, which compulsory military service excites in certain classes, not indeed in this case due to anti-militarism, but because Ireland had never known any uniform but that of the English soldier, nor any army but the English army of occupation. Add that the small extremist minority, who saw no enemy of Ireland but the English Government and only wanted war against England, opposed the recruiting and withdrew their followers from the bulk of the National Volunteers who thus lost a fraction of their troops to the profit of the revolutionary clan.

Redmond's propaganda nevertheless succeeded in

convincing Ireland that she owed it to herself to take part in the struggle for justice and liberty ; its success in the last months of 1914 and in 1915 is incontestable. An official return of 1916 shows the number of recruits enrolled in Ireland by that date to have been 130,000 which, with the 57,000 Irishmen already serving with the colours at the outbreak of the war, as well as those in the Navy would bring the number to more than 200,000 men contributed to the war up to that period by Ireland, without counting the tens of thousands of Irishmen residing and enlisting in England, or who, having emigrated, fought under the Australian, Canadian or American colours. These figures are all the more remarkable when one considers that out of a population of four million souls Ireland has a proportion of male adults very inferior to the normal, owing to emigration which draws away every year the flower of her youth. The honour of contributing this military effort at the outset of the war has not always been rendered her. The least suspect English voices have, however, done her justice. From the month of August, 1915, the *Times* declared she had given her quota to the army in proportion to her men. And a few months later, Lord Kitchener, Minister for War, congratulated Ireland himself, for the "magnificent response" she had made to the call for men.

IV.—DECEPTIONS.

Ireland can, therefore, claim the merit of having done her duty in the first period of the war. She did it without calculation or ambition, on the faith of the one promise of freedom. Now it was for England to do her part towards Ireland. She owed Ireland her promised liberty, she owed her justice and goodwill, and how easy it would have been for her then to have made her peace with her for ever. But England, absorbed in the war, and her security in Ireland

assured, did not worry further on that score. For the sake of the opinion of the world it was necessary to have Ireland on her side. Having achieved this object she thought no more of the sister island. 1914 to 1916 tells a lamentable story: a negative policy of "wait and see," according to the formula dear to Mr. Asquith, followed by one of mistrust and obstruction, of pin-pricks and suppression, under cover of which the Orangemen and Tories played their ill-starred game. As a result enthusiasm and confidence were killed, and replaced by irritation, suspicion and cynicism. Ireland, through deception after deception, became alienated and hostile, and bit by bit the position of the moderate leaders was undermined, and the seed of rebellion sown.

First—Home Rule. It was voted. Cost what it might, some means of applying it should have been found. There should at least have been an attempt to implement it by Executive action. England was at war with despotism, for the defence of the rights of small nations: should not her first gesture have been effective assurance of the rights of Ireland? Could she fight for the freedom of Europe while refusing this freedom to the sister island? On 3rd of August, 1914, Sir Edward Grey vowed in Parliament that England would be faithful to her honourable engagements towards her friends. And towards Ireland? If England had immediately put Home Rule in operation, there was every chance that even the minority of extremists would have agreed to take their place in the new order. Instead of that the British Government yielded to the pressure of the Orangemen who, with the Tories exerted themselves still further against Home Rule. Carson outweighed Redmond; Ulster outweighed Ireland. The Home Rule Act was indeed promulgated on the 18th September, 1914—which Lord Londonderry stigmatised "a scandal"—but its application was postponed

till the end of the war, and Mr. Asquith pledged himself that Ulster should not be submitted to coercion in the proposed Amending Bill. It was the triumph of Orangeism, and, for the Irish Nationalists it was a painful shock charged with injustice and insult. It caused the overthrow of confidence in England's word, and the birth of a bitter, discouraging sense that while they were being asked to fight as a free nation they remained in reality but a people of serfs and suspects.

Suspects, even when it was a question of their taking part in the war. Redmond had asked, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, had solemnly promised two things : First, that the Volunteers should be recognised, organised and utilised by the War Office ; secondly, that the Irish levies should be formed in a distinct corps, retaining their national character. But while Ulster from the start was given satisfaction on these two points, Nationalist Ireland never obtained from the War Office fulfilment of Mr. Asquith's promise. She set store by her National Volunteers, in whom she saw the symbol of her nationality. She was deeply offended that the War Office refused to take them over—a refusal all the more inexplicable since, with the mass of the Volunteers enrolled in the fighting corps, there would remain a minority of extremist Volunteers, and to leave such a nucleus out of control, idle and armed, was to prepare and ask for a revolutionary movement. On the other hand the War Office, by an inconceivable mixture of blundering and cold hostility, seemed actually to strive to discourage recruiting. In Catholic and Nationalist Ireland enlistment propaganda was intrusted to Protestant Unionists. Catholic troops were sent Protestant officers. The training of officers, allowed to Trinity College and the Belfast University, was refused to the National University. The Irish troops were refused their distinctive badges, they were re-

fused their traditional Green Flag, they were not allowed to accept the pennons embroidered for them by the ladies of Ireland. The creation of an Irish army corps was refused. Ireland, in short, was to fight anonymously under British colours. Ireland's whole contribution to the war was to be credited as Great Britain's ; her high military deeds, such as the exploits of the Dublins and Munsters at the Dardanelles were passed over in silence. In calling the Irish to the war everything was thus done to rebuff them. Mr. Lloyd George himself one day in the House of Commons said : "At the decisive epoch of recruiting a series of stupidities has been perpetrated of an almost unbelievable malignity. Nothing is so difficult as to recover a lost opportunity when once national susceptibilities have been offended and initial enthusiasm killed."

Against such ill-will Redmond, who had the responsibilities of leader without the effective powers of a head of a government, was powerless and disarmed. And when in May, 1915, the Coalition Ministry was formed Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster leader, was called to the Government, as well as an Ulsterman of mark, Sir J. H. Campbell, and with them Sir F. E. Smith, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Walter Long, Sir John Gordon, those prominent Tories who had played the Orange card against Irish Nationalism.[1] All the powerful enemies of Ireland in power and honoured, and Orangeism and Toryism masters of the situation. Was not the Irish cause thus delivered over to the anti-Irish, to the virtual "rebels" of 1913-1914, and Home Rule abandoned for ever? That was what National Ireland said.

1 Mr. Asquith offered a post in the Ministry to John Redmond, but not the only post which the Nationalist Leader might possibly have been able to accept, that of Chief Secretary for Ireland. Redmond refused.

Note by the Editor.—Mr. Redmond refused to accept any post whatsoever in the British Government.

Resenting profoundly all those blows struck not only at her pride but at her just rights and at her good-will, her early enthusiasm cooled. She had entered the war for the cause of liberty, and liberty was denied her, and she saw that the high principles for which England took up arms were not made for her. In fighting for nationalities she believed she was fighting for her own, putting the seal to her charter of enfranchisement and winning at last recognition as a nation. Far from it ! . . . . Little by little she turned from the war. She relaxed her military effort ; recruiting fell off and then stopped. The anti-British spirit reappeared and became active. She tired of treading quite alone the road of conciliation. She had given freely and had received nothing in return. In the fight for Home Rule she was vanquished. Orangeism had triumphed. She felt despised, duped, and betrayed.

For these deceptions she blamed her leaders, the Parliamentarians, the constitutionalists. Even before the war the Parliamentary Party was criticised in Ireland. It was accused of having made itself the servant of the English Liberal Party, instead of remaining, between the Liberals and the Tories, in the independent position from which Parnell knew so well how to profit. It was reproached for having given away its freedom by accepting the parliamentary salary, and having allowed itself to be contaminated by the favours of power. The leaders were specially reproached for declining to accept either blame or advice. All these criticisms now became more pointed. The old Party, it must be said, was a little out of touch with the young and ardent in the country, its influence on the new generation was on the decline. And besides, as in England, there was at that time in Ireland a movement of irritation and hostility against party organisations, professional politicians, political " machines," and the patronage and corruption which

accompanied them. In August, 1914, Ireland generously responded to the generous words of her Leader, but when she saw what befell her goodwill and her claims, she laid the blame on her constitutional chiefs as well as on the English Government, and, full of disillusion, turned against Redmond and the Parliamentarians. The Catholic clergy, until then the strongest supporters of the Party, began to frown and turn their back upon it.

And what was most serious was, that this drive of anti-Britishism and anti-Parliamentarianism, which naturally found amongst the extremists its most active agents, helped extremism, of which the virus without yet gaining new ground was about to grow more bitter by the favour of circumstances. We have said, it existed before the war; latent and diffused, without power, it represented but a small minority, and in this minority many divergent opinions conflicted, on such matters as the use of violence, the republican idea, etc. The revolutionary movement of Ulster, in 1913-1914 had excited in all these groups the relish for fighting; then Ireland's entry into the war isolated these groups from the bulk of the nation; and soon in Ireland were seen extremist volunteers, separated from the National Volunteers, and in Dublin a little "Citizen Army" emanating from the proletariat of the capital. The extremist chiefs, finding the Government morally disarmed against these separatist or revolutionary troops through its initial irreparable mistake of allowing the Ulster Volunteers to arm, took advantage of this state of things to train their men and more or less secretly prepare for a rising against England. The movement was provoked and stimulated by the Irish in America, the most violent of all—they have nothing to lose—who through their political friends the German-Americans, started conversations with the German Government, sent an Irish delegate to Berlin, a *cerveau brûlé,* an Ulsterman besides, Sir Roger

Casement, who at last obtained from Germany a cargo of arms for Ireland. The rising broke out in April, 1916, on Easter Monday in Dublin, two days after the police had arrested Casement, just landed from a German submarine and come to Ireland—O irony !—for the purpose of stopping a revolutionary move, and after a German ship full of arms was sunk by the captain on the approach of an English gun-boat.

V.—THE EASTER RISING, 1916, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

On the whole the Easter Rising in 1916 was a small affair indeed—a plan for a rebellion on a larger scale having been countermanded. Not more than 1,000 men took part in it, coming principally from the Citizen Army of the Dublin proletariat, with a contingent of Republican Volunteers and of neo-Fenian intellectuals. It was not the revolt of Ireland, but a revolt in Ireland. And it took by surprise the Government, public opinion, and the Parliamentarians. These latter, with the bulk of the Nationalists did not hesitate to condemn severely this anti-patriotic act ; even in Dublin at first the rebels met only with hostility amongst the people. The impression produced outside was enormous. At once Ireland lost the greater part of what sympathy she might have in the opinion of the Allies. In England, there was legitimate indignation at seeing themselves struck in the back while the war was claiming all their energies ; they did not ask themselves if the Government had not some responsibility in the origin of the affair, they did not remind themselves that for a thousand rebels who were in Dublin, there were at that moment more than two hundred thousand loyal Irish subjects fighting for England in the English uniform. . . . .

Surprised by the event, Irish opinion was troubled

and disconcerted ; the mass of the people had not as yet passed over to extremism. The rising suppressed, it was the moment to show trust, and by a generous policy of conciliation, to soften the anti-British spirit and to give to the Party of order, still in the great majority, its place and its influence. England could yet, even at that moment have recaptured her sister island by kindness. Mr. Asquith knew it, when he made a journey to Dublin in 1916. He had the desire to do the right thing ; but the Government was wanting in courage, perhaps also in time, and in the freedom of mind which was needed for giving a new orientation to the Irish policy of England. He began again to bend to the will of the Orangemen and Tories, the partisans of the strong hand, more powerful than ever since the Coalition. The course of things was to go on as before, and we were to witness the evolution completed by which an Ireland for the most part still sound, was to be transformed into an Ireland definitely hostile, rebel and separatist.

The rebellion called for suppression. Severe? No doubt, the war was on. But rigour is not always wisdom ; between clemency and justice the amount of the dose is a delicate question when it applies to a high-strung and sensitive race held in subjection against its will. Many voices in England, amongst them that of Lord Bryce, counselled indulgence : it had well succeeded in 1914 in the South African insurrection, when General Botha made Maritz and Christian de Wet see reason, and, without a single execution, public opinion was rallied to the English cause. But what happened in Ireland was that after the military operations in which much blood was shed, and a whole neighbourhood of Dublin destroyed, tardily, on the judgment of a secret courtmartial, sixteen men were put to death, there were over 3,000 arrests, nearly 200 condemnations, and 1,600 to 1,800 people were deported or interned in Great Britain by

simple administrative action, all without appeal from the military authority. The mass of the Irish people, who felt they were neither guilty nor responsible, did not accept the punishment as legitimate. While the fact of the rebellion, the example of the revolution, might have made them reflect, might have brought them back to the path of order, the fact of the suppression filled their heart with bitterness, and reawakened, " polarized," all their old wrongs and their traditional hostility against England.

Bit by bit, matters were understood, and the " errors " or the abuses of the military authorities were heard of, such as the murder of the peace-making journalist Sheehy-Skeffington. Unknown yesterday it was learned who were the leaders, now celebrated, of the rebellion : professors and poets like Pearse, MacDonagh, Joseph Plunkett ; Connolly, the Ulster labourman ; the clan-chief O'Rahilly of Kerry. The words of Colonel Brereton who was their prisoner were repeated : " They fought like gentlemen." Dramatic and touching incidents were told : that of The O'Rahilly, who, having done all he could to prevent the rising, threw himself into it and was killed ; that of Grace Gifford, whose portrait by William Orpen, under the title of " Young Ireland," had but lately excited the admiration of Londoners, and who, engaged to Joseph Plunkett, married him an hour before his execution, to have the right to bear his name : that of Connolly, shot sitting in a chair—having been wounded he was unable to stand—who, in his last interview with his wife and daughter, " bravely, almost joyously " said to them : " I thank God for having spared me long enough to see the rising of the dawn."

Thus the horror which at first was felt for the crime began to be felt for the British suppression. Changed by degrees, Irish opinion, without approving the rebellion, felt compassion and sympathy for the rebels.

whom it had now come to regard as martyrs and heroes. Until then hostile to extremist ideas, the bulk of the population was tending to adopt them, unless something were done to alter the situation, and to reconcile Ireland.

Twice within a year the Government tried to do something, but without conviction or the will to succeed, anxious mainly to keep Ireland quiet. In June, 1916, it brought Home Rule again under discussion, and offered to the Irish to put into force the Act of 1914, with the reservation of the temporary exclusion of the six Ulster counties until the end of the war, an Imperial Conference having then to regulate the difficult Ulster question and the no less delicate question of Ireland's finances. Redmond, furnished with these written offers, which he accepted, and which were soon accepted by the Ulster Council, had them also agreed to, not without difficulty, by a Nationalist congress. It seemed that at last the object aimed at was attained, and that the Government had only to make the agreement law : but they reckoned without the Tories and the Orange party who tore up the agreement by exacting not only the temporary but the definitive exclusion of Ulster. Once more the Government bent and gave in, and Redmond was left with a new set-back and the responsibility of having allowed himself again to be tricked. Once more the resentment of Ireland was accentuated and rose against England, as against the Parliamentarian Nationalists whom England used even against their own country. As ever, it was said, England deceives and mocks us. From the front even come those complaints, sorrowful and touching : " We believed we were fighting for liberty, alas ! we know now that England will betray us !" . . . .

It was the same story the following year, 1917, with a different setting. Mr. Lloyd George, who had been head of the Government since December, 1916,

and surrounded in his Ministry by the principal chiefs of the Tory-Orange coalition, proposed, on the suggestion of Redmond, to call a great meeting or "Convention," composed of representative Irishmen of all parties who were to endeavour to find a scheme for an autonomous constitution within the Empire. He promised that if the Convention resulted in a fundamental agreement he would present a Bill to Parliament on the basis of this agreement. On one side and the other the proposal was accepted, the extremists alone remaining outside, and the Convention composed in part of members nominated by the Government, the remainder chosen by the respective political parties and by the local authorities, came together for the first time in Dublin on the 25th of July, 1917. There were there men of every opinion and every creed: John Redmond, four Catholic Bishops, the learned Mahaffy, Provost of Trinity College; Dr. Bernard, Protestant Archbishop of Dublin; Lord Middleton, Leader of the Southern Unionists; Russell, the economist and poet, better known in literature by the initials A.E.; Lord Londonderry, and Mr. Barry, chiefs of the Ulster delegation; Sir Horace Plunkett, creator of the co-operative movement; Andrew Jameson, the big distiller, whose name according to the popular phrase, is "in every Irish mouth." The deliberations, under the chairmanship of Sir Horace Plunkett, continued behind closed doors for eight months. It was quickly seen that, with the exception of the Ulstermen, who were there only *ad referendum* mere spokesmen of the occult authorities of Orangeism, without power or responsibility, all the Irishmen brought together at these meetings, like the soldiers in the trenches, felt the influence of the National solidarity which united them and which developed in them, above the divergencies of politics, a favourable spirit of tolerance and compromise.

After many vicissitudes, and a personal intervention by Mr. Lloyd George, a relative majority, composed of moderate Nationalists, Southern Unionists, who, for the sake of their common country made the sacrifice of their Unionism, and Labour representatives agreed on a measure of wide autonomy analogous to that enjoyed by the Dominions ; with a single Parliament, political guarantees in favour of the minority, and the military powers reserved to the Imperial Government. The contentious question of the taxes, particularly the Customs, was left in abeyance until after the war ; on this point the extreme Nationalists separated, notably the representatives of the Catholic Church, who refused to give up even provisionally the right of Customs taxation. As for the Orangemen, who felt they were supported by the Coalition in England, they said NO to everything, and nothing could make them move towards the principle of the constitutional unity of Ireland. On the whole it was less a check than a half-success. However, Mr. Lloyd George refused to take the conclusions of the Convention as valid, and to make them law : Was not Ulster in the minority ?

VI.—ORANGEISM BLOCKS THE WAY.

Once again, then, it was Ulster that blocked the way for Ireland, and Ireland saw autonomy refused because the Ulster minority opposed it. Thus it was the Tory thesis triumphing since 1914 : the safety of Ulster was the supreme law, for Ulster was the pledge of England in Ireland, her instrument of domination, it was the " corner " established in the Green Isle to assure at one and the same time British authority and Irish discord. It was Ulster which must be satisfied in Ireland, while preventing the formation of a united Ireland against Great Britain. This is so true, that it was the sole purpose (we anticipate events a little

here) of the Government of Ireland Act, promulgated in December, 1920. By this Act for which not a single representative of National Ireland voted, Ireland was cut in two ; one part being Ulster, with its six counties (of which two, be it noted, are more than half Nationalist), and the other part, that which is negligently called the " rest " of Ireland. Two Parliaments were provided, or rather two pretended Parliaments, for their powers were cut down as it were to nothing, notably from the fiscal point of view. Ireland remaining financially dependent on England ; and between the two Parliaments, a mark of union, a Council in common, in which they were to be equally represented, and which they could only transform into a common Parliament on conditions perfectly impossible to realise. The " rest " of Ireland refused to have anything to do with this caricature of Home Rule, with this law of " dismemberment " and " financial exploitation " ; Southern Unionists and Nationalists were in accord on this point. Orangeism, on the contrary, accepted the Ulster Parliament for the six counties, because it saw its separation from Ireland sanctioned by law, and saw assured to it both its guarantees and its privileges of veto as to the constitutional future of National Ireland. Home Rule was in time given to Ulster, which always fought against it, while the " rest " of Ireland, which always demanded Home Rule, and a real Home Rule, was to find itself legally deprived of this real Home Rule, and reduced to the status of a Crown Colony. We will not dwell further on this law of circumstance, temporary stage, which events have already gone past, but which shows very well what was, up to then, the fundamental idea of the policy of England towards Ireland, and towards Ulster.

Does it follow that there is no solution to this Ulster question which dominates the whole question of Ireland? And if the Convention of 1917-1918 was

unable to come to the "fundamental" agreement exacted by Lord George, has one the right to argue in favour of the theory, much circulated among the English, according to which the obstacle to the solution of the Irish question is precisely Ireland herself, this house divided against itself, these dissensions of the Irish with their deep-rooted inability to agree, which would explain and justify in the past all the Irish policy of England? But these Irish divisions, is it not England herself, as history teaches us, who produced and maintained them, by the application of the political maxim *divide et impera?* That Ireland was and is still divided does not prevent its being true that she represents in reality, something other than a geographical expression. By right of history she is a "nation"; and for that very reason it has always been the object of English policy to reduce that "nation" to the status of a "question."

Of this Irish nation, Ulster is for good or ill an integral part. To separate Ulster, or a part of Ulster from Ireland, is to divide the indivisible, to mutilate a living body. Ulster, on the contrary, is not and never pretended to be a nation apart; its population as we have said is anything but homogeneous, it has not a national history like Ireland; it is, after all, only a minority in Ireland which wants to determine the law for the majority. To refuse autonomy to Ireland because Ulster does not want it, is surely a strange abuse of the theory of the right of minorities, and a plain violation of the constitutional principle of government by majority. Was freedom refused to Bohemia or to Poland, because in Poland and Bohemia there were allogeneous and opposing minorities? Let us not forget that the Unionist population of Ulster is only twenty per cent. of the total population of Ireland, while in the four Ulster counties with a Protestant majority there is a Catholic and Nationalist minority of thirty per cent., which means that the

Nationalist minority in the heart of Ulster is stronger than the Ulster minority in Ireland. Can consideration be had for the one and not for the other !

But, it will be said, if Nationalist Ireland is to be given justice, Ulster in fact being refractory ; to make it enter the gyron of Ireland it will have to be coerced : England refuses . . . And with reason, although it is only too true she makes use of precisely this very coercion towards Nationalist Ireland. But the use of force in regard to Ulster is not the point in question. Let England simply leave Ulster to itself, and the solution of the problem will quite naturally be found. For we know this Ulster question to be an artificial creation on the part of England. Political Ulster was made in London. If it is anti-Nationalist it is because the Tories with the Orange collusion have made it so, if it blocks the way for Ireland, it is because a great English Political Party urges it on for its own advantage ; if it is left alone it will reflect. It well knows that, separated from its hinterland, its economic life will suffer and become impoverished. It is well aware that the day will come, as it did for landlordism, when Orangeism, last fortress of English hegemony in Ireland, will disappear by force of circumstances. By degrees it will grasp the fact that it cannot always be humoured in this attitude of splendid isolation, of acting the part of Ireland's gaoler, and of eternal opposition in face of the National aspirations of Ireland. The day England ceases to use Ulster as a war weapon against Irish Nationalism, when she leaves it to itself, without mental reservation as to its responsibilities, free to come to an understanding with Nationalist Ireland and to meet it half way, that day the solution to an agreement will be possible on the Ulster question.

If the Convention of 1917-1918 was only a partial success, it was first of all because England refused to grant the key of autonomy to Ireland, that is to

say fiscal liberty, notably that of Customs, but because and above all the Ulstermen being "commissioned" by the Tory-Orange coalition, were neither free nor responsible agents in their intercourse with the Nationalists : they were there not to negotiate but to oppose. If instead of a Convention artificially composed deliberating in secret, the Government had made appeal to an assembly of representatives elected directly by the country, and elected with the definite object of bringing about the constitutional unity of Ireland, representatives who, having full powers, would feel the weight of their responsibility—in other words a constituent assembly ; and if at the same time England had definitely withdrawn her backing from Ulster, there is no doubt whatever that after the negotiations, laborious without doubt, but unfettered and fecund, we would have seen the Convention producing the basis of an agreement between the two Irelands : the half success met with in the difficult circumstances by the Convention of 1917-18 is a proof.

VII.—THE COMING OF EXTREMISM AND THE RUIN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY.

Notwithstanding this half success, the British Government, as we have said, refused to adopt the basis of the report of the Convention and give it legal effect. Instead of rallying the moderates of all parties round the basic centre of the agreement come to, it rejected the lot. Henceforth the die was cast. At an end were the hopes of conciliation in London, of justice for Ireland ; and in Ireland also a policy of moderation, of understanding with England was ended. On either side they reached breaking point. At once the Government wanted to apply Conscription to Ireland, against the advice of Lord Wimborne, the Lord Lieutenant who had been replaced by Lord

French. Conscription, Ireland as a free country would have seen long ago voted by a national Parliament, but as a subject nation she refused to accept it as a yoke imposed on her, as a mark of slavery, from the hands of an authority which she considered foreign. The policy of the "Castle" took shape in strong measures, a rigorous plan of government; it was a provocative policy of the worst kind, which was before long to bear fruit. Inversely amongst the Irish, anti-Britishism came to the fore and was master of the situation. In the past as well as the present attitude of England, there was only ill-will and bad faith, suppression and betrayal: therefore, no need of caution to be observed. Home Rule was no longer hoped for. Should such a day come, they asked themselves, would it be worth while; they wanted more, and they wanted it now: Independence. They had ceased to believe in constitutional methods as an effective means of attaining their national aim.

The time for legal action was finished, that of ultra-republicanism was about to begin. Already, in 1917, in several by-elections, the extremists were triumphant at the polls; in Co. Roscommon, Count Plunkett, father of one of the Easter rebels, was elected; in Co. Clare, E. de Valera, head of Sinn Fein, was elected in place of Willie Redmond, the Irish leader's brother who was killed in the war. Finally, in the General Election of December, 1918, while the Government in England had a sweeping majority of 400 "Coalitionists" with reactionary and Chauvinistic tendencies, in Ireland came the overthrow of the Parliamentary Party, who from 80 members fell to only 6, and the triumph of extremism, who captured 73 seats; which showed how divergent were the views in England from those of Ireland. The moderates and constitutionalists were swept away and disappeared from the scene: the country having lost faith in them had no further use for them.

Sad ending to a Party, which, for more than forty years, often in trying circumstances, honourably directed the country's destiny, and nearly brought it to its goal. Before it there had been isolated nationalists in Parliament, but in reality the Party's standing only dates from the elections of 1874, when, for the first time, the secret ballot permitted the real Ireland to be represented at Westminster. Its apogee was seen under Parnell, in the times when, first by obstruction, then by holding the balance between the two great English Parties, it wielded a formidable power in the House of Commons, making and unmaking Ministries, converting Gladstone to Home Rule. Since Parnell disappeared there was a sad period of dissensions, until the day came towards 1900 when the power and unity of the Parliamentary Party were restored, and it prepared for new struggles, under the leadership of John Redmond. English opinion has often been severe on these professional politicians, whom it considered talkative, eccentric at times, without manners or culture, rejoicing in scenes and turbulence. Doubtless they had their faults. Their policy was sometimes wanting in vision, and sometimes wanting in courage in dealings with their constituencies. They abused with frivolous violence in Parliament, and they delighted in exasperating an audience who refused to be persuaded. That was before the conversion of the Liberals and the stage of the "union of hearts," when they showed themselves ready with a masterly policy of conciliation and construction. They loyally did their part both in protesting and advancing, and faithfully served Ireland's cause, according to their opportunities. They obtained for Ireland the agrarian laws, the land purchase legislation, with its consequence the disappearance of landlordism ; they obtained local government, a National University, a special legislation for congestion and migration, etc., they proved to the

most deluded the impossibility of maintaining Unionism in Ireland. Their reign has, therefore, not been unfruitful; these results will continue now they are gone.

To have, by their constitutional action, eliminated for a long period the revolutionary party from the country, which was not to reappear until they themselves disappeared, is not the least of these results. To have maintained the unity of Ireland under the shield of legality, while trying to combine Irish patriotism with loyalty to the British Empire, and to obtain for Ireland National autonomy within the Imperial system—this objective of their efforts they were many times very near realising: with Gladstone in 1893, on the eve of the war in 1914, and finally at the Convention in 1918.

But they did not realise the illusion when it came, a fact for which Ireland could not forgive them, and above all she could not pardon their chief, John Redmond. He died sorrowfully in the month of March, 1918, during the course of the work of the Convention of which he did not live to see the end. Of pure Irish blood, although he was not mainly of the Celtic race, but of Anglo-Norman origin—he descended from a certain Raymond le Gros, who was, in the twelfth century, one of the first Normans to settle in Ireland— he had been too long in the British Parliament not to have become slightly contaminated with its spirit. The qualities of leadership possessed by Parnell as head of the Party, the fighting powers which the Orange chief Sir Edward Carson displayed in his own time, were somewhat foreign to his moderate temperament; temporizer, willingly carried by compromise because he expected more, and at the same time seeing future possibilities, the obstacles and the limits. For instance, he lost much support in Ireland, and especially that of a large section of the clergy and the Episcopate, by his condescension to the Ulstermen, by his desire to find a means of conciliation

with them—trickery he was told—by the assent he thought it his duty to give to the plan of the temporary and provisional secession of Ulster—is it not the provisional arrangements that last longest? He wanted to attain, even at the price of a painful compromise, the essential in his eyes being to obtain Home Rule, even in an insufficient form which time, he thought, would help to improve. He was essentially a loyal and generous man, far-seeing and right-thinking. What will remain to him outstanding amongst his titles of honour, is, that on the 3rd of August, 1914, when some Irishmen, their memory full of the past, hesitated between the national struggle against England, and the struggle of the world against Germanism, he resolutely threw his country into the camp of the Allies, putting the cause of civilisation before the more particular cause of Ireland, and apparently at the risk of sacrificing the latter to the former.

How sad to think that this noble and courageous act of statesmanship is the very act for which Redmond and his colleagues of the Parliamentary Party after 1916 were, in Ireland, the most violently attacked. And with the most cruel injustice. "You have engaged Ireland in war," they said, "as if she were free. She was not—and on the promise of liberty, a promise which was not kept; you should have imposed your conditions: you have been deceived." "Or else, you have deceived us," declared the more forward, "you had not the power to pledge the country, and you have done so without any guarantee. You have vowed the loyalty of Ireland as if you had Ireland in your pocket, you have taken Ireland's cause, bowed under the weight of seven centuries of history and tradition, and you have thrown it out of the window."[1] Deluded and exas-

[1] Textual: *The Insurrection in Dublin.* By James Stephens. Dublin. 1916.

perated by England's rebuffs, Ireland thus showed the most shocking ingratitude to her faithful servants. In Dublin, where he had been so often acclaimed, Redmond sometimes saw himself, during the Convention, hooted in the street by groups of extremists. Bishops wrote : " The country has been sold," or, " Our leaders have brought the National cause to disaster." Poor John Redmond, dying without glory or reward, after thirty years of loyal service and noble devotion to his country : disowned by the English statesmen who, after having made use of him, did not scruple to abuse and deceive him, he had the bitter sorrow to see himself also disowned and branded by his own countrymen. His life ended in the shipwreck of his hopes. It was only destiny that failed him—not honour. History will do him justice.

VIII.—A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS.

And now, Redmond dead, the legal and Parliamentary Party removed from the scene, we saw in December, 1918, extremism sole master in Ireland, responsible before the world, for Erin's cause and her good name. What would the extremists do? What we imagined from the outset was, that the moment the Great War on the continent came to an end, war would start afresh in Ireland against England. This happened. The drama became more knotted : and it moved fatally before the tangle was unravelled.

What " a tragedy of errors " this history of the origins of the Irish drama ! On either side, events happened and mystified the people. In refusing concessions and conciliation to the moderates, in denying Home Rule to the sister island, the freedom which, after all, would have been Ireland's justification in entering the war, England, encouraging Orangeism to override and deride Irish Nationalism, undermined

the authority of the moderate leaders and played the game of extremism : she reaped what she had sown. She believed that the war absolved her from keeping faith with Ireland, and was an excuse for her to preserve the *status quo,* while on the contrary the contrast between the Government of Ireland, as it functioned for more than a hundred years, and the great principles for which the Allies were fighting, flashed before the eyes of the Irish. From the time England preached the enfranchisement of small nationalities, she continued treating the sister island as subjected without as much as allowing her a foretaste of the autonomy that she demanded ; thus she contributed to driving Ireland on the road to violence and the dream of independence.

As a set-off, Ireland if she is not without excuse, is not altogether free from reproach. She believed the War would establish and set the seal to her liberty ; in which she was mistaken. At the beginning she responded in a praiseworthy conscientious manner, fully confident, to the appeal addressed her, by the mouth of Redmond, England and the Allies. But this magnificent effort she had neither the courage nor the patience to maintain, when she saw the war did not bring her justice. Embittered by English refusals and harshness, by the lamentable defeat of her National aspirations, by the triumph of Orangeism, Ireland, under the stress of circumstances, isolated and remote, allowed her grievances and anti-Britishism to take precedence over the cause of civilisation, she disowned her Leader, she retired from the war, she failed to resist the example and temptations of extremism : and then what should have been her success and her glory was seen changed to disaster. Before the world she lost the credit of her initial sacrifice, and she left the war vanquished.

How changed the course of history would have been had Ireland followed to the end the Leader who

was showing her the way, and if in the acceptance of the ordeal, she had shown the same generosity, the same perseverance as he did. Is it not permissible to think she would have been in the position of morally forcing England to do her justice and give her her liberty had she but continued in the cause of right and of liberty to the last? May we not believe that at last she would have obtained, by constitutional action, without violence or compromise, that which the extremist was doing all he could to gain, but at what a price? At any rate, she would have had the opinion of the world on her side.

Chapter II.

SINN FEIN AND THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR.

(1918-1921.)

DURING three terrible and painful years, the Irish drama held the scene. It was quite near us, behind the British curtain, a tragic episode of the struggle which, during seven centuries, Ireland, unable to conquer, but refusing to die, untiringly continued against English domination. What has been the evolution of the Irish question from 1914 to 1918, what has been the "reaction" of Ireland to the effects of the war, and how did the drama become more entangled?—this is what we have tried to explain above. We know that in 1914 having believed she was attaining her age-long aspirations, Ireland saw herself losing in a short time the fruits of her efforts, and that then, rejecting her constitutional leaders, and forsaking legal methods, she made use of violence and gave herself to extremism. Extremism is what Sinn Fein then represented and incarnated. What did it do in Ireland, and what did it do with Ireland? Before answering, we must regard its past, and its meaning.

I.—THE DOCTRINE OF SINN FEIN.

It was by no means a new thing this extremism in Ireland. When, conquered by Cromwell and William III, Ireland was no longer able to fight against her powerful neighbour on equal terms, open war was turned to revolutionary action: the insurrection of 1798, with Wolfe Tone and Lord Edward

Fitzgerald, the conspiracy of Robert Emmet; the rising of Young Ireland in 1848, with John Mitchel and Smith O'Brien; then Fenianism in "'67," blemished at a later stage by the crime of the "Invincibles." Under different forms, it was always a recourse to physical force, with the aim of shaking off the English yoke and gaining Independence. For half a century the policy was ardently urged on by that "greater Ireland," America, to which Ireland saw emigrating, from the effects of the great Famine, from misery and oppression, the best of her manhood, become more bitter in their anti-Britishism and their propaganda against England. In action and power, extremism was always present; when constitutional methods seemed to authorise some hope, it was silent and lost ground; invisible but present, it remained ready to take its place again in the battle.

Such was the case before the war. For the forty years during which the constitutional Party held sway, extremism was slumbering; it had not for that reason disappeared. There were even many different kinds. First, there was the remains of the old Fenians, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, closely connected with the Irish-Americans. There was a wave of republicanism circulating amongst the Intellectuals. There was in Dublin—new thing—a revolutionary workers' Party, Nationalist as well as Marxist, born of a series of unhappy strikes and maintained by misery in the Irish capital. Then there was Sinn Fein.

This was less a Party than an intellect, an influence, a national expression. It placed itself above politics, and appealed by the voice of Arthur Griffith to all Ireland's sons, without distinction of class or creed. *Sinn Fein!* Ourselves alone! Let us save ourselves. Instead of asking for liberty, let us take it. Away from the Parliamentarians, "who always bark but never bite"! And from Parliamentarianism, a useless

and degrading game, school of slavery and of anglicisation! To send representatives to the Westminster Parliament, which, as Mitchel said, is nothing more "than a hotbed of corruption and a mill of coercion," not only is it playing the dupes' game, for England has never given way but to fear or restraint, but it is compromising Ireland in recognising the authority of a foreign assembly, it is admitting the validity of the Act of Union of 1800, and justifying under a constitutional varnish British power in Ireland. Home Rule would be but a caricature of freedom, with the one right of managing "gas and water," and a few small affairs of the same kind. "Long live a Sovereign and Independent Ireland."

Ireland a Republic! Sinn Fein had not gone that far as yet; it contented itself with the constitution of 1782, which left between Ireland and England but a single and thin thread, the Crown. They dared not, as did the other revolutionaries, make use of "physical force," at least for the time being, and until circumstances would favour starting the struggle with some hope of success: the call to arms was to be the last act in the drama. Till then, its means of resistance was passive with autonomous reconstruction. No more compromise. No more Irish delegates in London, but a National Assembly in Dublin. No more enlisting in the British army. It said, we will go no more to law courts under the Crown, but to Irish courts of arbitration. We will refuse to pay English taxes. We will reconstruct on a National basis our schools, our industry, our commerce, we will free ourselves of the economic subjection to Great Britain, and, as Swift said, "burn everything that comes from England, except coal." We will make a prosperous Ireland, a National Ireland, an Ireland in spite of and without the English. Ireland will be free the moment she acts as if she were so.

Policy of hope and regeneration, but a revolutionary policy as well, or rather extremist, if not by actual methods, at least holding the same views as a starting point. It was a peaceful rebellion corresponding to a peaceful penetration ; it was self-help in the national life ; it was the literal application of the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination or free will of the people.

Thus between the different aspects of Irish extremism there was a difference of opinion before the war, but there was also a mutual foundation. First of all, hatred of England, at least of England in Ireland, this hatred of which Mr. Lloyd George said that " centuries of barbarous injustice, and, what is still worse, centuries of wrong and insolence, have sunk deep to the marrow of the Irish race." Then the belief that all is permitted against an enemy who without any claim occupies the country, and keeps it in subjection. Opportunity of methods, but not their lawfulness, are discussed. Again, the conviction that Ireland could not " have her chance " and live her life unless separated from England, and that enfranchisement could never be won by moral force, as a free gift, of a foreign Government whose word was no longer generally received, and whose only aim was to gain time in regard to this invalid, Ireland, until the invalid died, either by emigration or anglicisation, and the Irish question of itself disappeared. There was nothing in this extremism which savoured of class war, nothing resembling the International or Bolshevism. The depth of its cause results from a political fact, the yoke of the foreigner ; it was not in the bad government of England, but in the fact itself of British domination : *" Not foreign government but foreign rule is Ireland's bane,"* said Wolfe Tone. His cry is that of Mazzini and Garibaldi : *Fuori i Barbari!*

II.—SINN FEIN IN ACTION.

Had constitutional methods succeeded, had England made the necessary concessions in time, extremism would probably have lost, with its "raison d'être," existence itself, and little by little it would of itself have been extinguished. It was not so; on the contrary the war witnessed and was the cause of the victory of extremism in Ireland: not to say in truth that of ultra Fenianism, which allied with the workers' unions, unhappily tried its hand during the rising of Easter Week, 1916, but that of Sinn Fein. It was into Sinn Fein that it hurled and melted as if in a crucible the whole of Nationalist Ireland, and, at the same time, it transformed this same Sinn Fein, and of a doctrine made it a party of action.

When at the call of Redmond the majority of the country in 1914 espoused the cause of the Allies and went to the war, extremism became cautious and vigorous. Already for two or three years it was roused and provoked, as we know by the rebellion of Ulster: It was not only Orangeism that triumphed in Belfast from 1911 to 1914, but the revolutionary plot, and Carson, in rousing the "Sacred Corner" restored "physical force," and as a consequence played the game of the advanced minority in Nationalist Ireland: Carson showed the way to Casement. The war which made men dizzy excited the more violent, and kindled them with foolish hopes. England was fighting against Imperialism and for the liberty of nations: was it not Providence, they said, who morally delivered her thus to our mercy? Will not her power be shaken, and will Ireland not benefit from the effects of this shock, if only she is watchful? *England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity!* It would seem this famous phrase was made for the occasion. However, the idea of an active rebellion is not apparent from

the outset of Sinn Fein. It was more of a neutral spirit, of wishing harm to Albion, Erin's welfare being at a discount : this war is not our war, for the British Empire is not our Empire. Excepting amongst the isolated or exalted, the spirit was not Germanophil. It was violently anti-English, but on that account it was not pro-German. *We serve neither King nor Kaiser, but Ireland.* If Germany was victorious, what would Ireland gain by the change of masters? " Should Germany want to take possession of Ireland, those who to-day resist England will be the first to fight against her," De Valera said soon afterwards. But we feel we are not at war with the Germans, they are nothing to us, they are not even our enemies.

No one denies the fact, that during the war there were German-Irish intrigues : there was Casement with his fruitless efforts to enrol Irish prisoners in the service of Germany, there were the arms sent to Ireland, and Boche submarines on her coasts. All of which was planned by the Irish-Americans, of which Casement's enthusiastic, ardent brain was the agent.

Even in Ireland there was but a small number of fanatics who allowed themselves to be carried away like those who, at the time of the Insurrection of Easter Week, 1916, during the " Republic of six days " in Dublin, did not fear putting in the proclamation of the Provisional Government an allusion to our " brave European allies." The imputation of an understanding with Germany, Sinn Fein has always denied with reference to itself, as it resented all responsibility in the Easter Rebellion : then, as yet, it was neither for a republic nor an armed revolution.

It did not organise the rebellion of 1916, rather the rebellion organised it, at least it caused it to become what it did. The check to the rising showed clearly the impossibility of fighting on equal terms against English power : discouraged, the ultra-extremists then joined Sinn Fein. To it came by degrees the

bulk of the country, to it was due the pushing forward of the revolt owing to the war and what followed the military suppression of 1916, then the check to Home Rule and the Convention of 1917-1918. Supported by popular sentiment, it thus became a political party. In November, 1917, it had 1,200 clubs in the country : Mr. de Valera became head of the movement instead of and in the place of Mr. Griffith : the man of action took precedence of the man of thought. At last it triumphed at the General Election of December, 1918. At the same time its tendencies became modified with its position ; a large number could not be satisfied with a policy of waiting ; without giving up any of its old principles, it rallied to the republican idea, not for love of the republic, but to save the future form of the constitution. It also became reconciled to "physical force," which it intended to adapt to circumstances and possibilities. Behold Sinn Fein in power, become republican and revolutionary.

III.—SINN FEIN POLICY AT HOME AND ABROAD.

In the beginning of the revolution there was no intention of using "physical force" ; this, for want of other methods, came later. It was if not a republic, at least a revolutionary and republican form of government, which Sinn Fein at first tried to constitute, and to this end it employed methods which it had always advocated—passive resistance ; the reconstitution of Ireland outside of and in spite of English law.

As early as the 21st of January, 1919, the Irish National Assembly, Dáil Eireann, met at Dublin, where the candidates elected the previous month assembled. Of the seventy-three Sinn Fein members elected, thirty-six were then in prison, four were in exile, so there were only about thirty members present, mostly ardent, intransigent young men, fearless and uncompromising, but without experience or knowledge

of the reality of things. With them were some older men, some "old academic greybeards." The Dáil passed a solemn Declaration of Irish Independence; it decreed a provisional constitution and elected a Ministry composed of five members. Suppressed the following September, it continued to meet secretly at intervals.

The new government strove to prevent the English Government in Ireland functioning, while it tried itself to govern the country, it established national institutions which in time replaced those already in existence. Between the English Government and the republican and revolutionary government, the struggle commenced. Struggle in which the latter remarkably enough had some singular successes.

To begin with, it applied itself to the country's economic well-being. It started proceedings to investigate the national resources, it worked for the establishment of new industries, it advocated a commercial fleet, it fought against emigration, against drunkenness, against the abuses of English importations and the export of food-stuffs: it floated a loan in Ireland, and another in America. Then it tried its hand at local administration: in the January and June elections of 1920, the public bodies in the counties, urban and rural districts and boroughs joined Sinn Fein in large numbers; they gave their allegiance to the Dáil, and ignored the British authorities. Lastly, in the greater part of the country, they instituted courts of justice and a police force, which functioned fairly well. Republican courts of justice, criminal as well as civil, were held to a certain extent everywhere; in the month of June, 1920, they were functioning simultaneously in the 26 counties. They were attended by republican police, composed of volunteers. They enjoyed a certain authority; even the Unionist newspapers testified to their diligence and competence; even the Anglo-Irish appealed to this illegal but honest

and impartial jurisdiction. In the West, agrarian agitation found scope under cover of the disturbance : the arbitration courts suppressed the disorder, and often succeeded in restoring the lands to the farmer to the satisfaction of the landlord. Meanwhile official tribunals were deserted or prevented from functioning, magistrates and justices resigned ; jurors and witnesses failed to appear ; the accused also were often missing, the regular police being unable to apprehend them. At Birr on the 8th of June, 1920, a judge was to be seen sitting in an empty court, while on the other side of the street a republican court was passing judgment on the cases down for hearing by the former.

Thus it came about in the spring of 1920, the authority of the Crown had become but little more than a name. Amazed at this spontaneous production of extra-legal powers, at first the British Government yielded and did not interfere. But it corrected itself and smartly replied. It harried the revolutionary tribunals, it hunted and imprisoned the judges and voluntary police, with the result that before long there was no machinery of justice functioning in the country. It cut down the finances of the local administrative councils by refusing grants or certain taxes which it habitually deposited with them, and which represented the best part of their resources ; so that these councils, not daring to burden their areas with new and heavy taxes, soon found themselves forced to reduce services, and at times to suppress them : lunatics were sometimes released, and hospitals closed. It was local anarchy. How would it end? A pacific revolution could only succeed against an authority that surrenders. The struggle could not be continued unless it were transformed from peaceful methods to those of arms.

Concurrently with this work at home, the Republican " Government " also endeavoured to pursue operations abroad : it tried by a clever propaganda to obtain

diplomatic recognition by the Powers, and give the Irish question an international character. As early as the month of January, 1919, the Dáil issued an "appeal to the Nations" proclaiming the historic rights and the Independence of Ireland, asking the "free nations" to recognise Ireland as a free nation, and to allow the "Irish Republic" to make good its case at the Peace Conference; it named its ambassadors to Paris. Republican Ireland had then many illusions as to the intentions of the Allies, and the support which the United States could give her cause. What high but vain hopes were awakened by the manifesto in which President Wilson promised peace and justice and appealed for the domination of justice founded on the free will of the people with the consent of the governed! Had not the House of Representatives voted a declaration on the 4th of March, 1919, interceding for Ireland at the Peace Conference in Paris, and the 4th of June following, had not the Washington Senate, with only two dissentients approved a motion, declaring itself favourable to the wishes of Ireland for a government of her own choice, and asking that the Conference hear the Irish delegates? Even at Paris, the Irish propaganda was supported by the presence of three Irish-American envoys—Messrs. Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan, who, again laid a memorandum before President Wilson—appropriately enough, of fourteen points—on the Irish claims, and also profited by their stay in Europe to make an investigation *de visu* in the Green Isle, whence they brought back a document of violent accusations against the government of the "Castle."

However, Ireland's diplomatic hopes were fatally mistaken. Messrs. O'Kelly and Gavan Duffy, delegates of the "elected government of the Irish Republic," laid down Ireland's claims before the Chairman at the Peace Conference, but Ireland was not admitted to the Conference—she could not be,

having left the war, if not vanquished, at least as a dissident, and always subject to the great victor, England—the request of her delegates was not even officially received. The blow was completed by Article 10 of the League of Nations, which set down that "members of the League undertake to respect and maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of all present members of the League against outside aggression." It was as if by preterition the formal condemnation of Ireland. But she did not accept this condemnation, and she worked energetically against the Treaty of Versailles in the United States, the only country in which she had some influence, where "President" de Valera, having escaped from his English prison in the autumn of 1919, was to start an intensive propaganda. He received the Freedom of the City in New York from Mayor Heylan. We know the United States rejected the League of Nations. But did this rejection, due first of all purely to American considerations, help matters in Ireland? Ireland only succeeded in interesting public opinion, realising, somewhat late, that sentiment does not enter into the politics of the Great Powers, and that moral courage, impartiality and generosity find, alas! no place in them.

IV.—THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR ON THE IRISH SIDE.

Ireland therefore had nothing more to hope for, and England no more to fear from a foreign intervention. The world was indifferent, and they are alone, terribly alone, face to face. From now on they resorted to arms. England tightened the vice of coercion, Ireland made use of "physical force." Who had begun it? Idle question in a struggle lasting seven centuries. The truth was both sides were eager to come to blows. Ireland, with the idea that, peace-

ful methods being useless, this was the only means left her. England, making believe that having attempted all to conciliate Ireland, it only remained to subdue her. England declared suppression was an answer to the rebellion: "reprisals" did not start, Mr. Lloyd George declared, until a hundred policemen had been assassinated. On the other hand, Ireland proclaimed that by insurrection she was resisting coercion, and using only legitimate means of defence. Let British aggression cease, the rebellion would cease too! She declared that this coercion was intolerable and horrible: in 1917, there were 340 political arrests, 24 deportations, and 2 murders of civilians; in 1918, 1,106 political arrests, 77 deportations, and 5 civilians murdered (murders which remained unpunished like those of the preceding year), 260 private houses were raided: this took place before Ireland was guilty of any criminal intentions since the Easter rebellion. It was not until January, 1919, that the first policeman was shot; that year there were to be 15 or 16.

Coercion became more intense. In September, 1919, the "Castle" suppressed all known political organisations, thus driving the country into the arms of secret societies, leaving the ground free for the more violent; to which the reply was the abominable attempt on the life of Marshal French in December. So harsh was the suppression, that the *Times* suspected there was provocation, and accused the "Castle," or the reactionary coterie who reigned in it, of driving Ireland to a revolt which would soon be steeped in blood, or at least of creating such a state of affairs in the country that ordered government would become impossible; in other words, of playing the same game as Pitt did in 1798, which ended with the suppression of the Dublin Parliament by the Act of Union. From January, 1919, to March, 1920, there were 22,279 Irish houses raided, 17 murders, 2,332

political arrests, 151 people deported, and 402 decrees for the suppression of meetings or of newspapers.

Be that as it may, it was proved that from the beginning of 1920, violence on both sides shook off all restraint, and let itself go. The "Castle" at all costs wished to re-establish its power; at all costs Sinn Fein would destroy this power, and expel British rule from the country, wear it out, paralyse it, and so prove coercion powerless, and show that Ireland could not be governed by England. At the same time on the side of the "Forces of the Crown" coercion had gone mad under the form of "reprisals" while on the Irish side the insurrection became organised in criminal attempts, which had remained isolated and sporadic until then, and entered upon a systematic campaign, concrete and co-ordinated, for the "suppression" of the British Government with all its agents, from those at the bottom to those at the top of the ladder.

Insurrection? Not a mass rising and ambitious offensive, where, the struggle being too unequal, it was clear that against the English military forces Ireland would be powerless in an ordered battle—but guerilla warfare. Every day, everywhere, under a thousand different forms, from shootings to isolated acts of arson, ambushes, or unexpected local attacks up to raids on a large scale, notorious by their outrages; the ingenious guerilla-soldier, who acted quickly and by artifice, in unexpected attacks and lyings-in-waiting, mysteriously hidden, always appearing in the most unexpected places, un-nerving the civilian with constant revolver shots or the bursting of bombs, constantly on the alert fearing sudden attacks when in a few moments he will see some of his men killed, communications cut, his positions taken, his arms snatched from him before he has had time to reconnoitre and defend himself. So it was organised crime? It is war, replied Sinn Fein.

By the votes and the will of the people, the republican government is by right the government of Ireland, we cause it to be respected by fighting the only way we can against the usurper who occupies our country, we are neither anarchists in revolt against legitimate authority, nor Imperialists seeking conquest, but the avengers and liberators of our country trampled under foot by a foreign oppressor.

Money was not wanting for this "war," as much came from America as was needed ; it was also raised in the country by voluntary or forced contributions ; where possible it was taken without scruple from the British authorities. An army was raised. Doubtless in no way resembling what is usually understood by the word "army," but, notwithstanding, something to be reckoned with, because imperceptible : Volunteers—some being forced into it by the Republican Terror—called up as need arose, fairly well disciplined, very brave, living and fighting while scattered, formed of small movable detachments, flying columns, like our Vendeans, living on the country, hidden in the towns, or else withdrawing to the hills, whence they would unexpectedly descend to "operate," and where after operations they found shelter ; they were to be found at the one time everywhere and nowhere. Sometimes women or young girls brought them, at the desired moment, arms which were hidden under their skirts, and which were afterwards put away ; meeting secretly they strike a blow and disappear into the night amongst the crowd, or in the corn. The Irish Republican Army with its improvised chiefs, M. Collins, R. Mulcahy, C. Brugha, was not very numerous ; it was rare to find in any county more than 50 or 100 men at a time in action, but their substitutes were always near at hand, ready to march, and the substitutes of these substitutes. It was said, the more violent became British coercion, the more volunteers arrived ; the day when little Kevin Barry,

aged 17 years, was hanged, several hundreds of young men joined up in Dublin.

These men feared nothing, undertaking any job against the enemy Government, its "hirelings" and its "tools." They began in a small way, then little by little the scene of operations became wider. Arms and ammunition were wanting; it was sport to them procuring guns and revolvers, also bombs and grenades, explosives, even motor cycles and motor cars, by attacking police stations, barracks, regular marching detachments, military trains of provisions. It was also sport burning in a couple of days, as was done in the West in the spring of 1920, 150 constabulary barracks, which had previously been evacuated by the police who, taking shelter in the towns, where they were better protected, abandoned a large part of the rural districts to the insurgents. To a certain extent everywhere courthouses were burnt down and public treasury offices; in May, 1921, in Dublin, not without loss of life, they set fire to the Custom House, where the Local Government Board and the Income Tax Administration had their offices. They cut the telegraph and telephone wires, they destroyed the central stations, they attacked and pillaged post offices, they stopped post office vans and official messengers, they tried to break open the prisons to liberate their friends. They kidnapped and hid away generals, officers, magistrates, and landlords, because they were working against the cause. They searched and made investigations in private houses: sometimes burning the houses of their adversaries.

In Dublin, the Metropolitan Police, being neutral and disarmed, were spared; as also the *Tommies* generally (excepting as a reprisal) when strolling in the streets of the town unarmed in the evening with his girl, and officers off duty, those acting on courts-martial being excepted. But from the beginning they attacked in great numbers the Royal Irish Con-

stabulary, this military police force, powerfully armed, composed mostly of Irishmen—" traitors " of whom the country must be rid—a force which indeed, weakened by discouragement, resignations, the checking to native recruiting, was soon to be revived by the annexing of the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries of sinister reputation : these became the everyday target of the republicans, the constabulary officers, district or county inspectors being specially chosen. They struck down the agents, direct or indirect, of the " Castle," crown witnesses, the *activists* who helped the British authorities in the war against Ireland. Above all, spies or informers irrespective of sex were executed ; on the corpse, abandoned by the roadside, often a piece of paper, with the following words, was pinned : " Judged, condemned, and executed. Spies beware ! Irish Republican Army." " Judged " being a figure of speech, there being no trial and no defence. This so-called justice was expeditious, mistakes were made, and sometimes admitted, the " green terror " did not consider the methods adopted for imposing its law, believing it justified itself by urging the necessities of war, which showed that Sinn Fein in battle needed to reassure its followers, and that, supported by the confidence of the country, it had the right to be unrelenting to traitors, its duty being to make all who would disobey its orders or try to harm its cause, at least respect its will.

They shot no matter where, no matter when, in the house of their victim, in hotels, restaurants, cinemas, tramcars, in crowded streets : a shot, the man fell, and the assailant disappeared ; or else four or five associates took the victim aside, and left him lying dead a few paces off. The best part of the time, so great was the terror no one present dared to move, knowing that at the slightest movement ten Brownings would cover him, and no one dared to

give evidence in court, knowing his life would be forfeit.

Towards the forces of the Crown, with insolence, in the twinkling of an eye, the *coup de main* often succeeded. Raids were carried out on armed stations, the blockhouse and barracks. Troop trains were derailed or blown up. Motor waggons full of soldiers or constables were attacked with muskets or grenade in the crowded street, or in the open country : in the course of events civilians were killed or wounded. What did it matter ! Assaults were launched by carefully laid ambushes on parties of regular troops. The Company Commandant, in charge of operations, made preparations to the smallest detail ; he arranged for each man his part, who was to use bombs, musket or revolver, he placed his men, organised patrols, sent out scouts for information as to the enemy's movements, disposed the rearguard and the lines of retreat, and gave account to his chiefs in writing. As the need arose, bridges were destroyed, roads blocked, trenches dug, telephone wires cut, and districts or towns isolated. At times real miniature battles took place, lasting several hours, a couple of hundred men being engaged on either side.

It cannot be denied, that in this guerilla warfare, although violence had its place, there were many acts of chivalry. We will not mention here the small but vile daily terrorisms, the boycotting, the tresses of the young girls cut because they frequented or aided the constabulary. One could not see without repugnance, during " operations " republicans donning the English uniform, mixing with women and children, to shoot with greater freedom. What more horrible than women murdered at their husband's side ? And what more awful atrocity than " Bloody Sunday "—the 21st of November, 1920, when, in Dublin, a dozen British officers in the morning were assassinated, all at the same hour, some in bed in

the presence of their wives? Besides, to political crime was added that of common lawlessness. Private vendetta was an easy matter under cover of the "execution of spies." The burning of a castle or the murder of someone of note brought to mind the *Whiteboys* of long ago. How keep within bounds, or curb crime when, the principal foundations of society being overturned, crime itself had become the law?

V.—THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR ON THE ENGLISH SIDE.

In spite of everything, we must say those invested with executive powers rivalled in excess and violence the revolutionaries.

Against a rigorous but just suppression nothing could have been said, severity being legitimate as well as necessary in contending with crime, from the outset and without the misuse of authority. With the whole arsenal of the coercion laws, with the Peace Restoration Act of 1920, which suppressed juries and organised courts-martial, and a state of siege imposed in the south-west of Ireland in December,[1] the Government was invested with considerable repressive as well as prosecuting powers. On simple suspicion, it could imprison, deport, or intern anyone in concentration camps; these contained at the end of June,

[1] In this connection, power was given the military command in the country. The police, who in the ordinary way took orders from the Castle, passed from its authority (a move which in truth had its advantages). Orders were issued to the population to give up within a stated time the arms in its possession, under penalty of death: the order, however, was not obeyed. It was forbidden, under pain of death, to aid, support, or give shelter to the rebels. Gatherings of more than six people were interdicted. Curfew started at 7 in the evening, no one being allowed out at night. A list of names of the inmates in every house had to be fixed on the door. In the West Cork district, in February, the military authorities ordered the forced enlistment of all men between the ages of 17 and 50, as "Civic Guards," in formation of half-companies of Guards, their duty being to oppose ambushes or Sinn Fein attacks, under their own personal responsibility.

1921, 3,252 people; and there were then in prison 1,579 untried individuals, plus 1,227 condemned by penal courts. It could visit at any hour all private houses; arrest, question and search all pedestrians, trap in town all occupants of a train or tramcar, spectators in cinemas or the faithful in church; surround a neighbourhood with Crown forces, a market-town or village, with a big detachment of troops, armoured cars, motors with blinds drawn, machine guns and barbed wire, for the purpose of searching and minutely investigating each person and each locality separately. It restricted and at times prohibited traffic; and put a close censorship on newspapers and correspondence.

The use of such powers could not always be kept within limits. Indeed, it was unpleasant to see a price put on heads, with rewards promised to informers, suspected people placed on lorries as hostages, political prisoners treated as criminals. Police searches become persecutions, as when visiting cloistered religious houses or a church during the Forty Hours Adoration. It was alarming to witness at courts-martial sentences imposed out of all proportion to the offence, and death sentences against which the most highly placed judges protested. Abuse was easy, and we must admit, almost fatal. But the public conscience has ever the right to insist that in the use of force, of no matter how repressive a character, the authority representing law and order shall itself conform to law and order; this is essential, and it is what was essentially missing.

True, it was no easy matter to cope with crime, when there were none to help authority in putting it down. It was not easy to quell a guerilla war, when the authorities were hated by four-fifths of the population. Here was a new problem which the British mind, slow to recover and adapt itself, was unable to solve impromptu. To subdue Sinn Fein and resume

the reins of a government, which, towards the middle of 1920 had slackened through impotency, defiance and anarchy, order had to be restored by a solid occupation of the country with forces well in hand and disciplined. It was necessary to subdue the Republican Army by skilled military operations, and while accomplishing this, to guarantee to the majority of the country the protection of the law, and make the population an ally, not an enemy, with a view to obtaining the support of public opinion by a fair policy of concessions. Whether at the proper time, the British Government failed to have a clear insight into the necessities of the situation, or whether they were forestalled by events, and taken by surprise, they were led to adopt a different course. While Mr. Lloyd George loudly declared that it was simply a matter of laying hands on the "gang of assassins" and delivering Ireland from the yoke of a few hundred brigands, after which the population would of itself repent, and order would be restored as if by enchantment, the fact remains that the whole of Nationalist Ireland was put to fire and sword in the name of British authority; the "Castle" could only inaugurate a régime, the outcome of which, if not the object, was to fight terror by terror and meet crime by crime: in short, the law of "reprisals" applied by the Black and Tans and the "Auxiliaries," with the assistance of the army.

The best of the fighting forces of the Crown engaged in the Irish war, was the regular army, which does not imply that it was not guilty of grave excesses. It was said there were 60,000 British soldiers in Ireland. Tommy, quite young, fair and fresh in his khaki, was, generally speaking, steady and disciplined. He fought the republican army, notably by wide investing operations, reconnoitring by *avions,* destined to subdue the Irish *Comitadjs* who held the field. Unfit for police duties, he was only supposed in this case

to lend a strong helping hand to the Royal Irish Constabulary, which was far more of a military than a civil corps, created by Peel in the middle of the last century. This Constabulary, the executive organ of the "Castle" had weakened in the spring of 1920; these Irishmen refused to make war against Ireland. Not only were the vacancies filled with haste, but its strength was doubled by the enrolment of men as best they could in Great Britain, receiving recruits from amongst the demobilised soldiers, and the unemployed; a number of these being men with little to recommend them, who quickly corrupted the others. At the beginning, with khaki they wore parts of the Constabulary's black uniform; this earned them the name of "Black and Tans," which was that of a celebrated breed of Limerick hunting dogs.

Moreover, these were reinforced by the formation of so-called picked men, the "Auxiliaries" recruited in England from amongst ex-officers of the war, who were given the rank of "cadets" serving as constables. Better educated than the mob of Black and Tans, chosen from more cultivated circles, these 1,500 to 1,600 Auxiliaries are also more independent; young, full of go, energetic, they might seem, as they started out on operations, rifle in hand, and revolver hung at their side, fresh and joyous hunters out for a good day's sport.

Because of the urgency of the situation, no time was taken to discipline or train them properly; they were let loose on the country, as on a punitive expedition, with the feeling that all was permissible against these "traitors" and criminals, these *Irish swine*. They were conscious of the fact that up to now authority was powerless to punish crime; they took charge! Living in the midst of a populace for the most part hostile, in which at first sight it was difficult to distinguish members of the republican army, as these latter had no more distinctive uniform than had

the Boers twenty years before, knowing that from the pocket of the first comer in this crowd might suddenly project a revolver or a grenade, they had the feeling that they carried their lives in their hands, and said their own security depended on the amount of fear they could inspire ; *oderint dum metuant!* Instinct of preservation, spirit of revenge and licence, all conduced to make them wage war against the entire nation.

They were there as in a conquered country—" as the Germans in Belgium in 1914," said General Sir H. Lawson—defiant, growling, ruthless to crush, to brutalise, to terrorise the population, would that not be the best way to force them to " abandon " their bad ways? They indulged themselves. As the republicans sometimes cut the tresses of these Irish-women who were lukewarm or suspected, so they in turn did likewise to the pretty Sinn Feiners. They broadcast threatening letters and comminatory notices signed " Black and Tan," with a skull and two cross bones. To reach husbands they threatened the wives. While marching they shot through house windows, they also shot at whoever took cover at their approach. They ill-treated at will those whom during the night they ransacked ; forced open doors or windows, while during the search the inmates were locked in, children sometimes being separated from their mothers and left alone with the police, belongings pillaged, interrogations at the mouth of a revolver, with cries of *put 'em up!* Blows and violence were general. They struck out at random ; an English correspondent declared, " it was the reign of the knout." They even threw men into the water. Those whom they arrested were *passés á tabac,* and in a thousand ways brutally treated. At Cork, in the month of December, Auxiliaries were seen driving the populace before them with kicks. At Kinvara, in the Co. Galway, in February, they stripped seven men,

throwing them to the ground, then beat them unmercifully, and forced them to sing "God Save the King," before making them run, then firing on them in their flight. When they arrived in a new district up to then peaceful, after a time of excitement, one could be sure trouble would follow; this is exactly what happened in Waterford in the summer of 1920, and later at Ardee and Drogheda after the installation of a camp at Gormanstown. Thus, under pretext of putting down crime, and keeping criminals in awe, they only caused the population to revolt, treating them entirely as enemies and *alla turca*. The officers, dissolute more often than not, closed their eyes. It was indiscipline and violence let loose against the insurrection.

With such a form of government men quickly become demoralised, especially when from the start and during many months secure from punishment, they know they are the masters, and their own masters; drunkenness frequently added to their misdeeds, they had lost all respect for private property as well as human life. Every day there were constant robberies and pillaging. They entered the shops revolver in hand, and rifled valuables and goods; in this way a number of business people were ruined. While searching people in the street, trapped in nets, they robbed them. These perquisitions naturally afforded temptations: under pretence of searching for arms or men on the run, they abstracted money, jewels, and also especially spirits.[2]

They also destroyed and burned. They plundered and ransacked houses, they burned or blew up

[2] In February, 1921, near Trim, in the Co. Meath, a party of cadets having brought back after a raid in a private house a whole cargo of plunder, and having being caught red-handed, General Crozier, Commandant of the Auxiliaries, dismissed some from the corps and sent the others before the War Council; his resignation followed on General Tudor, his superior, refusing to ratify these orders, which made a great sensation in England.

municipal and commercial buildings, factories, farms out of which the inmates were hunted, because suspects resided there, notorious Sinn Feiners, or men on the run ; or else because a crime had been committed by republicans in the neighbourhood, if indeed it was not often on their part simply the will to terrorise. For " operations " they dressed as civilians covering their face with a white cloth with two eye-holes, or else real masks which, known as *goggles*, were given them " for night service " by the authorities.

Amongst the systematic burnings, special mention must be made of the creameries, or, as we call them in France, *fruitieres*, which during 25 years had been erected in great number in the country parts for butter and cheese-making, and were one of the important elements of the country's wealth. From April to November, 1920, 42 creameries, making one million sterling in business, were entirely or partly destroyed, in answer to attacks made on police barracks, or for the murder of Inspectors of Constabulary, or perhaps for no known reason ; in the spring of 1921, the figure soared to 61. A farm burnt meant a family ruined ; a factory, a whole staff out of employment ; a co-operative creamery, all the peasants in the district hit, as well as the owners, the farmers—the entire population of the district was affected at the one time.

Thus, for revenge, prevention or punishment, the agents of the law murdered as readily as did the revolutionaries : the guilty, suspects, militant republicans, those whose names were on the black list. At night, masked, or with faces blackened they entered a house, and seizing this one or that, murdered them in bed, or else took them out to fell them in a field or on the road, leaving the body where it lay. By accident or error, in the trouble and excitement, very often it was the innocent who was struck, the pedestrian who obstructed them, or the unknown who had the ill-luck to cause displeasure : as in the case

of Canon Magner, aged 60 years, murdered in December, 1920, by Cadet Harte, when he intervened to protect a cyclist in trouble with the police. The cadet being arrested was declared to be insane. Or, again, the old steward of a big property who, riddled with bullets, was left for dead under pretext that some months before two "spies" were "executed" by Sinn Feiners in a corner of the estate. Sometimes, the victim was some person of note in some high position: it was Lord Mayor MacCurtain of Cork, Mayor Clancy, and Mayor O'Callaghan of Limerick, all three killed in the presence of their wives, the two latter as reprisals for the murder of a general who had presided at an enquiry at Mallow. Those arrested often disappeared "without leaving any trace," according to the official version, shot at as they tried to escape, but in reality discreetly and deliberately "suppressed." Besides the murders of individuals, there were also murders on a wholesale scale, by volleys fired on the crowd by patrols in motor cars, massacres, as at Croke Park, in Dublin, on "Bloody Sunday" during a football match, under pretext (known to be false) that the police had been fired on—*man hat geschossen*—the police fire and kill or wound 63 people, it was the criminal counter-part of the assassination of the English officers that morning by the republicans.

To crown the work of violence, there were operations worked conjointly, approved of collectively of which the Irish Bishops declared in their manifesto of the 21st of October, 1920, that "it was a blind revenge of barbarians, executed with a deliberate purpose against a whole town or village, by those who were charged by the English Government to protect life and property, and to maintain law and order in Ireland, without the slightest evidence of complicity." This method began in Thurles at the commencement of 1920; then in Fermoy, Limerick, Bantry, etc., in the

spring ; in Tuam and Mallow, etc., in the summer and autumn. Each time with variations, the theme was the same. There had been crimes perpetrated in the district by Sinn Feiners, or attempted crimes. Then, usually in the middle of the night, there would arrive motor trucks full of police or troops, dressed eventually as civilians wearing masks, without officers, having all the necessary materials, explosives, petrol, incendiary bombs, and trench tools. There was a discharge of musketry. The inhabitants tried to escape half dressed into the country, some being killed. The whole village was burned or blown up, or the entire neighbourhood in a town, or a number of houses. Sometimes there was no other discernible reason for a raid than the desire to make an example. From April to July, 1920, about 60 towns or villages were in this way either partially or entirely sacked, and from then on, the rhythm of the " dragonnades " accelerated until the end of the year ; one might think he was looking on the martyred cities of Belgium, or on those of our own Northern regions : " It was worse than anything I saw in France," was said by a British sergeant.

Observe that here the point in question is : these operations were committed in cold blood, without the excuse of legitimate defence or in the heat of battle ; the attacking force came from afar equipped with all that was needed, often it appeared the buildings destroyed had been chosen beforehand. Note also, it was not a matter of striking the authors of a crime or attempted crime : punishment was meted out to a whole gathering, the guilty ones perhaps not being even there. Thus, on the 11th of December, 1920, we arrive at the most tragic event of all, the sacking of Cork. That morning, in an ambush in the vicinity the republicans killed a "cadet" and wounded eleven ; the same evening an assault was made on the most beautiful part of the city by the Auxiliaries and the

Black and Tans who ill-treated the population, shooting at random, and burning the Carnegie Library, the City Hall and other municipal buildings, about fifty private houses and the greater part of Patrick Street: at the least seven million pounds worth of damage was done, not counting the pillaging. "Cork," wrote a priest, "resembled Louvain."

All this was "unofficial," "unauthorised," and "ignored" by those in power. After Cork, as after each battle, the "Castle" denied the responsibility of the Crown, against all evidence, and was content to put all excesses to the doing of Sinn Fein. We must admit one would have to be very ignorant of the traditions and spirit dominating the Castle to believe, without severely criticising, its declarations or *communiqués,* which were nothing more than a means of offensive or a diplomatic defence which it unscrupulously used in its war against Ireland. In reality while theoretically condemning the violence, and "reprisals" carried on *proprio motu* by the police, it tolerated them for months, tacitly approved, and in an underhand way encouraged them. They knew that in Dublin there is no offence when one "sees red," they knew that nothing would be said; certainly there would be no adequate punishment, no public enquiry, and no serious measures taken to prevent a repetition of the scandal. Orders and circulars to the police against excesses were without sanction, therefore, non-efficacious. As a set-off there was this or that explanation given by the Chief Secretary, and even by the Prime Minister, which, by excuses and congratulations directed to the police, were very real incentives to wrong; as in the case of the official paper, the *Weekly Summary* distributed to them gratis.

Notwithstanding—after the sacking of Cork—the time came when the Castle, while making certain admissions had, though timidly, in the way of repres-

sion to try re-establishing some sort of order in its own house. It was not easy, at least in what concerned the Auxiliaries and the Black and Tans who had got completely out of hand, and whose insubordination had become, in the school of crime, a formidable strength. During the first three months of 1921, 43 men were, after trial, dismissed from the police force, and 24 condemned by courts-martial; later on in the year there were death sentences for assassinations. By way of retaliation for this enforced punishment of their men, the authorities decided to organise "official" reprisals against republicans by the methodical destruction of houses, farms and villages, by order and under control of the Command, and having notified the inhabitants. The motive, was either that an ambush had been laid in the neighbourhood against the regular troops—the inhabitants should have known this and given warning—or more generally that the places were inhabited by active Sinn Feiners. From January to May, 185 buildings and steadings were thus destroyed with all their belongings, amongst the number being some owned by loyalists. The method of suppression was largely made use of twenty years before by the English in the Transvaal, and Mr. Lloyd George at that time was one of those who protested the loudest against this "farm burning." Besides, official reprisals did not deter the others from carrying on. It was a competition between the one and the other: ordered violence, far from opposing, only added to that committed without authority, against order, and in disorder.

VI.—THE TERROR. IRISH RESPONSIBILITIES.

Thus, from the beginning of 1920 to the middle of 1921, it was a pitiless war, unnameable horrors in a crescendo of ferocity. A vicious circle, one desperate outrage outbidding another, revenge and provocation.

As the "Castle" termed murders the so-called executions by Sinn Fein, so Sinn Fein termed assassinations the hangings by the "Castle" by sentence of courts-martial: it said, "England executes her prisoners of war." To "reprisals" it responded by counter-reprisals. When in February, five Sinn Feiners were put to death in Dublin for surprise attacks on the police, in retaliation the following day five unarmed English soldiers were killed in the streets of Cork; then from the regular forces came the non-official reprisals; there was no reason why it should cease. In January, Sinn Fein declared that for each house burnt by the law, that of a loyalist would be also burned; the "Castle" replied by making it known that for every one house three would be burned; it was giving a free hand to crime. The war in being prolonged, had become intensified on either side.[1]

Terror reigned on one side and the other, the innocent often being the victims. The revolver and bomb were all powerful. Whence came the shots? It was not always known, one lived in darkness, and in the dark anyone may be struck, from right and left, for revenge, by error or accident. No one was master of his life or of his property. One went to bed with the knowledge that perhaps during the night the house would be "raided," and that he would be suddenly awakened by kicks on the door—"Open quick, if not, we will break it open"—and the night raid, always accompanied with brutality, would mean either arson or death. At night time was often heard the noise of shooting, or explosions in the darkened streets, where the Black and Tans were masters. In the morning, the walls were pitted with bullets, and in the papers

1 From the 1st of January, 1921, to the 30th of June, there were 641 killed and 606 wounded in the republican army and amongst the population, and 350 killed and 511 wounded of the Forces of the Crown. The Sinn Fein authorities counted during the twelve months of 1920 by the "Castle's" agents 48,474 raids on private houses, 98 deaths of unarmed civilians and 115 "prisoners assassinated."

were long lists of deeds of violence — ambushes, fighting, arrests, executions, burnings and assassinations. There were "hold-ups" the whole day long, police traps, pedestrians stopped and searched; military demonstrations, sometimes with aeroplanes and tanks; Auxiliary patrols in motors, and Black and Tans in lorries, with guns levelled ready to fire, scouring the streets at all paces in every direction, or of armed soldiers in helmets circuiting in their heavy waggons covered with metallic nets; then, at a street turning, the bursting of a bomb or the bang of a revolver, the smart reply of firing of musketry, stampeding the passing crowds, who sought shelter, and the innocent fell.

In the villages, in the market-towns it was different; the small galling and demoralising tyrannies, menaces and violence; when there were not worse crimes on one side or the other. Ruralist and burgess are equal before the inquisition and terror which, if forcing them to open their eyes and ears, makes them shut their mouths. Life continued, shops were opened, but the people were vigilant, distrustful and silent. Laughter had disappeared, society and even families were divided, social intercourse, formerly marked with so much good grace and ease, even between political adversaries, was embittered. The population was suffering from a nervous tension, especially the women and children, owing to a morbid depression. "Our existence is a nightmare," wrote a Kerry priest in December, 1920.

The people said nothing, it was difficult to divine their thoughts. One thing was sure, with the exception of Ulster, everybody in Ireland condemned with horror the "Castle's" policy of "reprisals." Southern Unionists of former days, such as Sir Horace Plunkett, Lord Monteagle, or The O'Conor Don, protested with the greatest energy against the Government's excesses. Even moderates were

driven into the republican camp, by the thousand, and among the pro-English some noted recruits—such as Mr. Erskine Childers—were won over to the rebel cause. This does not mean that everyone alike approved Sinn Fein. To begin with, when they had spread through the whole of Ireland, they were no longer as in the beginning a mere something and heterogeneous. They were led by Catholics and Protestants, landlords and labour men, priests and lay men, whose inclinations did not always coincide. There was a relatively moderate Sinn Fein, there was also a Sinn Fein with particularly advanced ideas. There was an intellectual Sinn Fein, doctrinaire, romantic, dreaming of Robert Emmet or of 1848, and a militant Sinn Fein. In the republican army, besides the gunmen of the American type, the fanatic, or "professionals," were to be found brave boys, young peasants ignorant of the world and of politics, but sincere in their patriotic convictions and their sense of right—religious, temperate, with an unsullied past, having no hatred for their adversary.

This explains why the bulk of Irish opinion with regard to Sinn Fein held many divergent views. The young were the most ardent; with them, the women who fifty years ago were opposed to Fenianism, to-day were warm supporters of Sinn Fein; then the enthusiasts, idealists, who in Ireland are legion, and the rebels. In the opposition, we find besides the Unionists or what remained of them, law abiding and experienced business men, those of the middle class, commercial leaders, big farmers. The old Home Rulers, who formerly dominated, while opposed to extremism, were none the less hostile to English oppression; powerless against political violence, disgusted and paralysed, they stood apart, nominally labelled Sinn Feiners, for they knew not which way to turn.

Betwixt and between, with or without zeal, the mass of them were for Sinn Fein, for since the fall of Home

Rule it was the only live reality in Ireland. They were won over to the ideal of independence, thus following the lesser clergy and some members of the Episcopate. Violence had no attraction for them. The Bishops, in each of their pastorals, condemned Irish crimes not without admitting as a rule that the existing state of war excused certain actions ; the Chief Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood publicly exploited their efforts to end terrorism. But, in each of their pastorals, they also and more severely condemned the excesses of the Crown Forces, denouncing them as more serious and more culpable than those of the revolutionaries, because committed by those who pretended, and who should have been, the representatives of law and order and justice. So judged, with its spiritual heads, the bulk of Irish opinion. It justified military operations and condemned the outrages of civilians. If, for the militant republicans, the crimes with which they were reproached were really no more than acts of a patriotic defence, legitimate in the struggle for enfranchisement which helped Ireland against the conquering foreigner, average opinion condemned them as criminal acts committed in a just cause ; as for example it considered the assassination of British officers on " Bloody Sunday " in the same way as the average opinion in England considered the massacre in Croke Park on the same " Bloody Sunday."

In condemning them, it was at the same time convinced that the British Government was the aggressor, and by its policy of coercion let loose a hurricane of crime. It condemned, but it was inclined to believe that the regime so-called of " counter-reprisals," if not justifying, at least excused them. That is the reason why the crimes of Sinn Fein did not alienate it from Sinn Fein. That is why the great majority remained more or less in open sympathy with it and brought it an effective support of at least a tacit

connivance. No one would lift a finger to assist materially or morally the Crown Forces in their work of suppression, but no one refused a night's shelter to a republican on the run, no matter the risk incurred by this act of complicity. Also, it could be said that eighty per cent. of Nationalist Ireland was actively or passively for Sinn Fein, the remainder supporting it through fear or terror. As General C. B. Thomson said, "without the loyal support of this eighty per cent. of the population, the republican army could not have held out for two months." It would be useless looking elsewhere for the prime cause of the powerlessness of England to break the Irish carbonarism; without the support of public opinion she could do nothing, and her initial and decisive mistake was not having, first of all, tried all possible means to rally the majority to her side, and conciliate the elementary forces of society in her struggle against extremism.

Thus Ireland could not wash her hands of Sinn Fein, and disown it as she could have done the Easter rising of 1916, or France the Commune of 1871. Her responsibilities were entirely involved in the crimes which sullied her cause. Heavy responsibility! Without doubt, they were not the ordinary crimes of brutal instincts, vile or vicious. "It was not a single explosion of criminality in the ordinary sense of the word," wrote the high English ecclesiastical dignitaries in a public letter to Mr. Lloyd George. They were the outcome of a national struggle for liberty. It would be unjust to judge them outside their ambient, or refuse to see them in the same light as we view in history what passed in the course of all big struggles of peoples striving for independence. But if a nation has a right to liberty, it does not follow that it is immaterial what methods it makes use of to assert this right. As the Bishop of Cork wrote:—"The proclamation of an Irish Republic by the Sinn Fein Members of Parliament, after the general elections of

1918, was not sufficient to constitute Ireland a republic. It is another thing to demand the right to a free self-determination with a view to obtain independence . . . . another thing to say that each small nation at present comprised in a greater monarchy becomes a sovereign state by the simple fact of proclaiming the principle of self-determination with the right to kill the servants of the Crown, and destroy the property of the State . . . ."

VII.—ENGLISH RESPONSIBILITIES.

The fault of the one does not efface that of the other. And yet it was only human that as Sinn Fein tried to hide its outrages behind those of the official forces, the British Government in its difficulty to defend its policy towards Ireland tried to hide its own behind those of Sinn Fein. After having for a long time denied all the accusations made against its servants, it had in due course to resign itself and acknowledge what it could no longer deny. But in owning up, it made excuses. It put all responsibility on the treachery of its unworthy adversaries, who exasperated its loyal defenders. "If there is war, there must be war on both sides," said Mr. Lloyd George at Carnarvon, in October, 1920. "Are the police to allow themselves to be beaten like dogs? Let us be just to these men who do their duty bravely." A woman having been killed by a shot fired from a military lorry, it was, "one of those unfortunate incidents which happen in every war." It pleaded provocation, as Ireland did against it, and the right of legitimate defence which was equal on both sides. It refused to have public inquiries, under pretext of the troubled state of Ireland. Driven by the Die-hards of the Tory Party, it preached violently the necessity for the use of force to stamp out Sinn Fein, a necessity which exceeded all else, and before which nothing

else counted. "We must break the back of terrorism before we can have peace," declared the Prime Minister. And again, "Force is no remedy, but to abandon force now, would be to capitulate before violence, crime and separatism."

British opinion as a whole was far from associating itself with the attitude of unscruplous ease displayed by the Government on the question of "reprisals." Misinformed on Irish affairs, slow to be roused, it was, however, roused, and from the autumn of 1920 uneasiness, embarrassment and doubt gave way to a lively and general sentiment of reprobation.

Among all classes and all parties, excepting that of the extreme Right, in all the newspapers from the *Times* to those with more advanced ideas, on platforms and in Parliament, voices rose from all parts protesting against "reprisals" and demanding an inquiry. Those of Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Grey were the first to make themselves heard; Messrs. Asquith and Henderson, leaders of the Liberal-Radical and Labour parties, also joined in attacking the Government. During the summer of 1920, a "Committee of Peace with Ireland" was set up, under the chairmanship of Lord H. Cavendish Bentinck, with the object of appealing to public opinion against the regime of "anarchy," of "reprisals," and calling on it to defend "the fundamental principles of law and British Liberty." Then came into being a Committee of English Catholics in which figured Mr. Hilaire Belloc, Sir Philip Gibbs, etc., who addressed a memorandum to the Prime Minister to the same end. The 17th of November, seventeen Anglican Bishops published a "resolution" demanding that an end be put to military terrorism: "We believe that force engenders force, that reprisals create reprisals . . . ." Meantime, the Labour Party sent Mr. Henderson with a commission of inquiry to Ireland, whose report, published in January, made a great impression. The

22nd of February, the Protestant Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of England, in a speech to the House of Lords, supported the protestations with his authority. Representatives of intellectuals in England, poets, literary men, artists and professors, issued a vibrating manifesto, in which they declared themselves "profoundly humiliated" at the state of affairs in Ireland. Lastly, in April, the high dignitaries of English Protestantism made a public appeal to the Government declaring it was "absolutely illegal, no matter how much provocation there was, trying to overcome evil by another form of evil equally indefensible," and complained that the actual policy of England in Ireland was causing great uneasiness in the Empire, and exposing England to misunderstandings and hostile criticisms, even on the part of nations animated towards her by the most friendly feelings."

It was certainly a great credit to the English people, that at a time when the outrages of Sinn Fein provoked on their part a very natural indignation they none the less in great numbers protested against the regime of "reprisals," protests which we cannot believe were all simply a vain desire to make a political opposition to Mr. Lloyd George. The protests, however, did not change the Irish policy of the Government, which the *Manchester Guardian* one day declared to be "the most awful chapter in our history since 1798." They made no change either in its responsibilities, they only pointed them out.

"It was not for having too severely enforced the law" that it was reproached, "but for having suspended all law, and having put a regime of terror in its place"; so wrote the *Times*. Its first duty was to maintain law and order, according to the traditional formula, and it was the one which precisely it failed to fulfil in Ireland, instead it provoked anarchy. "If lawlessness is to be the reply to lawlessness," wrote

the *Observer* in August, 1921, " it means the destruction of all established law." And Lord Robert Cecil said nearly the same thing in the House of Commons on the 21st of February following : " the supremacy of the law is the guarantee of freedom, and reprisals are the negation of this supremacy."

What the Government was reproached with, was not that it wished to suppress excesses too harshly, but, " with having punished crime by counter-crime, and chastised the innocent instead of the guilty . . . . with having substituted revenge for justice " : " an all-powerful revenge," that was, according to Mr. Asquith, the policy of the authorities in Ireland, a " policy of violence without discrimination or responsibility." A " criminal " policy, " cruel and inhuman," according to the Henderson Commission enquiry. The Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords on the 22nd of February said : " It is not a question of policy, but a question of morals, of what is just and what is unjust . . . . If peace can only be procured by unjust methods, then such a peace is not worth obtaining. One does not pursue or chastise friends by invoking the aid of the devil himself."

According to General C. B. Thomson the tragic irony of the situation was, that the Government had not effectively " ordered " " reprisals " ; it " allowed them. It did not consider its responsibility." Its policy of coercion was as if " ashamed of itself." According to Sir Philip Gibbs, there was " absence " of authority, while instead of making an " honest effort " with a view to Irish peace, it allowed its officials, the police and the army, to fight " terror with terror." The Government brought to light with the Black and Tans " an undisciplined and unbridled force." It created an army which it could not control and which " got completely out of hand," concluded the Henderson report ; if it did not directly and pre-

cisely advise "reprisals" none the less it "was entirely responsible," for as much as "it associated itself with the crimes committed by the forces of the Crown, and took upon itself to defend them."

G. K. Chesterton wrote: "What we maintain in Ireland is not a Government, not even a pretence of Government. At the best it is war, and a very barbarous war . . . . a war *à la prussienne*." "Prussianism!" How many times has that word been repeated by English people when speaking of what was done in the sister island in their name. If it is war, "at least it should be carried on according to the rules of civilisation," wrote the *Westminster Gazette*. "It is a degrading and cowardly war," affirmed the Air Force Commandant, Erskine Childers, it is "the regime of military dishonour." And this filled with sadness the old soldiers who would see and judge for themselves, like Generals Sir H. Gough, C. B. Thomson, and Sir H. Lawson; or those who, like General Crozier, preferred to resign rather than stay and serve under such a form of Government.

"The Government has trifled with the honour of the country," the *Times* concluded. And in the same way the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "The system of reprisals discredits the Government . . . . its policy puts us outside the pale of civilised nations." This was the feeling expressed by the Henderson Commission at the end of its report: "Things have been done in Ireland in the name of Great Britain, which must cause her name to be held in horror by the whole world. The honour of our country has been gravely compromised. Not only does there exist in Ireland a reign of terror, which should make every British citizen blush with shame, but there is a small nation kept in subjection by an Empire which proudly boasts that it is the friend of small nations . . . ."

VIII.—THE TRUCE (JULY, 1921).

And what after all was the result? From the material point of view it would seem that the war between Erin and Albion, the war of the two sisters, was fruitless inasmuch as it was culpable and cruel, and on both sides the use of force was a failure. The English were unable to bring the Irish to reason, the Irish could not "oust the English." In the month of June, 1921, they had come to a deadlock. Each maintained their position without being able to take that of their adversary. There was no hope of a military decision on either side. Here and there lassitude was apparent, if not in the combatants, at least because public opinion was weary of the carnage. So they had to come to negotiating. It was not peace, but a step towards peace. The Truce was signed the 19th of July, 1921, between the English and Irish authorities.

From a military point of view, there was no decided victory; but that does not mean that politically the two adversaries were not far from being at the same point as before the war.

If the English Government was able to maintain its occupation in Ireland, it failed in restoring British "law and authority," which by coercion and reprisals it only made an abuse and misuse of force, of a legitimate and necessary force to suppress crime, but irregular, unconscious of Irish aspirations and rights, and never having known how to bring with it a timely conciliation with just concessions; or else it had, or one had for it, the mental reservation so often denounced of provoking a general rising, a massed rebellion, so that then it would have the right before English sentiment and the opinion of the world, and that it would also have had the means, to put down and punish in such a manner as to definitely subjugate

Ireland, by " pacification " in the sense that Tacitus and Cromwell understood the term ; in one hypothesis as in the other, this policy failed before the passive and active resistance of Ireland. Martial law did not bring peace. The Black and Tans did not get the better of the gunmen. The Truce was signed without the Government having succeeded in " breaking the back of terrorism." To be a success, violence should act quickly ; if not, the opponent has time to get accustomed to it, and prepare his counter-policy, without taking into account whether public opinion is troubled or protests, or whether the foreigner is moved. In June, 1921, the defeat of the military policy of reprisals was admitted by the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and also by the Chancellor of England. They were neither able to prevent the outrages of the extremists nor restrain the republican troops who held the field ; which made Sinn Fein believe itself invincible. It only succeeded in estranging the Unionists and moderates of the South, in invigorating instead of suppressing Irish Nationalism, in fanning for generations to come the flames of hatred against England. More than ever Ireland refused to accept the English yoke.

Now, let us examine the Irish side. If Sinn Fein has been unable to oust British domination by passive resistance, if it failed to have Ireland's claims recognised at the League of Nations, it cannot be said either that its arms were victorious. It stood its ground well against England ; but that is all. Yet, it is a great deal.

It played high. The Fenians themselves had made but *coups de force,* unexpected events destined to open one's eyes and make one reflect. They did not make strength their policy. And here, behold Sinn Fein alone, and without help, expecting to bend by violence the powerful, stubborn, and victorious Albion ! Had it lost, it would have ended all hope in the

country, *la mort sans phrases*. If it risked the stake, it can be understood to a certain extent, by the effect of outside influences. As in 1798 and 1848 revolutions on the continent caused the Irish rebellions, so in 1919-1921, it was the counter-stroke of the Great War that is seen in the war in the British Isles : the Irish drama was but an episode of the great world drama.

She came out of the ordeal painfully, doubly so from the political and economic point of view.

On the one hand, extremism compromised the future of her National unity, by estranging Ulster, reviving Orangeism, by widening the gap between North and South. We remember that before the war, in Ulster, Orangeism rose up in arms with as much audacity as impudence, against the aspirations of Nationalist Ireland for autonomy. Having thus been one of the instigators of extremism, it had need to increase its strength. The more Sinn Fein indulged in violence, the more violence was excited in Ulster. Crime and disorder had become more general in the North-east, under the affable eye of the authorities, against the Nationalists, while at the same time they increased in the South against the Government Forces ; they constantly degenerated into veritable anti-catholic *pogroms* in Derry, Belfast and their vicinities. Sir Edward Carson's " Covenanters " the " Ulster Volunteers," were organised as special police and rivalled in zeal the Black and Tans. Catholics and Nationalists, driven from their homes fled, as in 1914 the Northern population in France fled before the German invasion. The " Orange Terror " smartly replied to the " Green Terror." Add that Sinn Fein using a powerful but dangerous weapon, up to a certain point boycotted Ulster commercially. Ulster was making large profits in its trade with the South, and felt its business interests severely hit. Briefly, the ditch was dug separating the " sacred corner "

from National Ireland. The ideal of National unity was flung far away, and the problem of Ireland's internal affairs rendered graver than ever.

On the other hand, the economic question is not less disquieting. The war, with the destruction of crops, the suppression of fairs and markets, the suspending or the slackening of traffic, local administration in chaos, imprisonments, commandeerings, had almost stopped economic life in the south, and for the future its sources were dangerously dried up. Towns and villages sacked, farms, factories and houses ruined, meant an enormous capital destroyed without hope of compensation. The spirit of enterprise extinguished, unemployment was everywhere, and misery acute. An Irish White Cross was organised for the relief of the sufferers, to which the Holy See in May, 1921, with its approval, sent a contribution of 200,000 lira. The Americans founded a Committee of Help, of which President Harding warmly supported the appeal. But what was all this to the immensity of the disaster? Emigration, which during twenty years had greatly declined, restarted and increased; for 2,975 emigrants in 1919, there were 15,531 in 1920, and its progress continued. Ireland was on the high road to economic decadence. Belfast and Ulster were hardly less hit than the South. Whether we calculate or not, British suppression tended to smother, to paralyse the country, and it succeeded in doing so. How will Ireland recover?

While one saw much of what extremism caused her to lose of her National unity, and of her virility, it is not yet clear what it will have made her gain with regard to England. True, that Erin was able to "hold out" against Albion, is a great event in Irish annals, and made a big change in the history of what was yesterday the United Kingdom. That the British Government came to offer a Truce to Ireland in insurrection, by inviting her to negotiate on an equal

footing, was for the sister island an immense moral victory, which had not been known since 1782. What effort will she make? Will she let herself be carried away by the dangerous game of ultra-republican claims, provoking a rupture the result of which would almost necessarily be a renewal of hostilities which this time might be finally fatal to her? Will she know how to win peace? It was a decisive moment. For the English: to understand they must go to the extremity of their sacrifice. For Ulstermen: another opportunity for a gesture towards Ireland, appeal which yet could save everything. For the Irish: to grasp the fact that the absolute is not of this world, and that the possible can be lost in striving for the impossible. May they, the one and the other, conscious of their responsibilities, docile to the voice of justice and moderation, lay the foundations of a work of lasting peace and conciliation.

Chapter III.

THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY OF THE 6TH DECEMBER, 1921, AND THE CIVIL WAR IN IRELAND.

(1921-1923.)

COSAS DE IRLANDA ! . . . . Who will ever understand Irish affairs ? In Ireland it is always the unexpected that happens, it is ever the most unlikely which comes to pass ; over the Green Isle there weighs a malediction that nothing with her seems to succeed, and such are the caprices of her fortune that observation remains disconcerted. This is the talk we hear, since this new act in the Irish drama unfolds under our eyes. Dare we pretend, that, no matter how incomprehensible at first sight events appear, we are to presume they have their logic in Ireland as elsewhere, and that they bind just the same with a rigour almost fatal, which, after all, is clear enough to those who take the trouble to find out the essential elements in their game.

We have already pointed out how Ireland, having resisted law and authority, gave herself to extremism in the struggle against England. In the month of June, 1921, it looked very like triumphing. After two years of war Ireland was offered peace by the British Government, and with peace, autonomy within the Empire : this was not her whole ideal, independence complete and entire, but at least it was all that was possible, a real substance of freedom. But the fatal and brutal vicissitude of fortune now comes on the scene. Overwhelmed and deceived at the one time

by her victory, blinded by passion, herself a victim of the violence which she called to her aid, she became disunited, torn and exhausted. Unable to curb or accustom herself to discipline, extremism becomes anarchy and civil war. After triumphing it was degradation and decay. What trials to be met before the day of lawlessness gives way to the new order, and peace is restored to Erin set free!

I.—THE ANGLO-IRISH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TREATY OF THE 6TH DECEMBER, 1921.

The English war in Ireland was being waged in full force more violently, more atrociously than ever, when on the 6th of June, 1921, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in a public letter, invited the representatives of Ireland, Mr. de Valera, as the "leader chosen by a big Irish majority in the South," and Sir James Craig, head of the constituted Government of the six counties of the North-east of Ulster by the Act of 1920, to take part in a conference with a view to putting an end to the age-long conflict. According to the different points of view, the news provoked joy, stupor, relief, consternation, and, above all, a general surprise. Had not Mr. Lloyd George proclaimed we must "break the back of terrorism before we can have peace," and that "there could be no conciliation until the conspiracy was destroyed, civilisation could not allow such a defiance of its most elementary laws." And more recently: "To abandon force, would be to capitulate to crime and separatism." Had he not declared that "Ireland's claim to being a nation was but imposture and dishonesty." Only yesterday the Lord Chancellor had announced the intention of intensifying the war and bringing it to an end with a hand of iron. "There is no one with whom we can negotiate." And, here we see the English Prime Minister officially addressing the

"rebels," those whom he had branded as a "band of assassins," and asking them to come to London to negotiate with him on an equal footing. To those whom he threatened to seize by the throat, he now extended a hand. What an unexpected event, and who could have looked for such an unforeseen change of policy, even on the part of a statesman who, like Mr. Lloyd George, had so often astonished the world by his sudden change of front!

For this sudden change in British policy towards the sister island, in truth there were imperious reasons. First of all, and it was the essential and decisive one—coercion, with all its harshness; the war—with all its horrors, had failed against the Irish insurrection. England had not succeeded in overcoming Ireland's resistance. To subdue the rebels by means of arms would take years, and how many tens of thousands more men than the 60,000 soldiers already serving, while time was passing and the effective forces were baffled? Besides, England had so many difficulties of all kinds all over the world, it was necessary she should ease her positions, and, above all, obtain peace at home. Also, the Ireland of to-day was not only in Ireland, but everywhere in the Anglo-Saxon world, and the Irish question had gone far beyond the limits of the United Kingdom. British outrages, reprisals, the atrocities of the Black and Tans, had done England immense harm abroad. Her whole external policy was affected. In the United States her prestige was shaken, and it was necessary when the time arrived for the opening of the Washington Conference that John Bull should have restored his influence with his cousin Jonathan by an act of conciliation to the Irish.

Even in the heart of the Empire, the reaction was very keen against English "Imperialism" in Ireland. England had to reckon with the Irish-American as well as with the Irish *diaspora* who were agitating,

and were a restless and powerful minority in the Dominions and the Colonies. Exactly on the 20th of June, the Imperial Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers met. It was not supposed to discuss Irish affairs officially, yet it did not fail to bring them officiously under discussion. Already, in London, General Smuts, the ex-adversary of Lord Roberts in the Transvaal war, having since then rallied to the Empire, and become loyalist Prime Minister of South Africa, a man of authority who was listened to, urged the Government to drop its policy of violence in Ireland which risked " undermining the very substance of the British Commonwealth " ; and Mr. Meighan, Prime Minister of Canada, did likewise.

Thus, the Government of London had no choice ; it became impossible for it to continue on the path of violence, and was forced to negotiate, free to resume the war in case of defeat. But it realised it was very difficult to open negotiations, and Mr. Lloyd George had to make use of all his cunning and fertility in opportunism.

On the one hand, the Ulster Orangemen sought for some means to make the negotiations a failure, feeling that what they called their liberties, really meaning their privileges, were threatened. It was from no spirit of sacrifice they had recently accepted from the hands of Mr. Lloyd George, the Home Rule drawn up for their little six counties by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, but as a defensive arm—and if need arose offensive—against Nationalist Ireland, and as a sure means of preventing Irish unity and independence. To this local Home Rule they clung as to their final charter : therefore, they refused to participate in the negotiations between London and Dublin, and tried to shuffle the cards by artfully playing the trump card which Mr. Lloyd George had so imprudently put into their hands, and which they now turned against him.

On the other hand, and what is more serious, between him and the leaders of Nationalist Ireland the arguments set down were diametrically opposed, the initial points and the points of view were absolutely contradictory. Mr. Lloyd George departed from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which offered a semblance of autonomy to each of the two parties by which Ireland was to be divided, to Nationalist Ireland (who did not want a deceitful gift with a law of partition) as to the six counties of the North-east ; he was disposed to widen this law, without changing its substance, that is to say, partitioning Ireland into two Irelands, without ceasing to form part of the Empire and the sovereignty of the Crown. To the actual masters of Ireland, on the contrary, there was only one Ireland, in whose name Mr. de Valera claimed solely to speak, Orange Ulster being separated from the rest of the country only by the contrivance of an English law, that is to say, a foreign law, null and void in the eyes of the Irish. And this Ireland, one, and an independent and sovereign nation, in spite of the Act of Union of 1800, because the rights of a nation are indefeasible, and by the act of solemn declaration of this independence, had been formally made in the Dáil in Dublin on the 21st of January, 1919. The English in Ireland were no more than foreigners having no claim, oppressors with no right ; they had but to go. It was not a question of Ireland, but one of illegal occupation and of the indispensable evacuation of Ireland by the English.

Among the extremists, the doctrine of the ideologist held first place. Willingly they would say with Royer-Collard : I despise a fact. Faithful to rigid formulas, to definite assertions with the effect of provoking their adversary, they thought that by conceding no matter what, whether by implication or preterition, on the strength of a principle would be to surrender without condition. They were lacking in judgment of the

actual and the possible. When it was pointed out to them that a nation does not thrive on theories, and that theories are not a policy, they replied that the idea by its strength alone would conquer, and that, of the opportunists or idealists, the latter represent the real practical men. Force of circumstances seems to them to vitiate all things: to negotiate with England, was forcing an unarmed man to discuss with one armed who would brandish his revolver at the former. They were dupes of simple illusions and of chimerical pretensions: according to Mr. de Valera, it was the same with two neighbouring nations, adverse to one another, the one weak and the other strong, the weaker one as such had the right to demand the strongest pledge of security; Ireland, a neutral state, should also have her inviolability guaranteed by the United States, the British Dominions, etc. Besides, convinced they emerged victorious from the Anglo-Irish war, therefore invincible—was it not England who offered peace?—they believed themselves in a position to exact from Albion, reduced to *quia,* unlimited sacrifices.

Was it not a miracle, that under conditions so unfavourable, negotiations were able to terminate or even begin, for between positive facts, which brought them to London for discussion, and abstract principles which they cling to in Dublin, there is no more point of contact than between two parallel planes. Indeed, after Mr. Lloyd George offered Ireland, *en prise de jeu,* Dominion status, minus six reservations financial and military—which offer the Irish at first disdainfully rejected—three months passed in useless epistolary controversies with "President" de Valera. He, while opposing all arguments, all adverse propositions, did not cease proclaiming Irish sovereignty and independence; he refused allegiance to the King, in the most doctoral manner, with an arrogance bordering on defiance; he was ready to destroy the bridges

which he could not otherwise take. Before this flow of intransigent dialectic, Mr. Lloyd George habitually of vigorous authority, showed a singular flexibility and an almost angelic patience : to such a degree did he need Irish peace ! Twice the thread was broken, and twice he renewed it with his own hands. He put all the energy he could command into the discussions. He gave way on words, it was no longer to be a question of gracious concessions, but a Treaty, no more talk of union, but association. He abandoned the six reservations mentioned at the beginning. He foregoes exacting the preliminary acceptance of allegiance to the Crown, thanks to which he ends by securing that Mr. de Valera sent over plenipotentiaries (headed by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins) to a conference met in London, without preliminary conditions—without " prejudice," as they say over there.

It was after much labour that he got them that far, in his own house in Downing Street, and there, around the green carpet he kept them, and his experience, his skill as an old stager in diplomacy was about to triumph. Not, however, without great anxiety. The Irish held a trump card in their hand, independence, a republic : they put down this card in the hopes of getting Irish unity, that is to say, the inclusion of Ulster in the New Ireland. But Ulster refused, and Mr. Lloyd George had promised not to coerce her. All had reached breaking point, when Mr. Lloyd George, after cleverly letting the discussions drag on, felt himself in a position to lay down his ultimatum to the Irish, with eight days for acceptance : he had played with the fish, now he was about to stun it with a hard knock. He had shown enough broad-mindedness in his concessions, had proved a sufficiently smart actor to gain public opinion to his side. On the other hand, the Irish felt, if they rejected this final offer, they would lose the sympathies of the whole world,

and their country would be threatened with a war of extermination: at the last moment they resigned themselves with a heavy heart, and accepted an agreement, which, while being theoretically far from their claims, at least gave their country an assurance of first-rate advantages. The Treaty was signed the night of the 5th to the 6th of December, 1921, in the absence of the Ulstermen who sulked to the end.

The Treaty of Downing Street was not a charter conceded, but a real Treaty, such as would be made between two independent powers, their principle satisfied which should count for something in the eyes of the Irish, being almost worth an implicit acknowledgment of Ireland's sovereignty—and, as in all treaties, a compromise made by mutual concessions: Ireland conceded much on principles, Great Britain did as much in deeds. Ireland received the name of Free State: being the official name—*Saorstát* in Gaelic, which she had given herself for the last three years. She was received in the Empire, or, what is said now, in the "Commonwealth of Nations known formerly under the name of the British Empire," so much does the word Empire sound amiss at the present time, the Dominion Status with special reference to that of Canada, being recognised as the freest: The laws, observances and usages which actually rule the connections of the Crown and Parliament with Canada will also henceforth rule their connection with Ireland. The Representative of the Crown in Ireland will be appointed in the same way as the Governor-General of Canada. The members of the Irish Parliament will take an oath of allegiance.[1] Ireland took upon herself such portion of the national debt of the United

[1] I..... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established, and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and successors by law in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Kingdom which by arbitration was judged equitable, deducting all just claims by Ireland as a counterpart. Ireland reserved to the British Admiralty certain privileges in her naval bases. English commercial vessels are allowed free *pratique* in her ports. She undertook not to keep a bigger army, in proportion to the respective populations of the two countries, England on her side doing the same.

As to the six counties of North-east Ulster, implicitly included with the rest of the country according to the first articles of the Treaty, they are to be allowed, by an address of the Belfast Parliament to the King, in the month following the definite putting into force of the Treaty, to declare their desire to remain outside of the Free State and keep to the Constitution given them in 1920, with the reservation in this case, taking into account the sentiments of the populations, of a revision to be made of the border line which had been fixed, as we know, by comprising under the Belfast Government the two counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, which are more than half Nationalist. So Orangeist Ulster had the right to remain in the future isolated from Nationalist Ireland : Time will show whether it is to her advantage or not to use this right.

This is, in broad outline, the Treaty which revolutionized so profoundly what yesterday was still called the United Kingdom, which was to close for a time, between Erin and Albion a struggle which would have been one of the longest and bitterest in history. It was in 1169 that the first Anglo-Norman expedition penetrated into Ireland. During three centuries, between the Irish and the "garrison," there was pitiless war, " with all the ferocity, without the finality of conquest." With great expeditions, massacres, " plantations," the Tudors began the conquest ; the Stuarts and Cromwell finished it, so that at the

end of the seventeenth century, under Anglo-Saxon "hegemony," mistress of the country, the whole Catholic population was "pounded like mortar," according to Sir John Davies, reduced to the condition of slaves, and kept in bondage during the eighteenth century by the celebrated "penal laws." The dawn of freedom seemed to rise at the time of the American War of Independence, under the flag of the United Irishmen: fruitless hope, for, after the insurrection of 1798, Pitt succeeded in forcing on Ireland the Act of Union—a union of the shark with its prey, as was said by Lord Byron. Finally, during the greater part of the nineteenth century, it was economic, financial, even social cheating of Ireland by England; it was anglicisation and decadence, with coercive laws, with belated and insufficient concessions, always extorted by violence, and on the Irish side constitutional agitation interrupted by revolutionary risings.

And behold here after seven centuries, England conscious of her final defeat in the Green Isle, harassed by Irish extremism, tired of governing a people against its will who did not tire of resistance and tried to shake off the yoke, at last resolved to abandon Ireland (excepting the six counties of the north-east) to her fate within the Imperial system. For the first time in modern history, Ireland, while remaining part of the British Empire had become mistress of her destinies. Will she know how to profit by the circumstances, and with her recovered liberty reshape her life?

II.—THE TREATY IN THE OPINION OF ENGLAND AND ULSTER.

Satisfaction and relief. Such clearly were the feelings with which the Treaty of Downing Street was welcomed by the bulk of opinion in England. Relaxation dominated after the grave transaction

which appeared to have succeeded, it was a feeling of deliverance to realise that the sinister nightmare was over, and the agony of starting a fresh war of extermination in Ireland gone. Since the Armistice of 1918, no event produced such a profound impression. King George, without deviating from his constitutional attributes, having done much for peace, at once wired his " joy " to Mr. Lloyd George. The latter did not fail to place himself before his fellow-countrymen as the victor, and mounted the Capitol ; for did he not succeed where Gladstone and Mr. Asquith failed, by settling the insoluble question of Ireland ?

Bitterness and regret there must have been in many English hearts in reviewing British political bankruptcy in the sister island, in seeing one of the oldest pillars of the Constitution fall, and the closing of a long sad chapter of national history, without honour. A " Treaty " with an " Irish Free State " are bitter words to many sons of Albion. But the oath of allegiance being respected, Ulster safeguarded, and the Crown consenting, why try to be more royalist than the King ? The Government had treated with rebel subjects. True. As formerly it did with the rebels of Canada, and later with those of South Africa ; in the one case and the other liberty produced loyalty.

It would also seem there were many advantages to be gained in the new order of things. One was happy to see disappear from home politics the old ferment of trouble which the Irish question had been for so long, and to have no more to do than let the Irish argue—and fight—between themselves ; one smiled beforehand at seeing the divisions and difficulties from which they were to suffer when left to themselves. In presence of opinion abroad, which for two years had been severe on English policy in Ireland, one counted on its being conceded that England showed proof of sufficient generosity, or at least of enough goodwill, to be assured of recovering her prestige in the world,

her freedom of diplomatic action, at the same time as the free disposition of her material strength for too long a time immobilised in the sister island ; between her and the United States the way was opened for a better understanding. As for the military and naval security of the country, it was no more compromised to-day than it was yesterday, since Great Britain still kept a hand on the ports and strategical points.

One way or the other, they said, Ireland is lost to us, the only question now being to save appearances. And save the Empire, which is the essential. The Empire in danger ! Such had been for many years the great argument put forward by the Unionists to reject Home Rule, and to-day—the wheel had turned —it was the very same argument given rightly or wrongly by the majority in the Government to justify conceding the Dominion status to Ireland. It was thought the violence done in Ireland had become a menace to Imperial integrity ; it was, therefore, hoped a policy of conciliation would be a means of consolidating the Empire ; necessity sometimes creates these illusions ! . . . .

Outside of the " Coalition," there were very few besides the reactionaries of the extreme right, called *Die-hards,* to protest in the name of honour and the flag against a Treaty, in which they denounced an abject humiliation, and ignoble capitulation to terrorism : " a folly and a shame," said Lord Hugh Cecil : " one of the greatest disasters in history," according to the Duke of Northumberland. However, the *ultras* of Unionism were not numerous, and were somewhat at a discount in public opinion. It is true they had as ally Ulster Orangeism in Ireland, which at once revolted against the Anglo-Irish Treaty. What ! During a hundred years, the Orangeman, England's soldier in Ireland, the only surviving member of the English " garrison " in the country ! And now they were proceeding to trample his rights

under foot, and force him into an Ireland one and undivided, reserving to him the right of secession, but at the price of a new settling of the limits of his border, which was a threat in disguise. Rebel Ireland was made an autonomous Dominion, favours were heaped on the prodigal child, whilst loyalist Ulster was left alone in her "corner," alone "with her dishonour." Not long before she was flattered, pampered by the Unionist Party; in London she spoke almost as master of the situation. And to-day an obstruction, she was abandoned by her old friends. Mr. Bonar Law himself, but yesterday one of the most solid supporters of the Orange campaign, approved of the nefarious Treaty, which "posterity," he said, "will look on as a triumph." The heads of the Coalition came to an understanding with the Radicals to give her a lesson and urged her to take her place in Free Ireland by accepting the supremacy of the Dublin Parliament. In face of this unworthy and complete change, in front of this "baseness" (let us confess) without elegance, she did not express anger, but her exasperation was shown in many curious ways, such as the refusal, at certain "loyalist" meetings to propose the traditional toast to the King, or listen to the National Anthem; and it was not without surprise and irony that one saw in some of the Orange papers Mr. Lloyd George styled a Jesuit, Mr. Chamberlain, a liar, and Lord Birkenhead, a coward!

At any rate, until some new order, Orange Ulster had no intention of recognising a Treaty in which she had had no part; *res inter alias acta,* she ignored it, and held to her acquired rights. Resist at any price, was the watchword in Belfast; she would oppose, if necessary with violence, any "changing of the boundary," she would refuse at all costs any "cutting of the border." Meantime, she would contest its validity, the better to defend herself. She provoked the Catholics, that is to say, the Nationalists,

as a counter-blow to put pressure on England in trying to destroy the Treaty. Therefore, she gave rein, in the six counties, to " anti-papist " terrorism, which had somewhat abated since the truce in July, 1921, but which was renewed with more violence than ever from the month of December.

Rigorous coercive measures surrendered the disarmed Catholic minority to 7,000 armed vagabonds or hooligans in Belfast, and the 6,000 Orangeist police called *Specials;* the Papists were hunted from their homes, killed, massacred, their houses burnt, whole neighbourhoods set on fire: it was the fate of the Armenians under the Ottoman yoke.[1] With bombs and revolvers they were so driven to extremities, that the Catholics of the north aided by the extremists of the south finished by retaliating, the which England was called on with indignation to witness. On the borders separating the six counties from the Free State, she " worked " up cleverly the population, shrewdly exploiting the incursions and violence of the Sinn Feiners, and thus appeared the little war which

[1] Anti-Catholic terroism raged for a long time in Belfast, but it had never attained such a degree of virulence. From July, 1920, to the end of June, 1922, it was reckoned that 9,250 Catholics were hounded from their employment by the Specials or by armed bands, 23,960 chased out of their homes, 446 killed, and 1,789 wounded. Observe that the proportion of Catholics in Belfast is one to every three Protestants. Within seven days, in the spring of 1922, 1,500 Catholics were destitute, their homes having been criminally destroyed. Some acts were particularly revolting. Constantly shots were fired on the crowds from the roofs of houses or tramcars, bombs were thrown into Catholic districts. Armed bands would stop an individual in the street, and put the question: Catholic? If the reply was in the affirmative or doubtful, he was killed. Churches, schools, presbyteries, were objects of outrages, as were the crowds at the entry and exit of religious buildings. In March, four members of the MacMahon family of Belfast, with a servant, were shot, by men in the uniform of Specials; two others were wounded. In June, the Catholic hospital, *Mater Infirmorum*, was for three hours during the night assailed by machine guns. Several times, the Venerable Cardinal Logue, Archbishop of Armagh, was arrested, menaced and searched. The local press, terrorised, did not dare say anything. Note that the Government of London paid the Specials, and maintained besides in the six counties twenty-three battalions of British troops.

served her to plead for England's help. Orangeist Ulster posed as the victim, and, by this continual system of provocation, was hopeful of shaking English apathy, and forcing England to intervene and break the Treaty, and recommence the conquest of Ireland : it was the same game successfully played by Fitzgibbon and Pitt from 1798 to 1800. But it had little chance of success this time. The London Government had no ambition to start again the war in Ireland, and in British public opinion Ulster Orangeism, even supported by the Die-hards, had definitely lost its cause : England was far too happy having finished with the Irish question for the present. She thought like Lord Palmerston, who was one day asked what ought be done with regard to the sister island, replied : " Can't you leave her alone ?" In return she wanted to be let alone in regard to Irish affairs : let the Irish disentangle themselves with their Treaty.

III.—IN IRELAND : FOR AND AGAINST THE TREATY.

RATIFICATION.

Nationalist Ireland, the principal party interested, hailed the Treaty of the 6th of December with surprise and joy at first. But the fires of joy were of short duration, for it was immediately realised that the peace signed between Erin and Albion meant the cutting of the country in two, and in place of the foreign war, the beginning of a domestic war, an impious struggle between men who yesterday were still united and whose first duty was to remain so and work together for National regeneration. The majority sided with Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Fein, and with Michael Collins, " the man who won the war," and accepted the Treaty ; the others, the irreducibles, with Mr. de Valera at their head, refused to submit.

When on the 14th of December the Dáil met, it

was between the one and the other, for days and days, breathless, passionate, and furious discussion in a stormy atmosphere, in which the drama touched melodrama, where verbiage bordered on hysteria, and grandiloquent orations alternated with the most brazen-faced insults, and invocations to the dead against the appeal for peace. Griffith was accused of "conspiracy" with Mr. Lloyd George: Collins, declared a renegade: Erskine Childers, styled a "damned Englishman." The Countess Markiewicz (*née* Gore-Booth) having approached within two feet of Collins and Griffith, hurled in their faces the epithets of traitors and fools, and Miss MacSwiney, sister of the late Lord Mayor of Cork, at the end of a three hours discourse declared she would pass the remainder of her life in teaching the youth of Ireland that the Treaty of the 6th December was the greatest act of treason known in the history of Ireland.

Distressing scene! Yet should we be astonished or scandalized at these divisions and discussions? Let us be just. Remember the quarrels between the supporters of Cavour and those of Mazzini and Garibaldi in Italy in the last century, and the struggles between the *intransigentes* of Kossuth and the conciliators of Deak and Andrassy in Hungary. We must not forget, from the time Ireland abandoned constitutional methods under British pressure, whatever elements there were of moderation, experience and balance were put aside, and there only remained on the political scene extremists facing other extremists; that Ireland had just emerged from a war in which England made use of the worst outrages against her, in which the whole country tragically suffered; that Irish history is full of reminders of England's promises violated by England, from the Treaty of Limerick up to the Home Rule of 1914, which brought it about that in every patriotic Irish heart was deposited a feeling of invincible suspicion

with regard to "perfidious Albion." Note, too, that as long as the country or her representatives had not come to a decision, opinions remained free. Consider how great could be the patriotic agony in the depth of these troubled souls at the gravity of the decision to be taken, and the vote on which depended the fate of the country.

One of the best of Erin's sons, George Russell, known in literature as A. E., man of action as well as poet, has drawn a picture of this anguish in an impressive *duologue* in which he puts face to face these two great forces: on the one hand human wisdom, experience, the practical mind and the instinct of realisation, the solid judgment of facts; on the other, the ideal, the dream, or, if you will, the subconscious, confused forces of the past, the genius of the race, ancestral directions, intuition forbidding the pledging of the future, making one hope that to-morrow will be better than to-day, the scene of sudden revolutions in history, and all the imponderables that in secrecy abound and direct the lives of nations.

What Mr. de Valera said, and what his partisans could do against the Treaty, making allowance for excessive words and phraseology, can be summed up thus: "Signed under duress, under the threat of recommencing the war, the Treaty, a work of violence and not of peace, cannot bind Ireland. Once again England dupes us in wishing to impose on us a shameful compromise, while we want, not a bargaining but a settlement. In this case it is not a free nation allying itself to a free nation, but a subject people which as an act of grace is given half autonomy. Ireland, an old historic nation, rich in civilization by a long way beyond that of England, who shone with glory in the Middle Ages up to the conquest under the Tudors, Ireland, the Island of Saints and Doctors, would henceforth be bound to the Empire, to this 'Empire of hell,' as John Mitchel said, and her sons

would become, by a common citizenship which we spurn, *Britons* of the West ; Ireland the Motherland would be by an unworthy *capitis diminutio* lowered to the rank of a colony, likened to the peopling of those young and spacious lands, formerly deserts and often unknown, which yesterday the Empire started making the most of. In truth, it is not even real Dominion powers that are being offered us, for England takes care to reserve to herself, in time of war or tension (how vague this word !) all powers which it would please her to exact from us on our soil for her defence. Besides, there would always be wanting to Ireland that real guarantee and security similar to that of Australia and Canada *vis-a-vis* England, to wit the strangeness, distance and immensity of the territories overseas which puts them beyond the reach of the British Lion's claws. Why should we take an oath of allegiance to a king, whose subjects we don't pretend to be? Authority comes from the people, and not from a foreign sovereign. Our National Government would become His Majesty's Government, the Irish army the army of the King. The day George V would come in person to open an Irish Parliament in Dublin, the black flag would be seen hanging from every window. Your Treaty is no more than a capitulation, such as Ireland has not known since Henry II. Even the Act of Union of 1800 was imposed on us by fraud and by force. And it is to our generation that the humiliation was reserved to vote its own fall by signing an ' ignoble ' document ! For God's sake, let us not tighten our chains, let us not ruin the moral foundations on which repose our right to liberty. If you give in, all the benefits acquired will be lost, all the sacrifices made will have been in vain : coming generations will curse us. Don't sell our birthright for a mess of pottage, for some material advantages, this right of independence which is the honour of our country. We have taken an oath

to the Irish Republic : let us be faithful to it. Let us be loyal to our brothers who died for it. Better to continue in bondage until it pleases Almighty God to humble our tyrants ! Long live the Irish Republic !''

Here now is the other voice, that of Mr. Griffith and the partisans of the Treaty. After the voice of defiance and passion, is heard that of sound reason, of good sense and moderation in appreciating the possible and conscious of responsibilities. It was like a Thomas Davis speaking after a John Mitchel. '' Let us not be trapped : there is no republic, there cannot actually be one ; it may perhaps represent the ideal, but an unrealizable ideal. It has really no historical foundation. What we have always claimed, was not a symbol or an abstraction, but our freedom, whatever the formula might be : if the Republic (*Poblacht*) has been the cry of the insurgents of 1916, since 1919 Ireland declared herself to be a Free State (*Saorstát*). To lay claim to-day to a Republic, is to claim the impossible ; it would mean sooner or later plunging us in a fatal war and depriving us of all foreign sympathy. From the day Mr. de Valera agreed to negotiate with England, no one could have failed to see that compromise was inevitable, and to bring about this compromise, we sent our negotiators to London ; they secured greater advantages for the Motherland, and forced from England what was humanly possible to get from her ; anyway they brought back the flag of Ireland intact. As in all compromises, there are defects in the Treaty, but at least it is acceptable and honourable to the Nation. It gives peace with honour, it leaves the country to itself. Ireland for the first time has made herself acknowledged a nation by England. She does not acquire full freedom, but she wins at least the essential freedom, the effective attributes of sovereignty, for which our ancestors have struggled and died ; the rest will come by the natural evolution of things and

the free exercise of our new powers. From now on, Ireland is her own mistress, free to mould her life her own way according to her own ideas : it means Ireland for the Irish. That England keeps certain rights here in time of war, rights which she would take, even if she had not got them, that is no proof of vassalage, but a transitory reservation. And as our freedom is similar to that of the Dominions, it does not follow we remain under British domination, as the Dominions enjoy *de facto* for a long time past a real sovereignty, the form being the 'equality of status.' To-day they are all interested in the preservation of our liberties which are theirs, and while independence for a small, feeble isolated nation, in the ordinary way is but a semblance and a sham, our association with the countries peopled mostly by Irishmen will be to us a powerful and precious guarantee with regard to England as well as abroad. Let us look at things as they are, and not as they might be, let us firmly hold what we have won, not letting go the prize for the shadow. Besides, are we abandoning the ideal of absolute independence? Certainly not. If the Treaty has not given us the full freedom at which nations have the right to aim, it gives us the liberty to work towards winning it. The Treaty is no more final than we are the last generation of Irishmen on earth. But meanwhile, Ireland cannot always continue living at war with England. The present generation has suffered enough : it is for our successors to complete the work. It would be culpable and to no purpose to condemn to martyrdom, with a view to attaining the unattainable, men who have already borne so many trials with an abnegation which deserves its reward. If you are still in doubt as to the reality of our victory, look around you : the English soldiers are clearing out, we remain masters of the field of battle! Long live the Irish Free State!"

These two theses thus come into violent collision,

and between the adepts on the one side and the other the struggle is fierce and frantic. No possible conciliation.

Among the intransigents above those of second rank such as Cathal Brugha, Liam Mellows, Austin Stack or Erskine Childers, towers the imperious figure of Eamon de Valera : very tall ; a small head, narrow profile sharp as his speech, smooth face, lined, troubled features even as his mind, flaming eyes, a great personal charm, with a vibrating eloquence which electrifies the crowds ; a pure sophist as well, a mystical St. Just, the most fertile and cynical of casuists, of whom we know in advance he will never be satisfied with anything or by anybody.

On the side of the partisans of the Treaty we have the "Blacksmith of Ballinalee," Commandant MacKeon, who was captured and condemned to death by the English ; the famous R. Mulcahy, Chief of Staff of the Irish army ; Kevin O'Higgins, grandson of T. D. Sullivan, the poet ; Professor Hayes, and his colleague, Eoin Mac Neill, one of the greatest Celtic scholars of the day, who, when in Portland prison, found himself one day at a sign from de Valera, acclaimed by the other Irish prisoners, to the great astonishment of the warders ; George Gavan Duffy, son of the celebrated Gavan Duffy of 1848 and ex-representative of Ireland in Paris. But all give way to the two strong personalities of Griffith and Collins : Michael Collins, the popular and already legendary hero of the guerilla, big and strong, of almost herculean stature, with a massive big head and large laughing face ; Arthur Griffith, small and square, firm and cold, impassive and abrupt, organising brain and realist, he also a self-made man, but to whom age has given, with experience, authority.

Griffith spoke the last, they voted on the 7th of January, 1922 ; the Treaty was ratified by the Dáil, but by a very small majority of 64 votes against 57.

The emotion was intense. Valera rose: "This is my last word. We have a glorious past behind us, four years of magnificent discipline before the world which has been watching us. And now . . . ." His voice choked, he sank down broken. He was replaced by Griffith as President, two days after, amid the vociferations and vituperations of the irreducibles. Then Griffith formed a new "Executive," under the authority of the Dáil, by which a "Provisional Government" was constituted, with Collins as head, he being specially charged with the carrying out of the Treaty until the voting for the Constitution and the effective establishment of the new Statutes.

IV.—THE IRREGULARS IN REVOLT.

THE JUNE ELECTIONS, 1922.

The task was a heavy one for the men who at this moment of trouble and transition were given power. England, loyally and at once kept her part of the Treaty. She set free all the Irish prisoners of war by a general amnesty. She recalled the Black and Tans of sinister memory. The British Army evacuated the country, where it had maintained a garrison for seven hundred years. The "Castle," centre and symbol of English domination, was handed over to the Provisional Government, which gradually took up all the civil services, administrative, judicial, and financial: it was the end of the British Government in Ireland. A joy and pride to Erin, but what a burden for the new power that had to lay the foundations of the new State! There was so much to be done, or so much to do over again. There was only its feeble authority between salvation and chaos. Unfortunately it suffered itself from congenital debility. Its duality stood in its own way. Executive power of the Dáil, it had but a narrow and precarious majority in the

Dáil. Provisional Government according to the Treaty, the fact of its bearing the stamp of England, and having her support were against it. With the exception of Griffith, it was comprised mostly of very young men, having no experience or tradition: "incompetent amateurs," as they modestly called themselves. Besides they were ex-extremists, with radical tendencies, being inclined to make a clean sweep of the past, they were suspicious of former leaders, and by the latter were suspected themselves. However, being the lawful authority, they had more or less on their side those who were for established law: business men, farmers, the most stable amongst the masses, the Episcopate with the majority of the clergy, even a portion of the old Unionists who had the desire to work for the reconstruction of the country, and the workers to a certain extent; the majority of Irish-Americans, even the ex-Fenians of orthodox tradition, being ready to co-operate with them as formerly they did with Parnell. But the support of a strong average public opinion was wanting. And having emerged themselves from violence, they were especially badly placed to fight it.

But violence does not tend to disarm. First commonplace violence, criminality of so-called common-right. Legacy of tragic times, of terror: a mob of desperadoes, of gunmen, adventurers or professional criminals, lived on the country by disorder and loot. English authority was no more, Irish authority did not as yet exist: spontaneous anarchy had sprung up during the interregnum. Armed raids by masked men, on banks, shops, post offices, and private houses; money, goods, precious objects robbed; trains, railway stations, looted; farms and castles burnt; kidnappings and assassinations; agrarian war in the West, as in the *no-rent* times, destruction of fences, of crops, removal of cattle, forcible seizure of lands, in fine, here and there, the red flag was unfurled and workers

of various concerns took possession of the factories. Demoralisation took hold of the youth : boys and girls carried revolvers : misery increased, and with it agitation. In January, 1922, there were 130,000 out of work, one million waste acres of land, 20,000 agricultural workers unemployed. Disorder reigned as master, unrest was everywhere.

Political divisions were widening, all over the country the struggle was intensified between partisans of the Treaty and its adversaries. These latter, the irreducibles, refused to accept the vote of the Dáil. Against them they had the majority in the Assembly, in conscience they should have submitted : instead of which—and here began their social and moral guilt—they rebelled, and, Montagnard against Girondist, they started a violent campaign against the Government and against the Treaty. Who were they ? They belonged to no one class, they came from all classes ; in the country they were not separated from their adversaries by a vertical slit, but by a horizontal line of demarcation. It was the young, even the very young ; fanatics, utopians, inspired by "the faith that confounds cowardly reason," as de Valera said one day, or who thought with Liam Mellowes that "men's lives are but a trifle, the life of the nation a trifle, the Republic everything." Minds haunted by the quest of the absolute, the unconditional, hearts tormented with hatred of England ; add those whom the war or politics deceived, with the inevitable cortege of men without faith or authority who take advantage of social unrest for their own profit.

Numerically weak, they were strong inasmuch as they were a revolutionary element, violent and unscrupulous. They had also a certain strength in the fact that many among those whom they fought, cherished the same ideal as they, that of total independence, differing from them only in the choice of time and means. Many people of good sense,

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experienced and cultivated, priests and even religious, showed towards them, as they did at the beginning a strange and dangerous indulgence, as if they were not displeased at seeing a minority rising to protest who would serve as a political reserve in case of a renewal of war against England.

The ratification by the Dáil of the Treaty, if we heed the irreducibles, was both illegal and *ultra vires*, the Dáil having sworn fidelity to the Republic, which subsists and will continue to subsist until the day when the people freely decided they no longer wanted it. The Provisional Government, born of the Treaty, has no right, and as such is a usurper. Anyway all popular opinion approving the Treaty was beforehand declared null, betraying free expression of the National will : " no human being," de Valera said one day, " could prefer the state of dependence to the state of independence, unless under the influence of a pressure that vitiates the consent." There cannot be a stable Government in Ireland unless it be a Republican Government. The Treaty does not bring peace to Ireland, but the worst of calamities. Resistance is lawful : " There are rights which a minority can justly support even with the use of arms against the majority, and of this number is the right to defend and preserve, for ourselves and those who come after us, the precious inheritance of a free people who never willingly alienated its territory or its independence."

Therefore, it was not a constitutional opposition which rose against the party in power, it was a war started against the Provisional Government to overthrow it, as the British Government was overthrown and hunted from the country. It was no longer against the foreigner, but against the Nation itself that the struggle was organised. Liberty, democracy, no longer counted before the will of a small number : pure Jacobin conception. They would make the Government impossible ; they discredited it, paralysed its

actions, incited the local authorities to refuse obedience to it. The press was hampered, papers with adverse opinions were seized; the *Freeman,* amongst others, and the machinery destroyed. Treaty partisans and those at the head of the Provisional Government were threatened. Public meetings were hindered, the speakers prevented from being heard, the crowds were intimidated by revolver shots, platforms were burnt, means of access were blocked. At Sligo, in April, an attempt was made to prevent President Griffith speaking. Electoral registers were stolen, also books and legal papers from the Treasury. Mr. de Valera, far from condemning this revolutionary campaign, preached and incited violence: "Forward, all of you, Ireland is yours, take her!" He predicted that only by the blood of her sons would the Nation find liberty. He announced and called for civil war, which was openly prepared.

The army was very quickly won over to the rebellion and politics. At first, here and there, there were mutinies, "soldiers' councils," *pronunciamientos;* then part of the more prominent in the army, separated from the bulk of the "regulars," repudiated the Dáil and the Government, began a struggle against established authority and against the troops who remained faithful. Isolated at first, the rebel troops, in the South and West, around Dublin, and on the Ulster borders, drew up gradually, more or less under the authority of a dissident "headquarters" which settled in Dublin, in the Four Courts, of which possession was taken by an unexpected attack on Good Friday, 1922.

There, a military "junta," the "Executive" of the "army council," tried to impose a sovereign power; the chief being Roderick (or Rory) O'Connor, an ex-officer of the regular headquarters. They said, "there are times, when it is incumbent on the army, the guardian of National honour, to save the country

in spite of itself. No race has the right to harm or destroy itself by cowardice," and " in a time of crisis the right of directing the country does not only belong to the Government, but also to all authority who justly interprets the traditions and national aspirations and makes use of the best means to assure the salvation of the Nation." According to Mr. de Valera, force is justified, if the army by using it can save the people from the fatal calamities which would follow the acceptance of the Treaty ; when it is cheated, it would mean betraying it if it was not prevented from being deceived.

Similar sophisms have served as a pretext from time immemorial to the sedition monger. Truly, the installation of armed revolution, the dictatorship of the revolver, had begun. The rebels enticed away, or arrested soldiers or officers of the loyal army, seized arms and materials, explosives and munitions, made surprise attacks on barracks, public buildings, buildings in the towns which would be strategical points in case of street battles ; they occupied railway stations, cut lines of communications, thus isolating entire districts ; forcibly took provisions and goods from shopkeepers, cash from banks and post offices (the 1st of May they robbed in this way £50,000 sterling in the branch establishments of the Bank of Ireland). This and that town in turn passed under the power of the irregulars, who behaved as if in conquered districts. Elsewhere they passed the nights in skirmishes, unnerving the population by perpetual menaces. Then, by assaults directed against the British soldiers, Protestants and Unionists they tried to provoke England into recommencing war with Ireland, in which case the irreducible minority would again take a tight hold of the country. It was the same in regard to the Belfast Government. They seized and plundered goods, valuables, trains from the six counties, Orangeist properties, while on the Ulster border armed

bands made unexpected attacks, committed arson, raids; all under pretence of retaliating against the Belfast pogroms, but it was rather with the hope of provoking Orangeism, by a skilful combination of economic boycotting with guerilla war on the borders, and beyond Orangeism the hereditary enemy England.

During several months the civil war was thus secretly prepared, menacing. Here and there they held parades, fired shots, but so far not much blood was shed; they hesitated to start bloodshed. The tragedy was not without comedy, and burlesque still held the scene in the drama. The regular troops defended themselves more than they retaliated. The Government decided not to reply to shot with shot. It undervalued from the start the influence of the rebels; it believed time would favour it, so it temporized, always sure of having the majority of the country on its side. It was timid in the exercise of its authority, because authority under the English had a bad name in Ireland. It did not want to inaugurate Irish freedom with the sword; it feared to make "martyrs," and hoped to win by patience, moderation and moral force, calculating that the country, enlightened and irritated by republican violence, would finally of itself react: political education by the rebellion.

Above all, it was weakened by being only "provisional" whilst waiting the definite ratification of the Treaty by the people. It was necessary, therefore, to have the elections as soon as possible, for the rebels, knowing what it would make them lose, were obstinate in their refusal, and prepared to upset things. Finally, in May, 1922, Collins concluded an arrangement with de Valera for an appeal to the country. Without prohibiting independent or isolated candidatures, this arrangement presented to the electorate a list of official candidates in which partisans or adversaries of the Treaty figured in the same numbers as those actually

in the Dáil. The elections were held in June on this basis, and notwithstanding this "coalition" which was favourable to them, and the violent pressure used by them on the voters, the irreducibles suffered a big defeat, as it was foreseen they would; out of 126 elected they only numbered 36. If the Griffith-Collins policy of delay was inauspicious for the cause of order, at least it allowed them in spite of republican opposition to take a popular vote which gave a strong majority and new authority to the Provisional Government, to the Party for peace and the Treaty.

V.—THE CIVIL WAR (1922-1923).

At last then, following the Dáil, the people by an unassailable verdict had pronounced for the acceptance of the Treaty against the revolutionary activities of the obstructionists. These latter had put down their last legal card before the country; they lost, and had but to submit. But this is exactly what they did not want, and could not do: the madness of violence which possessed them did not relax, they had sunk too deep; the bridges behind them were broken. As in January they refused to accept the decision of the Dáil, so now they refused to accept that of the electorate.

On the part of the Government there was no further excuse for temporizing. At the risk of failing in its most elementary duty, it must re-establish order, and make the will of the people respected. Besides, the British Government did not neglect to let it know that, for the sake of the Treaty, it must bring the Republicans to reason. In Dublin, the 28th of June, 1922, after giving due notice, the regular troops attacked the Four Courts, which was the centre of the revolutionary forces; and all points occupied by the irregulars, particularly in O'Connell Street. There was war in the capital for eight days, street to street

fighting, and house to house, and from basement to roof. The law, by force, triumphed; the Dublin rebels, Rory O'Connor at their head, surrendered; Cathal Brugha was killed; during the week 65 were killed and 270 wounded, amongst them being many civilians; 700 were taken prisoners, 25 buildings were destroyed, there was five million pounds sterling worth of material damage. From Dublin, the war extended to the provinces, especially in the south-west, where republican troops were bit by bit repulsed, and driven, not without a lively resistance, from the urban centres they occupied—Limerick, Waterford, Cashel, Tipperary and Cork; so that towards the middle of August, the rebel army appeared beaten from a military point of view. At that moment the regular authority was weakened by a double loss, the death of Griffith, who succumbed to heart failure; and that of Collins assassinated by the irregulars.

The rebellion, nevertheless, was not extinguished. The war became guerilla. Every method of attack or resistance used by the Irish army in 1920-1921 against British troops was now employed against the regular troops and the National authority, by small imperceptible republican bands, mingled with the civilian populace, or hidden in the mountains, meeting for their operations and attacks, and, this done, dispersing: surprises and sudden assaults, ambushes, attacks on detachments and convoys, killing isolated soldiers, local battles on a small scale, raids on military or administrative buildings, private houses or mansions, burnings or destruction with explosives, firing in the streets night or day, with an accompaniment of bombing—certain nights in Dublin, there were republican attacks at eight or ten different points. Sometimes they fired on pedestrians and on passing motor cars. They threatened newspapers and journalists. They systematically destroyed railways in the South of Ireland; certain lines were gradually dismantled.

Every other day they blew up a train, or set fire to it, having first pillaged it, or else they started it down a siding over a broken bridge where it toppled into an abyss, or better still, started it against an oncoming train. They terrorized the local population, seized their goods, forced them to work for them or enrol with them. They issued proclamations forbidding anyone to obey or take an oath of allegiance to the lawful Government, or to pay taxes.

Powerful and feared in some of the south-western counties, they held others under a constant threat by their unexpected incursions. They did not stop at the worst outrages. As in the previous period, bodies were found on the roadside with a paper pinned on: "Spy, Republican Army." An Englishman, chauffeur, who had been guilty of driving Collins in his car, was taken from his home by masked men and killed. Then young girls in towns handled bombs. In Dublin, in broad daylight some motorists stopped in an unfrequented spot, dragged from their car two struggling men, and putting them against the wall, executed them with revolvers. At Gort, near Galway, during the funeral of a regular soldier killed in an ambush, they opened fire, killing an officer in the procession. Another day they descended on a village in the Co. Cavan, burnt five or six houses and killed two civilians: acting quite in the style of the Black and Tans of former days. Was it not a time for saying: "Freedom! what crimes are committed in thy name!"

It is a hard task contending against guerilla warfare of this kind: the English found that out. At that time, it is true, the majority of the country was against them, which majority to-day seemed to be for order and peace. But hostile as the people were to the irregulars, they did not react against their outrages; terrorized, they did not resist. The rebels found many sympathisers, open or hidden, amongst the populace:

it was characteristic of this state of things, that the Dublin Municipality paid half salary to all its employees who, having fought with the republicans, had been captured and interned by the lawful authority. This latter was not always well inspired in its political actions, so often arbitrary and maladroit; it disconcerted or discontented its warmest supporters. Of faithful troops it barely had half the number of soldiers maintained by the British Government in Ireland two years before: troops badly instructed, with little discipline, insufficiently drilled, who often got out of hand, and who, men or officers at times showed an annoying complaisancy to the republicans; one day it was found necessary to shoot four men, who, having gone over to the rebels, were recaptured by the regulars. Was it not strange that in the course of the many outrages committed by the republicans in Dublin, the guilty were hardly ever taken, and that the republicans were free to burn the railway station at Sligo without hindrance, although there were 500 men of the Government forces in the town?

Be that as it may, the Government took a large number of rebel prisoners, whom it confined until further orders in prisons, camps, and ships. Twice it offered an amnesty to the republican combatants, on condition that they ceased fire, gave up their arms, and made restitution of stolen goods; the result was hardly satisfactory. In October, 1922, it set up, in agreement with the Dáil, military courts to try summarily, and with power to condemn to death not only rebels found guilty of crime, but anyone found with arms or explosives, military uniforms or State documents; and with power to impose sentence of penal servitude for threatening death, or assistance given to escape. From the month of November began the red series: Erskine Childers was one of the first shot; then Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes, etc.; at the end of January a goodly number of death

sentences had been carried out. These, however justified they were by the necessity of saving the country from civil war, managed in all the circumstances, to take on some of the aspect of reprisals.

Far from subduing the rebels, this tardy suppression, both weak and harsh, excited and exasperated them. De Valera had himself named by his partisans President (*in partibus*) of the Republic, and formed a so-called Republican Government; for a long time he had been outdone by the more violent, the revolutionary power being in the hands of the armed bands, commanded by local leaders, with some leaders better known—such as Liam Lynch. Outrages, worse than ever, were particularly directed against Ministers, Deputies, and Senators, and their families, as also some private individuals favourable to the Free State; all were threatened, some were assassinated, many again saw their houses burnt, just as many residences belonging to the old Unionists were sacked and burnt down. There was method in this criminal folly.

Add that under the republican flag there developed pure and simple banditry. Amongst the rebels there were men with strong convictions who, always discerned the hand of England behind the Saorstát, and who accordingly saw red; there were pure revolutionaries for whom, like Mazzini, "the tempest is always the pilot"; there were also vagrants, ordinary malefactors, desperadoes, who killed or burnt for plunder. Between certain leaders of roving bands and highway robbers, it was said, the difference sometimes was very small.

Of these excesses the republican leaders were, whether willing or unwilling, accomplices, and the republican cause itself bore the responsibility. "There are things one should not do, even to save one's country," was said one day by John O'Leary, the old Fenian, who suffered twenty years penal servitude in British prisons. This was forgotten by the Irish

rebels of the irregular party. The fight for a republic degenerated into a sort of sanguinary frenzy, a vertigo of crimes, destructions, personal vengeances, which dishonour a party. Over the relatively small number of rebels who remained in the field, the clergy, whose moderating force was formerly so powerful in Ireland —it was notably lessened since the coming of Sinn Fein—had lost all influence; to a pastoral letter of the Episcopate condemning the rebellion, and decreeing excommunication against those taking part in it, they made a reply as ironic as it was insolent. No hope of bringing them to reason, they will only give in to force, and until force can get the better of them, they will continue to ruin their country morally and materially, and to murder their brothers with utter contempt for the lives of men. Let Ireland perish, rather than the Republic!

VI.—THE SITUATION IN THE SPRING OF 1923.

Finis Hiberniæ! Unless succour arrives at the last moment, from God or man, it is all over with Ireland, which will soon be no more than a land of death and misery: such was the impression in the spring of 1923 of the impartial spectator. The disaster appeared all the more overwhelming as the lost chance had seemed so good. What might not have resulted from a Treaty, the conditions of which, on the whole most favourable, should have satisfied, for the present at any rate, the most patriotic?

Of what good was it, that since the month of December, 1922, the Free State officially came into being? After the ratification of the Treaty, a most democratic constitution had, in effect, been voted by the Dáil and accepted by the British Parliament: House and Senate had entered upon their functions; President Cosgrave, Arthur Griffith's successor, had formed a ministry; and, for Governor-General of the

new Dominion, the Government in London had the good sense to choose, instead of a duke or peer, or great English personage, an Irish Nationalist, connected with the political life of his country for forty years, and who did not hide his sympathies for Sinn Fein—namely, Mr. Timothy Healy. Thus, Irish freedom was consecrated by law, and the way opened to an era of peace, progress and prosperity. Why was it, that Ireland after having almost gained her goal should again be set at naught by the blind fury of a small number besotted by utopianism and by crime? Was anarchy to submerge her? It seemed like the agony, the slow suicide of Ireland.

Ultimate and lamentable ordeal! Should one, with certain religious souls, guardians of the "missionary" traditions, which, since the early centuries, had made illustrious the Island of Saints and Doctors, give it a mystical interpretation, see in it, as it were, a "folly of the Cross," and say that this supreme affliction was necessary to enable the Irish to realise the truth, and understand the Will of God for the nation? "The Irish, people of eternity, fight each other to become a nation of time; they will be brayed in the mortar until they have learnt to look higher and to look further off, to receive the full light and to recognise their true vocation."

Or else, at the opposite pole of the world of ideas, should one listen to the positive and realist English thesis, which holds that the Irish are an inferior race and maintains that force alone—meaning British force —can prevent them destroying themselves? Celts, they are by nature turbulent and undisciplined, fond of agitation, disorder and quarrels; having dissension in their blood: "Put an Irishman on a spit, you will always find another Irishman to turn it"; incapable of submitting to lawful authority, they are more incapable still of governing themselves. We do not attach much credence, so far as we are concerned, to

this so-called ethnical fatality, this " double dose of original sin," as Gladstone ironically said, with which the children of Ireland are supposed to be for ever afflicted. Here the past should serve to throw light on the present.

For centuries England did everything, by the application of the policy of *divide et impera,* to maintain divisions amongst the Irish ; for centuries, by oppression and persecution, she impressed them with the conviction that law and order were but a tyranny unworthy of respect, that their enemy was their master, was authority ; for centuries she ruled them against their will without allowing them to serve an apprenticeship in government, or to create for themselves a governing class, so as to acquire, with experience of affairs, the instinct for responsibility. Why should it be astonishing if they lacked this political mind now, which Plato declared was necessary to the Republic ? Peoples oppressed for a long time do they not lose in the end the faculty of governing themselves ? Far from being the result of the newly-acquired autonomy, Irish disturbances seemed to be rather that of the prolonged refusal of this autonomy. Conceded in time and freely, emancipation should have given peace and life to Ireland : but England delayed too long ; at the last minute, in 1914, she took back the given promise, and soon the Black and Tans went to spread in the sister island crime and terror, the germs of demoralisation, the ferment of exasperation. What we saw in Ireland then was, in great part, the consequence of the egoist and tyrannical policy of England for generations towards Ireland.

It was also a consequence of extremism. In many countries, there have been violent periods. In Italy, Germany, and the Orient, extremism raged in divers degrees. Sometimes it was successful. It was said the world belonged to it ; nothing was ever done in history but by its help, for it alone could break the

fatal circle, the chain of interests, prejudices and habits. We do not believe it should be condemned everywhere and always. But if like Heaven, earth suffers violence, it must be legitimate violence, that is to say, founded on right which justifies it, and on necessity, there being no other way out. Without which it carries a penalty in its train, and what it founds has no duration. Is it passion instead of reason? Then experience proves that it does not share this passion; like all passions, it becomes tyrannical and exclusive, it holds you, brings you where it will and turns against you some day. Full payment is exacted in the end: "Order avenges itself."

It avenged itself terribly for two years in Ireland!

That which is tragic in the "case" of Ireland, in the history of the origins of extremism, such as we have tried to trace them, is, that the responsibility has not been entirely hers; for she was thrown out of constitutional paths, first by the example and threats of the Orange party, who were the first, as early as 1913 to start the appeal to arms, next by England's refusal to concede the promised Home Rule which had been passed in the House of Commons; and finally by the coercion that followed, and by all the British provocations and persecutions. Under this head, National Ireland has a big excuse, and to-day she pays for a fault which is not merely hers. That there has been a fault, and, that she was somewhat responsible for it, appears to us undeniable. For, after 1914, she had another way opened to her besides that of violence. Had she continued, as she had begun, nobly doing her duty in the Great War, had she done it to the end, she would, by every right as by the heroism of her children, have forced England to give her justice; having shared in all the pain, she would have shared in all the honour; and to-day, she would be in a better moral and political position *vis-a-vis* herself as *vis-a-vis* the world. Instead of

that, from 1915, heart and perseverance failing her, she turned her thoughts inward upon herself, in a narrow and egotistical vision of things, becoming the victim of a gross optical illusion in the interpretation of the great European events from which she had not the right to disengage herself.

Crushed at the sight of her open wounds and her violated rights, forgetting that liberty is not an end, but a means, she finished, for want of coolness and self-mastery—to be moderate it is necessary to be strong—by giving way to the men of violence and surrendering herself to extremism. And extremism, since then, sealed its own fate; we have seen what have been its effects. It allowed the Irish to drive the English out of the country, but it then, as a sort of counter-shock drove the Irish against one another. Ireland, to win her liberty, had recourse to arms, and, this liberty won, the first use she made of it was to arm her sons for civil war, lacerating herself. Illegitimate violence provoked nameless excesses, and if it enabled Ireland to win her national rights, it carried with it the inevitable consequence of making her lose, even by the exercise of these rights, the most precious of blessings, that is to say the unity of her sons and the rectitude of her own conscience, not to speak of sympathies abroad which, for a long time to come, these crimes deprived her.

From the excess of evil shall we see some good come, and peace emerge from war? Will a re-birth follow decadence in the heart of this nation, that in its long history, was never able to conquer, but stubbornly refused to die? Let us hope so. It is to be presumed that the revolutionary virus will some day be destroyed. Either by the irreconcilables being in time worn out, or by the crimes provoking in the terrorized population a sudden energy by which it will find the strength and means to subdue the fomentors of disorder. Let us hope it will not be too late, and

that there will remain to exhausted Ireland sufficient strength for her convalescence and uprising. Finally let us hope to see reason take the place of passion, and order, after having been sufficiently "avenged," give back to the country life and equilibrium. The day the Free State comes out of the ordeal she will still encounter difficulties. The Ulster question is not settled; finances need straightening out; national economy has been upset by the civil as by the Anglo-Irish war; anarchy reigns. Above all, Ireland has to serve her apprenticeship to self-government: difficult task at any time and in every country, more difficult still for a country but yesterday enfranchised, and but yesterday the prey of civil war. To rise from her ruins, to take up the immense work of her regeneration, Ireland has need of all her children. May they understand the necessity for order and unity, discipline and work, gaining experience by contact with realities, the practice of toleration and moderation, and, in a word, learn to live for their Motherland instead of always aspiring to die for her!

Chapter IV.

THE NEW IRELAND (1923-1926).

One tires of everything, even of civil war. During months after the Anglo-Irish war, and after the signing of the London Treaty (6th December, 1921), which created the Irish Free State, and made of this Free State a Dominion within the British Empire, civil war was ravaging the Green Isle. For more than a year Ireland tore herself in the midst of the worst violence. But even violence wears out. At last, in the middle of the year 1923, the fratricidal battle ceased. The tempest has abated, and during the calm Ireland, bleeding, troubled, uneasy, nursing her wounds, seeks her road and her life. She takes stock of the past and makes soundings of the future. Like her and with her let us study the position.

I.—THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR AND THE RESTORATION OF ORDER.

It was not without difficulty she came out of the civil war which had been, if one might say so, a struggle of passion against reason : of the passion of violence against the necessary understanding of order and government, without which no state can exist ; and of the other passion, quite noble in its principle, the aspiration for independence, against cold human wisdom, the instinct of national preservation which, being content with the possible, refuses to risk the actual good for a chimerical better. Thankless task, if it was a question of speaking reason to passion, especially to an impulsive and inflammable people ;

still more thankless to struggle against the ideal in a country of the ideal, in the name of crude reality, particularly when the ideal of complete sovereignty is that held by all the inhabitants, on one side and the other of the barricade, the difference being only on the present possibility of attaining it. But a very necessary task, for no country can live by civil war. Revolution can lead anywhere, on condition of being able to emerge again. Bayonets can be put to any use, except to sit upon. The life of the country was at stake, even the saving of this "sister island" which, had the Treaty been broken, England would have at any price, "Cromwellized" and effaced for ever off the map.

Mr. Cosgrave, President of the Free State Executive Council, and his Ministers, gave themselves with courage to this heavy task. Against Mr. de Valera and the irregulars who refused to accept the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and took up arms for an independent Republic, they were compelled to make use of severe measures. They instituted courts-martial, which imposed severe penalties, and passed many death sentences. They interned more than 12,000 Republicans who had been taken prisoners during hostilities, of whom they only released those—and they were a small number—who gave an undertaking not to "serve" against the lawful authorities. And when, the revolutionary ferment becoming exhausted, Mr. de Valera asked to negotiate, refused any conditions save a general surrender of arms and submission to the law. Finally, the 1st of June, 1923, Mr. de Valera in a proclamation full of proud acrimony, ordered those who remained his partisans to cease fire; he was shortly afterwards taken prisoner and interned: but he was spared a court-martial, which could do no other than condemn him to death as ringleader of the rebellion. The Free State Government was

victorious over the Republicans. Officially the civil war was ended.

But disorder had not ended. Anarchy survived. Under the mask of political fanaticism, ordinary crime broke out: murders and outrages, arsons, raids and armed robberies. In the south, agrarian war was rife, the carrying off of cattle and seizing of farms. Everywhere, to a certain extent, there were refusals to pay taxes; in November, 1924, there were ten thousand income tax defaulters, the situation being worse for local rates; either for want of funds, or to trick the Government, certain local councils ceased functioning. Strikes succeeded one another, violent, instigated by Bolshevists or the agitator Larkin, who, having barely landed from America, tried to foment revolution in the Trade Unions; manufacturers closed their doors, and the ports emptied. If Ireland's economic regime has been able for nearly ten years to bear the terrible ordeal of the revolution, the war against England, and the civil war, Ireland owes it to the sole fact of being essentially an agricultural country.

Besides, the irregulars did not acknowledge defeat, and did not recognise the established authority; between two "coups," apparently they were peaceful citizens, having their arms and munitions hidden in secret depots. In March, 1924, near Cork, dressed in stolen uniforms, they attacked with machine guns a detachment of English soldiers on leave, killing one and wounding twenty: their fixed idea being to provoke a rupture between the Free State and England. The Irish police were particularly exposed to their attacks, as also members of the legislature or of the Government, of whom many were attacked and their houses destroyed. There was not a town or village without some ruins. From the depths of society all the primitive and savage passions came to the surface, while, like a seismic shock the civil and

foreign wars had thrown down the stability of social order.

Far more serious than the material damage was the demoralisation—offspring of great upheavals. Minds disturbed, deterioration of character, astonished and caused uneasiness; a sign of the times, in literature, was the morbid and putrid art of a James Joyce, which recalled the worst follies or *sanies* of the Russians. . . .

Against this anarchy in which Ireland was in danger of foundering, the Government, supported by the representatives of the nation, patiently struggled, courageously repressing it without fear. Already in the place of the old constabulary, a military force in the service of the English, they had instituted a national police force, armed only with the baton of peace, and distributed in 800 stations, which quickly secured public confidence. In place of martial law, it passed a severe law for public safety, which gave power to intern dangerous individuals for six months preliminary inculpation, and authorised courts, to award the " cat " in addition to the normal penalties, to those found guilty of armed robbery or wilful arson. Its material and moral authority increased rapidly. In November, 1923, 3,000 internees started a hunger strike, in prisons and concentration camps, in the hope of securing a general amnesty; but by now the Government was sufficiently strong to refuse to have its hand forced, supported besides by the clergy who deprived the strikers of the sacraments owing to the immorality of their cause, and also helped by the fact that Mr. de Valera, after having given or permitted to be given, the order to strike, was dispensed from giving the example personally: releasing was done in small batches at a time, by selection, as the re-establishment of order proceeded.

Towards the end of 1924, order was sufficiently restored to allow of rigours being relaxed. Then the

remainder of the internees were set free, with the exception of those condemned for crimes against common law and those accused of drilling unlawfully; a general amnesty was proclaimed for all political activities of the irregulars during the war from the 6th of December, 1921, to the 12th of May, 1923; thereafter the period of severity was the gesture of clemency intended to pacify opinion. And now the Government, with greater freedom of mind, can set about completing the work of organising the Free State.

II.—THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FREE STATE.

The Government had begun this task from the moment of the signing of the Treaty, and continued it during the civil war in the midst of unheard of difficulties, during the tragic times when no Irishman knew in the morning what would have befallen him, or his city or his country by the evening. From the beginning of 1922 nothing remained of the old order of things, of the English establishment in Ireland, its state, its forces, or its power; all had to be made anew. In the City Hall in Dublin, there were eight young men of the Provisional Government, courageous and upright, gifted with as much inexperience as good intentions, working to lay the foundations of the new State on the ruins of the old, while the crowds shouted under their windows. It was a miracle to see order rising gradually out of disorder, and the Free State emerging from chaos.

To begin with, a constitution had been voted and promulgated. Conceived entirely in a spirit of democratic liberty, it laid down in principle that all authority in Ireland be derived from the people of Ireland—after 700 years the English had to admit as much—that the Free State is a co-equal member of the Community of Nations forming the British

Commonwealth of Nations. It proclaimed civil and religious liberty, liberty of opinion, of assembly and association. The Irish language was declared to be the national language, English being also recognised as an official language. The Dáil or Chamber of Deputies is composed of members elected on the principles of proportional representation, of one member for every 30,000 of the population, every adult citizen, without distinction of sex, being an elector and eligible who is not placed under disability or incapacity by the Constitution. The Senate (Seanad) is composed of sixty members, "citizens who shall be proposed on the grounds that they have done honour to the Nation, by reason of useful public service, or that, because of special qualifications or attainments, they represent important aspects of the Nation's life," to be elected by citizens who have reached the age of thirty years on the Parliamentary roll.[1] Senators and Deputies are to take an oath of allegiance as set down in the Treaty of the 6th December, 1921.[2] Popular initiative and *referendum* function almost the same as in Switzerland. The Executive Council, the President being nominated by the Dáil, in its turn nominates the other Ministers from amongst the members of the Dáil and Senate; extra-parliamentary members can be nominated by the Dáil for the technical Departments; all being responsible to the Dáil. Finally, as in the other Dominions, the supreme executive authority is—fictively—vested in the representative of the Crown,

[1] The Constitutional provisions of the Dáil and Senate appear to be insufficiently precise, and eventually may give rise to friction. Mr. Cosgrave had a motion passed in the Dáil which, in practice, suppressed divorce in Ireland; the Senate, on the contrary, upheld divorce: some day a conflict may arise on this subject in the two Houses, and the Constitution has not made provision for a means of solving it.

[2] See p. 89.

who promulgates the laws according to the constitutional practice in use in Canada.

Thus, since the 6th of December, 1922, the Free State (Saorstát) proceeding from a provisional law is officially established, with Mr. Cosgrave as President of the Council, and Mr. Healy, a proved Irish Nationalist, as representative of the Crown ; Parliament and Government have entered into office. Add that in the month of September, 1923, public opinion confirmed the results of the General Elections of 1922, sanctioned the new order and gave a big majority, with a new authority to Mr. Cosgrave's Government.

Thus constituted, the Free State was organized. The central administration simplified, was concentrated in nine ministries in the place of some fifty Departments, boards or offices, as expensive as irresponsible, which emanated more or less from the "Castle" under the old *régime*. Local administration was also simplified, only County Councils, Town Councils, and Urban District Councils being retained, the Poor Law Unions, Workhouses, and the Boards of Guardians being suppressed, all the old rural edifices, of Queen Victoria ; and if, owing to the revolution many difficulties subsist, insolvency, fraud, or corruption, the way is at least open to more regular and economic functioning of local life. The administration of Justice is according to the recommendations of an Enquiry presided over by a former Lord Chancellor, Lord Glenavy, decentralized and democratized. In education, efforts are made to put schools of all grades in harmony with the National spirit ; teaching of Gaelic is made obligatory everywhere, in Dublin the Catholic National University is developed in the face of the Protestant or neutral Trinity College. The agrarian crisis has existed in Ireland at all times : land purchase for the occupiers, already fairly advanced before the war, is resumed on

a new basis and brought to completion, while jacquerie is suppressed by flying columns.

In the economic order the Government seeks to develop industry and check unemployment; it reorganizes the railways, promotes schemes for housing, and for perfecting the country's hydraulic and electric machinery; and resists the popular demand which asks for a stiff tariff as a means to restoring industry; it proceeds ably by way of experiments, and votes a *régime* of "selective" protection to help this or that branch of production, according to recognised needs.

The two most difficult questions have been the military and financial questions.

The first almost caused the fall of the Government. There was in question the demobilising of the National Army from 55,000 men which it numbered during the war, to 19,000. This was the occasion for a group of extremist officers to attempt a *pronunciamiento* which was suppressed by General Mulcahy, Minister of Defence, but which caused a political crisis: a Minister, Mr. MacGrath, broke away from his colleagues as a protest against the bad administration of the army, while General Mulcahy resigned, repudiated by the Government which, forced to manœuvre, gave some satisfaction to the mutineers by immediately changing the entire personnel of the Headquarters Staff, and came out of a bad and confused situation rather weakened. Besides it was not an easy thing to make a regular institution of an army, which by its origin and construction, was less of a constitutional force than a survival of the revolution; one dare not assert that the new organization suited the circumstances and actual needs of Ireland.

As for the financial situation, in what European country does it not hold the first place in the cares of the statesman? Immense ruins, colossal expenses of the war, and of the aftermath—fifty million pounds indemnity to pay for personal or material damages;

big arrears in the collection of rates, without mentioning unemployment, and economic depression, all seemed to indicate the bankruptcy in the near future of the Free State, at which the Republicans rejoiced in advance. Yet the Government succeeded in extricating themselves from this difficult situation. While managing to gather in the unpaid taxes, it issued, at the end of 1923, with a success that was of good augury, a first loan of ten million pounds, which strengthened the position of the Free State by interesting large numbers of subscribers in its stability, and which restored Irish credit at home as well as abroad; it also issued, in imitation of what England did during the war, Saving Certificates, of which to-day there are several million pounds worth in circulation, thanks to the splendid propaganda of Thrift undertaken by a private committee directed by an eminent servant of his country, Mr. T. P. Gill, with the co-operation of a certain number of disinterested men of all classes and opinions.

If the first Budgets of 1922-23 and 1923-24 showed a big deficit, the next was already much better, and in 1925 and 1926 it proved possible to reduce the income tax, the rate being lowered to the English rate, and certain indirect duties. The extraordinary put aside—and covered by the loan—the ordinary Budget of 1926-27 balanced itself to about £500,000, which was sufficiently satisfactory considering there remained some economies to be made in expenditure; less, it is true, than the lively Press campaign would lead one to believe, which attacked the so-called Governmental extravagance—and, considering on the other hand, that the public debt is very small; England in effect renounced imposing on the Free State any participation whatever to the British debt, which was but just, for in the course of the nineteenth century, and up to 1920, Ireland paid far more than her proportionate share of the charges of the United

Kingdom. The financial future of the Free State did not appear unfavourable.[3]

On the whole it is a considerable work of reconstruction, which the first Government of the Free State realised in three or four years, with as much energy as perseverance, and with a very clear judgment of realities and national necessities. More sensible and positive than original, the work will continue, although all of it cannot be praised, and faults have been made. The men who took charge of the country in the course of the terrible drama, were not supermen; being quite young they had had no preparation for a task as thankless as it was fruitful, they had everything to learn, and had to become smiths through working in the smithy. With them civic courage equalled patriotic faith. Sprung from the revolution, they had the merit of bringing moderation into their policy. Duty never found them afraid; they always bravely bore their responsibility to the full, and they gained an authority in the country to which nothing in their past had contributed. They served their country well.

The fact remains, thanks to them and the wisdom of the people who followed them, Ireland to-day is re-born. She has won the right to self-government,

[3] Is Ireland likely to live economically? Just as much, we believe, as Denmark, which, with a population nearly the same, is not less taxed, or Norway, less populated and much more heavily taxed; two countries which are not more favoured in natural resources than Ireland. The trade balance shows an annual deficit from 18 to 20 million pounds; but this deficit is made up mostly by invisible exports, incomes from capital invested outside, remittances of emigrants and tourists, etc., so that the net loss on the balance of exterior payments should not exceed from five to seven millions sterling annually. The black spot is emigration; emigration of the poor, who go to seek their fortune in towns, that is to say in America; the well-off, whom dear living impels to live elsewhere; capital which does not dare embark in enterprise in a country where, it is said, nothing succeeds. This triple emigration may cease if Ireland recovers economically by greater agricultural production, and development of her industries; at bottom, it is a question of will, of education and of national confidence.

and takes her place amongst the nations. Left to her own resources during and after the revolution, she has been able to recover and rise from her material and moral ruins, by her own methods, without help from outside, by an act of conscious and courageous will, which is really her first act as a free people.

III.—PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS AND THE PUBLIC MIND.

Thus, the forces of the law finished by overcoming those of disorder. The toxines have been re-absorbed by the red corpuscles. The fit of nerves has come to an end; convalescence continues. What has been the effect of the crisis on Ireland, and in what sort of moral state does she emerge from the ordeal?

She is still Ireland, but how changed! She used to be emotional and excitable, changeable and passionate, "mercurial"; the attack over, behold her, depressed, weary, and exhausted. This languor was already known to her after the insurrection of 1798, and the Act of Union; after the great famine, and the rising of 1848, when she seemed to be a "corpse on a dissecting table": "Everyone was still as galleys on a calm sea," said Sheil; "the Nation's pulse seemed to have stopped, and the country paralysed to the heart." Reaction is violent after action amongst these Celts who more than anyone are "nervous machines," according to the saying of Napoleon. Everything was dull, one retired within oneself, and from the bottom of the heart arose an indescribable bitterness and disgust of one's self and of everything; nerves relaxed, but hearts remained hard and unfeeling, having been too rudely shaken. The need of calm dominated; there is a desire for peace and order, the rest will follow.

She was an idealist, a dreamer, full of piety, rich

in mysticism and poetry; was not the philosopher Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, one of her sons, author of *The Principles of Knowledge,* and the *Dialogues of Hylas and Philonoüs,* for whom the outside world did not exist? And now for a time she has become a realist and pessimist, even cynical. True she has kept her Faith, yet perhaps not all her old religious fervour, and in any case her Church, which mixed itself too much in the political struggles and in these struggles was somewhat divided, has lost its civil influence in the country. Her literature, full of symbolism and spirituality has made famous the world over such names as Yeats, George Russell, Douglas Hyde, Standish O'Grady, and many others; to-day, complete paradoxical reversal, it is in the infernal circle of the most violent realism that, with their stupid virtuosity of style and analysis, James Joyce and Sean O'Casey, to name only two of those at present in the public eye, would lead her. Great social upheavals are not conducive to interior life; the hurricane has dried up the Irish soul and degraded the spiritual riches of the past: Gaelic culture is declining. Momentary recoil, temporary break, for the Island of Saints and Scholars cannot find life in materialism, and never will the Gaels be able to give of their best but by rising towards the eternal ideal.

Ten years before, she gave herself enthusiastically to high hopes and great thoughts. Deception came, and with it scepticism. Discouragement and disillusion—where are they not found to-day?—hurt her all the more because she had so long pined for liberty, which was to bring her the golden age. Liberty has come, almost complete, but not happiness. Before, how beautiful it seemed to her! And now she thinks: it is only this? An Irish writer applied to this state of soul one of Ibsen's sayings: "He who possesses freedom otherwise than as a fervent desire, possesses it dead without a soul." For it is not a goal but a

means, not an end but a beginning. Many say, as it is said elsewhere as well : " We have lost peace." And others : "We were better off under the English."

And then reaction after violence brings with cold reflection, horror for so much misery and crime, a certain uneasiness of conscience. Who knows ? Read this play by Sean O'Casey, and played in Dublin almost without protest on the part of the public, *The Plough and the Stars,* in which the rebellion of 1916, seen from its lowest aspects, its grotesque wretchedness and revolting realities, without a trace of nobleness, appears to be made only for ridicule and contempt. What good was the revolution ? Oh ! the vanished dreams, the hopelessness of things ! Oh ! the soul of Pearse—leader of the insurgents and son of an Englishman—who in his inflamed verses had expressed so beautiful an ideal !

All others were but the effects of the ordeal on political mentality and in the public order.

Under this aspect of her national life, Ireland was suffering both from a decay in development and a want of education, which must be attributed much less to her supposed ethnical incapacity than to the long survival of foreign domination. Missing the sense of the real, she resorted to oratorical agitation, to that sonorous and hollow verbiage which, in every country, second-rate politicians affect, and which, over there they call *raimeis*. Too much prejudice and levity ; too little public spirit ; too much passion and too little moderation : too much faction and dissension and too little discipline : individualistic and critical, she lacked the respect for order and authority—the case is not isolated—as in her history there was wanting the strong mark of the Roman law. The Trial, that great school of correction and improvement, has marked her now at least in the healthiest part of her being. That in circumstances so tragic order should have been re-established, and the new State created

and made to function is already proof of an inward reform. The great majority appreciated and sustained the courage and work of the Government. The *raimeis* has ceased to take as formerly, and pure politics are less in favour than " economics." The Irish have seen too much anarchy and civil war, they have suffered too much from it to doubt any longer the necessity of submitting to civil rule, to the discipline that not only constitutes the strength of armies, but that of States.

The lesson was dearly bought, but it has been effective. Here is a little instance in proof. Certain local authorities, town or county councils, incompetent or corrupt, or simply won over by the Republicans and their propaganda of anarchy, having put out of gear the administration for which they were responsible, the Government was authorized by law to send " Commissioners " with power to manage for a time the interests held up. Wherever they worked, Dublin, Cork, Co. Kerry, these temporary Commissioners were favourably received. Like the executive power, public opinion seemed to have understood the necessity of giving to popular self-government a control or counterbalance representing law and superior interest, and of allying—difficult problem—the spirit of discipline and order to that democratic spirit which is one of the fundamental traits of the race.

Likewise, the cruel experience did not fail to inspire the Irish with a certain sense of reality and moderation in public affairs : seeing things as they are, knowing how to adapt themselves to them until such time as it might be possible to change them, enduring what you cannot help, even if it happens to be your neighbour's opinion—what an apprenticeship ! At the end of 1925 the Dublin Government, in this new spirit, and after many hesitations and difficulties, resolved to conclude with the Belfast Government an understanding in which it was agreed that the Borders between

the Free State and Ulster should remain for the present as they are, and that the two Governments would act directly together in future for the settling of matters of common interest (further on we shall come back to the question) between the inevitable war against Ulster and against England, and a dolorous *statu quo,* but one which held out the hope of ultimate unity, Mr. Cosgrave had the wisdom to make the choice which was the most politic, in the best sense of the word, and public opinion had the wisdom to approve it, notwithstanding present sacrifice, in view of the future good. It was considered that by goodwill and good example Ulstermen should be drawn gradually into the orbit of National Ireland, as was always done with regard to the Protestants scattered in the south. For, religious or social intolerance never flourished in Catholic Ireland which, from Grattan to Parnell, often made choice of Protestants as leaders. It is sufficiently remarkable to-day that a great number of Protestants and ex-Unionists—too great a number according to some—were called to the Senate, which is presided over by one of them, the Government believing in giving them a wide scope in the State, content to be able to lean on them and interest them in the destinies of the Saorstát.

As to public feeling with regard to England, being so complex it would require a long analysis. Nothing is forgotten, nothing of the past forgiven, neither the seven centuries of persecution, nor the uninterrupted exploitation of Ireland by England during 200 years, nor the successive rejections of Home Rule, nor the war of 1919-1921, with the atrocities of the Black and Tans. But if the stigmata of oppression are still extant, and even if to-day Ireland finds herself *invita pars Imperii,* the fact is that the English rulers from the top to the bottom of the scale have left the country, and there remains neither a British policeman nor a British Tommy on the National soil. *Bien*

entendu, there is the provisional situation in the Six Counties, but has been dealt with, for the time being, by the arrangement above referred to with the Belfast Government, with its mental reservations on both sides. Under the heading " Anti-Britishism," which never included the English people, but only English domination and laws, and the agents of England in Ireland, this feeling without losing in depth has lessened and become wiser, the more so as it is no longer daily exasperated by the Celtophobe manifestations of the old die-hards of Unionism ; it tends to shape according to the attitude more or less correct and loyal which England will take in the application of the Treaty of 1921 : less passionate, it, too, seems to have become more realist.

IV.—THE DIFFERENT PARTIES AND THEIR POLICY.

All these psychological reactions which have marked Nationalist Ireland on the whole, have notwithstanding left the intransigent Republicans impassive, at least what remains of them, for if at the elections, in September, 1923, the Republicans again had a majority in 44 divisions out of 153, it was thanks to proportional representation, and especially to the fact that their renunciation of armed strife had made the electors believe they had decided on a constitutional policy : in reality their influence in the country has greatly diminished, and their place in public life tends to lessen day by day.

These had learnt nothing, understood nothing, and felt nothing. The worst trial—the civil war—it is to them their country owes it, who did all in their power to bring about her downfall ; having no remorse they seem to have no conscience, and appear to have no concern as to the terrible responsibility they have incurred before the moral law as well as the social law. If they ceased fire in 1923, it was under pressure of

force, without regret or clear statement, and without giving up their arms. They lived as in a sealed enclosure, with their fixed idea of absolute independence for the whole of Ireland—an impossibility at the present—with their pretentions and delusions, as with their hatred of England ; relations and circumstances, the state of minds, the material situation, means and obstacles, all the first elements of the art of the statesman, escape them.

Twice a majority pronounced in favour of the Treaty and the Free State ; they refused to acknowledge the validity of the verdict, and denied to the people the power of withdrawing the right of sovereignty, a usufructuary not being free to dispose of the reversionary interest in his inheritance. Their ideal being the highest, they have the right to impose it, even by force. Besides, is not one vote for the Republic worth more than a thousand votes against it ? In their eyes, the Free State with its institutions does not exist ; the Republic alone exists. Their members, therefore, refused to take the oath of allegiance and take their seats in the Dáil ; they would themselves constitute a pseudo-Dáil. They have a so-called President of the Republic of Ireland, recently Mr. de Valera, but it is believed it is now Mr. Art O'Connor. Thus they play outside of the world of realities, on a stage constructed by their imagination in a fourth dimension ignored by the living. They had no practical plan : words or violence, going from childishness to folly through *raimeis* and sophistry. In truth to realise actually their objective of Irish Unity in an independent Republic no less than war on three fronts would be needed, against England, against Ulster, and against the Free State.

Add that amongst themselves they were irremediably divided. The " militarists," the youths, impatient of the bondage of "politics" incite to blows ; if it often happens that clandestine depots of arms are dis-

covered, it was said, it was owing to the information of moderate extremists, if one may thus speak, being anxious to take the means of violence from the hands of the more violent. Mr. de Valera, the purest of the pure, found some purer than he, who drove him from the ranks of Sinn Fein—he had to create a new organisation, called Fianna Fáil—Miss MacSwiney to-day covers him with insults, having yesterday covered him with flowers, and with all the force of her hysterical declamations, proclaims the holy war ; Mr. Art O'Connor undertakes to demand back from England a good two thousand million pounds sterling as indemnity for National and moral damages done by her in Ireland.

But people like these can no longer be taken seriously. America, which formerly subsidised the extremists, has abandoned them. If, in Ireland, as elsewhere, there is always an electoral patronage for the more violent, the great public looks on their game with resigned and familiar irony, but also with some irritation ; it is annoyed that they should vainly agitate for an " impossiblism " which is of no help in solving present difficulties, and should discredit by their hooliganism and eccentricities, as they did lately by their criminal excesses, an ideal of independence and unity which remains, for the future, that of all Irishmen. Because this ideal is in all hearts, they are shown indulgence, they are even given votes at the elections : But for the love of God ! let them allow the country to recover in peace her strength and her very existence !

Outside of the Republican members, who are conspicuous by their absence, the actual Dáil contains, instead of the two big standard parties, a number of little groups, who hold in common the acceptance of the Treaty and the support of the Free State institutions ; the Government Party leaning on the political organization, *Cumann na nGaedheal,* which, at the

1926 General Elections, returned 63 deputies; the agrarian or Farmers' Party increased with 15 members, the Labour Party with losses have also 15 members, an active group under the direction of a capable leader, Mr. Johnson; finally, the Independents, numbering 16. In 1924, from the Government Party seceded the little MacGrath group, dissolved now, and in 1926 the minor "People's Party," which, under the ægis of Professor Magennis and Colonel Moore, appeared to be trying to make a bridge between the Constitutionals and the Republicans. And now the old Unionists would create a Conservative or "Centre" Party, while Captain Redmond tried to resurrect the old Irish Nationalist Party which extremism had so easily swept away in 1918.

So it is in Ireland, as in many other countries, a reign of groups, with all the evils attached to it; the narrowness of individual view-points and set prejudices, personal struggles, instead of struggles of ideas, party spirit supplanting the National spirit, the powerlessness of Parliament giving rise to the country's irritation and lack of confidence, all of which we suffer so cruelly in France, and which brought Italy to Fascism.

In the midst of all these groups, the Government never failed to have a majority, even a big majority each time it took a strong stand: in December, 1925, at the time of the vote of agreement with Belfast, there were not 20 votes against it. Besides the Senate does not give it any difficulty: this higher Chamber, where a Pleiade of men,[4] not so representative and experienced as public opinion had expected to find them, have so far played but a dull role. This does not prevent the Government from being made, inside

[4] Or of women, for there are women Senators, such as Mrs. John Richard Green, widow of the illustrious historian, and a historian of great talent herself. The question of reform of the method of electing Senators is an order of the day.

and out of Parliament, the object of lively and abusive criticisms. Everyone admits it to be composed of honest, courageous and disinterested men : President Cosgrave, a fervent Catholic, has experience, character and authority : Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, Minister of Justice, although rather too British according to some, has as much capacity as knowledge, and, it is said, ambition. They and their colleagues have shown themselves capable of rising to the occasion at a time of crisis. But in daily current of life, if they are firm and sensible, they are reproached with being curt and dull, and that cannot be forgiven. Ireland is tired of them ! . . . . They have been unable to win hearts. They are followed from a sense of duty, and because there is no one else to put in their place—and it is quite possible that after the next elections they may have to withdraw.

The future, we believe, will say that Ireland was fortunate, when all was crumbling to find these men ; their work when they are gone will speak for them.

" Variable and cloudy sky, some local storms, visibility low, fairly cold " : in these meteorological terms a cautious critic,[5] described the Irish political atmosphere latterly. In starting her political life, free Ireland had to provide against many trials. It is easier to create democratic institutions than it is to make them function. Few nations have succeeded at it, and even these discovered sooner or later signs of usury and clutching in the machinery, while others give up the task after unhappy trials. Aggravated by the war, the crisis of parliamentarianism was universal. Will Ireland, a newcomer in the career, come through the test with honour ? Will she turn the experience of other countries to her profit ?

She has some advantages : the democratic instinct which is innate in her nature ; a social body in which

[5] Mr. George Russell, in literature A. E.

predominates the conservatism of the peasant proprietor ; a small territory and a limited population ; no outside issues ; finally, as she has but lately started in public life, none of these fatal traditions, inveterate, ineradicable, of abuse and corruption, which deprave men and irremediably infect the *régime*.

But she lacks political education : electors and elected, governing men, all have to learn their lesson, and public opinion has still largely to be formed. She lacks men of experience and culture to guide her, or rather she has discarded many, in the new order of things. Whether she willed it or not : it is necessary she should attract them, seek them, whether in the old Parliamentary Party or amongst the landlords, business men, or former high officials. At the next elections, probably the Republicans will only secure election if they undertake to accept the constitution, and take their seats in the Dáil : it is desirable that their entry on the field should be the occasion for a regrouping of the political forces which are dispersed, and to-day still amorphous. It is to be hoped that Ireland will renounce the discredited *régime* of groups and succeed in organizing in the face of a real Government Party, a veritable opposition, strong and united, supported by definite principles, possessing a programme not only critical but constructive, and a body of doctrine, with an ideal of its own, both of culture and of economic and social organization. Let us hope she may succeed in solving this grave problem, one of the most difficult at the present time, and on which perhaps depends the fate of our European civilizations : how to make parliamentarianism and democracy live and co-operate usefully, and make a Government emerge which governs for the good of the country.

V.—THE ULSTER QUESTION AND THE 1925 AGREEMENT WITH HER.

In the life of Erin there is an acute difficulty which takes precedence of all others : the question of Irish unity, for the fact is that the "Irish Free State" does not comprise the whole of Ireland, for by its side there is "Northern Ireland," that is to say, the North-East corner of the island, a small state composed of six counties (out of nine) of the ancient Province of Ulster, which while enjoying a certain autonomy, remains part of Great Britain (thanks to which the old United Kingdom, preserving little more than its ancient name may still be called officially the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

We have said[6] how the Orange Party, enemies of Irish Nationalism, urged by British imperialists, agitated incessantly, and succeeded in 1893, 1914, and again in 1916 and 1917 in frustrating the cause of Home Rule, which would have placed them under the authority of a Nationalist Parliament in Dublin. They have always shamelessly oppressed the Catholic minority in Ulster ; the Orange Terror, to-day rather quiet, raged with a terrible violence from 1918 to 1924, during the Anglo-Irish war and the civil war which followed.[7] Finally we know that[8] on the initiative of Mr. Lloyd George, and by an English law of 1920, the North of Ireland, comprising the counties of Antrim, Down, Derry, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh, the two latter having a Catholic and Nationalist majority—about one million and a quarter inhabitants out of four and a quarter—saw itself constituted as a separate state, with a Government and Parliament subordinate to the Government and Parliament of London ; and although the Unionist

[6] See p. 6. [7] See above pages. [8] See above pages.

members of Ulster did not want to pass this law, against which the Nationalists of the North as those of the South, for their part protested with the greatest energy, the new statute came into being, and on reflection was accepted by the Orange forces who believed they found in it a pledge and a weapon against Nationalist Ireland : thus by her own authority, and only by it, England claimed to cut Ireland in two, Albion with a gesture tore the historical unity of Ireland.

This foreign law Nationalist Ireland could not recognise ; this rending, this " dividing of the indivisible," which she even hated to think of. In her eyes, Ulster is not a nation apart, it has neither a homogeneous population nor a history of its own, nor separate interests ; the most violent Orangemen are Irish by adoption, tied for better or for worse by a a thousand traditions and characteristic traits to the Irish from which only a half-political, and half-religious antagonism artificially provoked and maintained by the English, separates them ; in truth, there is only one Ireland, one Irish Nation.

When after two years of Anglo-Irish war, the truce signed (July, 1921), negotiations started between Dublin and London, in which the Northern Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, refused to participate, the Irish spokesmen succeeded in having it admitted that they spoke in the name of the whole of Ireland. As a matter of fact, it was the whole of Ireland which, according to the words of the first articles of the Treaty of the 6th of December, 1921, was given the status of Dominion, and was made a Free State. But this satisfaction in theory was destroyed by a subsequent article in which it was laid down that Northern Ireland would have the option of remaining outside of the Free State, if she wished to do so, by an address presented to the King if voted in the Belfast Parliament before six months, with the express reservation

that in this case, it would be preceded by a special commission of inquiry, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants, for a new fixing of the boundary between the two States. When the time arrived, the Belfast Government hastened to declare "forfeit," meaning to address to the King the declaration assuring to the six counties their exclusion from the Free State. Between the two Irelands, the legal and arbitrary separation of 1920, far from being abolished, was thus confirmed. Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, with its special statute, and sees its independence sanctioned with regard to Southern Ireland. Orangeism triumphed. And not content with this first success, it would add a second, the revision of the boundary which prescribed to the Northern State the same article of the Treaty giving it the right to secede, she proclaimed she would oppose it by every means, and that she would preserve above and against all the Six Counties with their present limits which was set down in the law of 1920.[9] Sir James Craig repeated often enough, "we will neither give one man nor yield an inch of territory."

To Nationalist Ireland it was a hard and fierce blow. The rebellion had been fought in the name of Irish independence—now the Free State remains attached to the Crown by the imperial ties in the name of Unity—now in place of a re-established unity it is a completed rupture with the six counties of the North-East. The bonds being all the tighter, by the Government of the North relying on its *non-possumus,* by a strengthening of the persecution of the Ulster Catholics notably in Belfast, and in Tyrone and Fermanagh, the two counties with a Nationalist majority; the "papists" being hunted from their homes to make way for Protestants, almost deprived of their electoral rights by a cunning re-organization of districts, and without means of defence given over

[9] See p. 90.

to the excesses of a veritable army of police called Specials, for whose up-keep England pays. Could the Nationalists of the South abandon to their fate their brothers of the North? Is it not their duty to defend them against the Orange Terror? While the Orange Party take advantage of the misdeeds of a few Republican bands, try to make believe they were threatened with a southern invasion, pose as victims, and call England with her soldiers and her money to her aid.

What is to be done? The Free State is up against the London Government as well as that of Belfast; at home, it has the Republicans against it who accuse Mr. Cosgrave and his Ministers of having betrayed the country. Time passes in useless discussions. To put an end to it, in July, 1924, Mr. Cosgrave compelled the British Prime Minister—at that time Mr. MacDonald—to provide for the fulfilment of Article XII. of the Treaty, which prescribes that a Commission be set up consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Free State Government, one by the Government of Northern Ireland, and one who shall be Chairman to be appointed by the British Government, to determine the boundaries between North and South. As it was foreseen, Northern Ireland refused to appoint a delegate: she would ignore the Boundary Commission, for her there is no question of fixing the boundary. The Government in London, declaring itself powerless to overcome this refusal had to pass a law authorising it to nominate an Ulster member of the Commission; it met finally, and spent a year studying the matter and gleaning information on the spot as to the wishes of the inhabitants. To bring pressure on it, a lively campaign was started in the Press by the Orangemen and their English supporters, the Conservatives, with the result, that, from all parts, one saw coming to light secret papers, letters or documents, tending to prove, that,

in the course of the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations in 1921, Northern Ireland received from London a formal promise to safeguard its boundaries, according to which Mr. Lloyd George would have given at this period contradictory assurances to both Belfast and Dublin. Once again, Nationalist Ireland was right in believing she was deceived by British bad faith.

. . . .

But the year 1925 ended dramatically. It was suddenly made known that Professor MacNeill, Free State delegate to the Commission, had resigned, that the Commission could not agree, and that a tripartite agreement was signed the 3rd December: by this agreement, the Governments of the Free State and Northern Ireland agreed to leave as they are the boundaries of 1920 until further orders, and promised to confer between them, whenever the necessity should arise, with a view to solving problems of common interest; the Government in London on its side in recognition of the spirit of conciliation shown by the Southern Irish, liberated the Free State of its part in discharging British debts, imposed by the Treaty of 1921. The three Parliaments, shortly after, with large majorities ratified this understanding, which the *Times* compared, not without some reason, *mutatis mutandis,* to the Locarno agreements.

The Irish Locarno could not fail to disappoint public opinion in Nationalist Ireland, and to be attacked, although with much less reason than the real, the other Locarno was assailed in France. It was mostly by the Republicans, the irreconcilables, who were not backward in covering with insults, the rulers of the Free State, without, however, offering a valid alternative policy. They had, it is true, proposed offering a large measure of autonomy to the Six Counties under the supremacy of a National Parliament, but Mr. Cosgrave, after Mr. Griffith his predecessor and Mr. Collins, had done the same without meeting with

success. They suggested putting pressure on the Protestants of the North by " crushing " those of the South—without pointing out in what manner—which would have provoked reprisals in the North against the Catholics. They finally spoke of annexation by force : as if it was not known that in such a case England would at once come to the support of Ulster.

There is no doubt that a policy of violence by the South against the North would have been both criminal and powerless ; materially and morally, it was impossible to make the Orangeists come into Nationalist Ireland against their will. The only issue, therefore, was a policy of conciliation. To prepare the way to unity, and to better the condition of the Catholics of Ulster, there was but one policy possible, an agreement, the same which inspired the tripartite agreement, which was not, as it was said, the death sentence of Irish Unity, but the best means to revive it. Let the Free State now give the example of a spirit of equity and good-will to Ulstermen, also an example of political stability, of social order, financial regularity, and finally succeed in showing what can be done by Ireland prosperous in her affairs, contented in peace, and so prove by facts to the Irish of the North that they have nothing to fear but can trust their compatriots of the South : time, we believe will do the rest.

Time, common interests, without mentioning historical association and culture. First of all, economic interest. Differing from Southern Ireland, which is principally agricultural, the Six Counties being more urban ; their two principal towns, Belfast and Derry, at this very time, badly stricken by the industrial crisis, lack a *hinterland*, which they can only find beyond the Border, or beyond the Customs barrier drawn across by the Free State which threatens to stifle the North-East. Then financial interest. It is

inevitable that a very small state ruled according to English ideas, that is to say expensively, encumbered by a fairly large annual participation in the expenses of the United Kingdom, finds it hard to make both ends meet ; so long as England opens wide her purse-strings as she does to-day, she can carry on comfortably, but the day will come when London will tire of this expense, and that day, isolated, at the end of her resources, Northern Ireland will reflect and turn to the South.

There remains the political interest. Here also matters will revolve gradually. Without doubt, Freemasonry is always powerful and keeps a solid hold of the Orange *bloc;* however, there are fissures in this *bloc*. The elections were not a success for the Government, the Nationalist members returned to the Belfast Parliament, in April, 1925, where, under the able leadership of Mr. Devlin, they are a small but serious opposition. Amongst the younger members, the idea of an amicable divorce from Great Britain makes headway, giving some truth to the phrase : scratch the Ulsterite and you will find the separatist, the descendant of Wolfe Tone and John Mitchel. The Labour men, advanced radicals, show a certain hostility to the Conservative leaders ; formerly one had seen Sir James Craig booed in Shankill Road, Belfast. "Leave things as they are," observed the illustrious author G. B. Shaw, "and the business men of the North will soon be pushed into the arms of those of the South by the Labour men : they will prefer a Parliament in Dublin to the Soviets in Belfast."

How, and how far will the evolution be made, is the secret of the future. Let us be content to testify that a new spirit of appeasement seems to be rising up in Ulster, after the critical years, as in the south ; extremism and fanaticism are dwindling. Inflamed minds tend to calm down. The special police have

disappeared. There is even a halt to religious strife, the Presbyterians have chosen a Dublin man for Moderator. Between the Belfast and Dublin Governments relations will become less strained; *on cause*, as diplomatists say, agreements have been come to, notably for customs on both sides of the barrier, there are efforts at penetration and collaboration in the working world as in that of commerce. The results of this policy and this new mentality can only develop slowly, but provided that England at length gives up the idea of making use of Ulster to oppress Ireland, for which she will have no further excuse, we believe that in the end the ties which draw the two Irelands together will show up stronger than the prejudices which separate them. And if, as we have the right to hope, Irish Unity is some day re-established, if some day we see the revival of the United Ireland of 1792, it will be by the beneficial effects of the slow working of conciliation and co-operation which the agreement of the 3rd of December, 1925, will have primarily and necessarily given it.

VI.—IRELAND A DOMINION.

We have seen some surprising things happen, but not more so than National Ireland should become a British Dominion! For the Free State has been, as we know, created such by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. According to Article I. of the Treaty, her constitutional status, in the Community of Nations known under the name of British Empire, is the same as that of the Dominions of Canada and New Zealand, of the Australian Commonwealth and of the Union of South Africa. According to Article II. her position with regard to the metropolis is that of the Dominion of Canada (taken as example), so that "the law, customs and constitutional practice governing the the relationship of the Crown and Imperial Parliament with the Dominion of Canada governs equally their

relationship with the Free State." Thus the measure of autonomy of Canada for the present is, and for the future will be, the same measure of autonomy of the Free State. It is known how much this autonomy of the Dominions has developed since nearly eighty years. Formerly England had only colonies overseas, possessions, managed by her agents ; the colonists, like the natives, were under the absolute authority of the Governor, whom they sometimes called, with a smile, " Mr. Metropolis." It was not until 1840, after the Durham enquiry, that the distinction of local and metropolitan affairs was outlined, or, which was soon to be designated, Imperial. Since then, the history of the big colonies has been that of a latent or patent struggle against their subordination to the British Government, of a continuous and victorious effort for an extension of their rights, once, one might believe, under the influence of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and the Imperialists of England, the Empire would become a super-State, annexing and dominating, and the Crown Colonies remaining serfs, and Dominions —the word had just been coined—becoming more or less free ; but very soon it was clear that these, jealous of their autonomy, and rejecting all ideas of tutelage, intended being treated as nothing less than associates. So that, the " Imperial Conferences," inaugurated in London in 1887, began periodically to admit their delegates to the study of Empire affairs.

That of 1917 is particularly memorable. The Empire saw itself called *Commonwealth,* or " Association of autonomous Free States," outwardly, the Empire, if one can say so, is " disimperialised," its name is almost banished from official language as suspect, for this name has something " imperious " about it which grates upon the free citizens of Melbourne and Ottawa, and breathes an "imperialism" which is distasteful to them and which the English themselves affect to excuse. At the same time, it is

admitted that the Dominions, or "autonomous nations" enjoy between them in regard to the metropolis an "equality of complete status"; beside Great Britain they take the figure and rank of equals.

From this moment the equality is complete from the point of view of home affairs, in spite of the survival of ancient forms and formulas; the development was made by the practice of precedences, like that of the English constitution without formal legislation or solemn declaration of rights; Canada and South Africa have been the most ardent contributors, besides making the other Dominions profit of their successive conquests. Outwardly, progress could not go so quick or so far. However, even there, the Great War hastened the movement. The representatives of the Dominions have signed the Treaty of Versailles, which was afterwards ratified by each of the Parliaments, and approved by the Crown for each of the Dominions. The following year, Canada has her right acknowledged to have diplomatic representatives abroad, notably in the United States, to take charge of interests exclusively concerning her. In 1923, she negotiated and concluded at Washington in her own name, with the powers conferred by the King, a fisheries agreement; thirty years before such an agreement was signed by a British plenipotentiary; ten years earlier it would have been signed concurrently by the British and Canadian plenipotentiaries, and this time the Canadian plenipotentiary signed it alone.[10] Even the right to secede has been recently claimed by certain authorised voices from overseas, and admitted by some British statesmen. The evolution is not at an end, the "Dominionism" of the future will be in short what the Dominions make it; but henceforth it can be said, that even from an international point of view, with reservation on one side of the quasi nominal

10 *A contrario,* in 1924, Canada refused to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne, because she was not represented at the negotiations.

supremacy of the Crown, and on the other the ties of blood and of interests which will influence for a long time yet their general policy, the Dominions are in sight of, and very near, independence.[11]

Of all these improvements realised, the Irish Free State benefited *ipso facto* the day it became a Dominion, as it will benefit by full right, of all which may be acquired in the future. From 1923 it has been, with the formal support of the British Government, admitted into the League of Nations: the 11th of September of that year Mr. Cosgrave, invited—exceptional honour—to make a speech to the Assembly at Geneva, in his discourse recalled to mind the Irish monk St. Columbanus, whose thirteenth centenary he had come from attending in Italy, and was happy to say, to-day, when the liberty and the new status of Ireland were acknowledged by the Nations, the prophetic words inscribed on the Saint's tomb at Bobbio: *Si tollis libertatem tollis dignitatem.* Since 1925, the Free State has a Minister at Washington entrusted to treat with the United States on matters exclusively Irish. As to the representative of the

[11] The Imperial Conference, which was held in London in October, 1926, saw efforts made to define the status of the Dominions in their relations with the Metropolis and other nations. We know the Canadian Parliament lately passed a motion claiming for Canada a complete diplomatic autonomy, and South Africa claimed on her side an "international independent status," and even considers omitting the Union Jack from its flag. Australia and New Zealand don't go so far, as a matter of fact they have need of the British fleet to defend them eventually in case of war in the Pacific; necessity generates loyalty. The Imperial Government, while apparently giving satisfaction to the desires manifested, has guarded against a formula too clearly specifying a very delicate state of affairs. Notwithstanding it was admitted that the Dominions are "equal in status and not in any way subordinate the one to the others, neither internally nor externally; united by a common loyalty to the Crown, but are freely associated in as much as they are members of the Community of British Peoples." The words United Kingdom disappeared from official language, the Sovereign taking henceforth the title of "King of England, Ireland, and the British Dominions overseas." The Governors General of the Dominions will in future be recognised as the representative of the King, and not as formerly of the British Government.

Crown in the Dominions that is the Governor-General, up to this the custom was that the Government of London made choice of some great Lord or high English dignitary: such as, at Ottawa, Lord Byng, Duke of Vimy, a General in the Great War, who, less fortunate than on the battlefield, deeply offended Canadian susceptibilities by an intervention considered, in local policy,[12] an abuse of his functions. More favoured than the Canadians, the Irish—exceptional case, and one which will not fail to be cited as a precedent by the other Dominions—have, in the person of Mr. Healy a compatriot for Governor-General; and one whose caustic raciness, when he was a Nationalist member at Westminster, with and after Parnell, had more than once caused embarrassment to the ministers of Her Britannic Majesty.[13]

It does not mean that many points of friction may be possible between London and Dublin; as there have been and there will be again between London and Ottawa. In 1926 a very small agrarian affair (Lynham-Butler case) having provoked an appeal from the party to the judicial meeting of the Privy Council at London, the Dublin Government had to pass a law annulling this right of appeal for private causes: which the English minister allowed to pass without comment.

More serious, more painful to national pride was

[12] In June, 1926, the Liberal Government having been returned with a minority in the House, its leader, Mr. Mackenzie King, according to custom, asked for a dissolution of the Governor General. This was refused, and eight days after it was granted to the Conservative leader, Mr. Meighen, whose Ministry had in its turn been defeated. Also in September, at the General Elections a strong Liberal majority was elected, as a protestation against the partiality shown by Lord Byng in the circumstances. In England it is the rule that dissolution is never refused to the Prime Minister.

[13] An example: At the time of the Boer war, and the big English defeats at the beginning, a member put a whole series of oral questions to the Government as to the effects sent to South Africa, and how many generals, officers, cannon, horses . . . . "And how many asses?" shouted Mr. Healy!

the blow struck at the Free State in 1924 by Sir Austen Chamberlain before the League of Nations. On the 11th of July, 1924, the Free State had, according to Article 18 of the pact, proceeded to register the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 at the General Secretariat at Geneva. But shortly after, a note from the Foreign Office arrived at Geneva declaring that in the opinion of the London Government, the pact would not govern the relations *inter se* of the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and consequently Article 18 of the pact (prescribing the registration of all Treaties or international agreements) was not applicable to the Treaty in question : a note intended to prevent the Free State from eventually submitting at Geneva her differences with England, and prohibiting the League of Nations, from registering the constitutive Treaty of the Free State, and that Great Britain was not justified in complaining, after having supported of her own free will, one year before, Ireland's admission to the League. Matters remain as they are, but doubtless only to revive some day, and with them the general problem of the position of the Dominions in regard to the League of Nations : is it really admissible that the British Government can have its own way in having the Dominions considered at Geneva as subordinate to it, and at the same time as independent nations in regard to other countries ? It is a question which the Dominions as well as the League of Nations as a whole, are interested in bringing to light some day.[14]

[14] Sir Austen Chamberlain's note to the League of Nations must have been officially discussed at the Imperial Conference in London in October, 1926, although official accounts did not mention it, all the Dominions feeling involved in the same way as Ireland. The question is all the more serious that at Geneva, the Free State having, with the support of South Africa and Canada, solicited a non-permanent seat at the Council. Great Britain raised her opposition to this candidature. Is it, therefore, because of the equality of members of the British Commonwealth, that the Dominions cannot enjoy the same rights as other nations at the League of Nations ?

VII.—CONCLUSION.

Is Nationalist Ireland destined to remain a "Free State" always and a British Dominion? This we may doubt. The great majority of the Nation doubtless accepted frankly the Anglo-Treaty with all resulting from it: frankly, but not definitively. The Treaty, declared Arthur Griffith, is no more final than we are the last generation of Irishmen upon earth. Ireland cherished at the bottom of her heart the ideal, the realization of which she was forced to renounce for a time, that of absolute independence, of a radical rupture with the British world; the warmest partisans of the Free State have on that point the same aspirations as the irreducible Republicans, though disassociating from them on the question—decisive also—of opportunity, and ways and means. The present state of things will continue provisionally for a time, more or less prolonged, but it will pass, a stepping-stone (the resemblance, though it excite the irony of the Extremists, does not appear to us less just), which will facilitate the last step. And we are not of those who believe it right to condemn this ideal. As Parnell said one day: "No one can set bounds to the march of a nation." Complete independence alone will permit of Ireland attaining her full development. Besides, is it not true that the reasons, political, military, or economic, which England had for opposing the disjunction of the sister island, have lost their value in the new world created by the War?

Also, rightly or wrongly, Gaelic Ireland, one of the most ancient European nations, the Island of Saints and Scholars which from the fifth to the ninth century was the refuge of culture, and saved western civilization during the barbarian invasions, cannot but suffer at seeing herself assimilated to the "new Anglo-

Saxon societies," to the young nationalities of the new continents, and to find herself whether she likes it or not an integral part of what still is the British Empire, no matter by what name you call it. Excepting in the measure where her association with the Dominions may help her to attain her full independence, the Empire—if it is no longer for her the " Empire of hell," which John Mitchel hated—does not interest her, imperialism is foreign to her, and is repugnant to her forms and traditions, even momentarily obscure, of inward life and feeling. Her geographical position, her particular psychology have put her outside the world, apart from the great currents of modern life, and she intends to remain so ; heedless of the agitations of the century, she only asks to be allowed to live in peace, and to let live.

It is, nevertheless, we believe, an illusion for her to think that a country can live isolated and indifferent to-day : independence, sovereignty, were they complete from a political point of view, as a rule are much akin from an economic point of view, to mention only this one. Doubtless she would benefit by emerging from her jealous insularity. In these times of materialism, has she not, by her traditions a religious mission to fulfil, an original concept of spiritual culture to spread ? In any case, she has in the United States, in England, Canada and Australia, and all over the world, millions of her children, whom foreign misery and oppression have hunted from her. Ireland is no longer in Ireland, she has spread over the entire earth. For the four and a half million Irish in the Green Isle, there are more than 1,800,000 who *born in Ireland,* live outside it, without speaking of the Irish descendants who emigrated in former times, and if there are, thanks be to God, amongst those exiles or sons of exiles, who in the Church, in the Press, at the Bar, honour their country of origin, there are too many others who cause her name to be neither loved nor respected : has

Ireland the right to lose interest in these children of hers who have strayed, and to be quit of maternal responsibility towards them?

To fulfil her part outside and gain final independence it is necessary—preliminary condition—that she remoulds her interior forces and her unity: necessary regeneration which we are convinced is still possible, the difficulties which Ireland will encounter in her task being no worse than those which so many European nations find in their path to-day. Mistress at home she now has all the necessary freedom to succeed: it is for her to know how to make use of it, by a severe practice of these two social virtues of order and discipline, without which freedom is but an empty and dangerous word. She has given herself the apparatus, this body a national soul! Let her free herself of fruitless political agitations, and let her not forget the hard lessons she has learnt by the experience of the war and the rebellion! And let her courageously give herself to the great work of which she undertook to lay the foundations in the course of the twenty or thirty years which preceded the war: with the Gaelic revival, it was her enfranchisement from psychological dependence of England, the reconstitution of her moral individuality by the return to the traditions and language of her past; with co-operation, self-help and technical instruction, it was a material uplifting already full of promise. To form character and opinion, to develop work and production, to reviving in Gaelic traditions the social consciousness and confidence, in one word, to regenerate the country spiritually and economically. It is a splendid task of national education which Ireland will realise, if she has the will, by interior effort; for it is only by interior effort that nations, like individuals, are moulded and progress!

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